United Nations S/2015/31

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 January 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 16 January 2015 from the Vice-Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 2138 (2014).

The report was presented to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan on 12 December 2014 and was considered in the Committee on 14 January 2015.

I will present to the Security Council shortly the Committee's views on the report, and any follow-up to the recommendations contained therein.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report were issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) U. Joy **Ogwu**
Vice-Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan

14-65632 (E) 210115

Please recycle

Letter dated 12 December 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Panel prepared in accordance with Security Council resolution 2138 (2014).

(*Signed*) Lipika Majumdar Roy **Choudhury**
Coordinator/Expert (Finance)
Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)

(*Signed*) Dakshinie Ruwanthika **Gunaratne**
Expert (International humanitarian law)

(*Signed*) Issa **Maraut**
Expert (Regional)

(*Signed*) Guido **Potters**
Expert (Aviation)

(*Signed*) Adrian **Wilkinson**
Expert (Arms)

Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)

Summary

Following its appointment on 21 March 2014, the Panel of Experts spent more than four months between May and October 2014 investigating the situation on the ground in Darfur and also visited Khartoum and the region, to determine whether the relevant resolutions of the Security Council were being implemented.

In general, the Panel welcomed a significant improvement in cooperation provided by the Government of the Sudan and more frequent interaction with the acting national focal point, yet the Government did not always fully accede to requests from the Panel for access and information. It was still reluctant to provide detailed information on some crucial matters.

The Panel identified the presence in Darfur of small arms ammunition manufactured post-2005, which had not been reported under previous mandates. This included ammunition manufactured in Khartoum in 2013; a certain violation of the arms embargo. Clear evidence was obtained of the certain continued use of improvised air-delivered munitions. The Panel also identified the presence of three weapons systems not previously reported as being deployed in Darfur, but has not, as yet, identified the chain of custody for those systems. The Panel confirmed the use of the Rakhsh armoured personnel carrier in Darfur; a certain violation of the arms embargo by the Government of the Sudan.

From the aviation perspective, the number of Sudanese Air Force assets present in Darfur has dropped to a historic low during the current mandate. Various sanctions violations were identified, including, highly probably, the transfer of Antonov An-26 aircraft by the Government of the Sudan into Darfur when subsequently used in an improvised bomber role. The now certain "routine" violations of the arms embargo by the Government continued through the regular rotation of Sukhoi Su-25 attack/close air support jet fighters to an aviation maintenance facility near Khartoum.

Overall, there was a decline in the number of aerial bombings reported, compared to previous years, although there were sporadic peaks of activity. During its stay in Darfur, the Panel observed an Antonov An-26 almost certainly in the process of being prepared for aerial bombing and obtained evidence of the almost certain continued use of Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft in their ground attack role.

The Panel investigated violations of international humanitarian law, including attacks against civilians and civilian objects in Khor Abeche, South Darfur and Birka, North Darfur. The perpetrators were identified as certainly members of the Government of the Sudan security forces. The investigation of the attacks on African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeepers in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, has resulted in a recommendation for designation. The Panel identified violations that were almost certainly committed by Sudanese Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) in Khor Abeche and Taweisha, North Darfur. The Panel also finds that it is highly probable that Sudanese Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahed Mohamed Nour (SLM/AW) incited protests within the Kalma internally displaced persons camp.

The Panel continued to face an impasse regarding implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze, mainly because the Government of the Sudan has taken no steps towards implementation. Follow-up action on violations of the travel ban reported in 2013 and a fresh violation in 2014 did not yield any results, owing to a lack of response from the countries concerned. The Panel has identified a major source of financing for armed groups in Darfur, through the illegal operation of vehicle checkpoints for collecting toll fees.

Whether it is the progress of the Darfur internal dialogue and consultation strategy, the conclusion of the security arrangements or the launching of microprojects and infrastructure rehabilitation, the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur is progressing slowly. Procrastination by the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur Regional Authority, insecurity owing to clashes between the Government and the armed opposition groups, intertribal clashes and the prevalence of crime are all serious impediments.

Being prey to radical Islamist turbulence and the situations in Libya, the Sahel and the Middle East has the potential to affect the security and stability of the Sudan. Darfur may not be immune to infiltration by radical Islamist elements.

Chad and Ethiopia are making efforts to support the peace process. The Sudan's relations with Uganda remain tense. The civil war in South Sudan, where the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front are directly or indirectly involved, will eventually have an impact on the peace dynamics within the Sudan.

The initiative of National Dialogue and Constitutional Process (27 January 2014) of the President of the Sudan is a valuable opportunity to engage in a comprehensive peace process. Armed and civil opposition parties are prudently committed to the National Dialogue, although it has been slow to start as a result of the opposing positions of the protagonists and procrastination by participants. International efforts (by the European Union, by the Troika of Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and by Germany, in particular) are taking place separately, alongside the facilitation efforts led by the President of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. An international diplomatic machinery will be necessary in order to support and strengthen facilitation.

Contents

		Page
I.	Introduction	6
II.	Methodology	7
III.	Programme of work	7
IV.	Operating environment and cooperation	9
V.	Regional implementation of the sanctions	10
VI.	Progress towards reducing violations of the arms embargo	12
VII.	Monitoring of offensive military overflights, including aerial bombardments, and aviation assets in Darfur	30
VIII.	Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights	39
IX.	Implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze	56
X.	Political process and progress towards removing impediments to the peace process	63
XI.	Summary of violations of sanctions and international humanitarian law	69
XII.	Recommendations	74

Annexes*

* The annexes are being circulated as received, in the language of submission only.

I. Introduction

1. The Panel of Experts on the Sudan was established by the Security Council in resolution 1591 (2005). The Panel's mandate has since been extended in resolutions 1651 (2005), 1665 (2006), 1672 (2006), 1713 (2006), 1779 (2007), 1841 (2008), 1891 (2009), 1945 (2010), 1982 (2011), 2035 (2012), 2091 (2013) and 2138 (2014).

2. In its resolution 2138 (2014), the Security Council requested that the Panel provide a final report with its findings and recommendations to the Council no later than 17 January 2015. The present report has been prepared in response to that request.

3. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of its resolution 1556 (2004), the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur. In its resolution 2035 (2012), the Council extended the reference to the three states of Darfur to all the territory of Darfur, including the new states of Eastern and Central Darfur created on 11 January 2012. In paragraph 7 of its resolution 1591 (2005), the Council extended the arms embargo to include all parties to the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the aforementioned areas. In paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of that resolution, the Council imposed targeted travel and financial sanctions on designated individuals (the listing criteria were further applied to entities in resolution 2035 (2012)), to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), on the basis of the criteria set out in that resolution. In its resolution 1672 (2006), the Council designated four individuals. The enforcement of the arms embargo was further strengthened by resolution 1945 (2010).

4. The Panel operates under the direction of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005). The mandate of the Panel, as set out in resolution 1591 (2005), is:

(a) To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the arms embargo;

(b) To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the targeted travel and financial sanctions;

(c) To make recommendations to the Committee on actions that the Security Council may want to consider.

5. In its resolution 2138 (2014) and preceding resolutions, the Security Council also requested that the Panel:

(a) Continue to coordinate its activities, as appropriate, with the operations of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and with international efforts to promote a political process in Darfur;

(b) Assess in its interim and final reports:

(i) Progress towards reducing violations by all parties of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2005), paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010);

(ii) Progress towards removing impediments to the political process and threats to stability in Darfur and the region;

(iii) Violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights, including sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations and abuses against children;

(iv) Other violations of the above-mentioned resolutions;

(c) Provide the Committee with information on those individuals and entities meeting the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005);

(d) Continue to investigate the financing and role of armed, military and political groups in attacks against UNAMID personnel in Darfur, noting that individuals and entities planning, sponsoring or participating in such attacks constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and may therefore meet the designation criteria provided for in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005).

6. On 21 March 2014, the Secretary-General appointed the following experts to serve on the Panel: Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury (India, Coordinator and finance expert), Dakshinie Ruwanthika Gunaratne (Sri Lanka, international humanitarian law expert), Issa Maraut (France, regional expert), Guido Potters (Netherlands, aviation expert) and Adrian Wilkinson (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms expert). The Panel wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Mohamed Mouti (Switzerland, language consultant).

II. Methodology

7. The Panel followed a professional and technical methodology underpinned by the maintenance of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. It worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). Emphasis was placed on adherence to standards regarding transparency and sources, documentary evidence and corroboration of independent verifiable sources. Parties cited have, wherever possible, been offered the opportunity to respond within reasonable, but specific, deadlines. The Panel based its reasoning on a balance of probability to establish the truth of any disputed facts.[1]

8. The Panel placed importance on the rule of consensus and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations only by a majority of four of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such a recommendation would be made only on the basis of consensus.

III. Programme of work

9. After the introductory meeting for the two new team members with the Committee, in New York on 7 May 2014, the Panel developed a programme of work to carry out its mandate.

[1] Terminology relating to the probability of an event uses a qualitative statement to reflect an associated probability or confidence percentage (certain, > 99 per cent; almost certain, 90-98 per cent; highly probable or highly likely, 75-89 per cent; probable or likely, 55-74 per cent). The term awarded is based on the quality of quantitative and qualitative evidence that the Panel has seen and/or had access to.

10. The Panel primarily focused on field investigations, with the experts deploying at regular intervals to the five states of Darfur. They conducted four field missions to Khartoum and Darfur during 2014. In total, the experts spent more than four months in Khartoum and Darfur between 5 May and 4 November 2014.

11. In order to identify the impact of the regional environment and assess sanctions implementation measures, the Panel made visits to Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda for consultations with official authorities and other actors. In Ethiopia, the Panel also held discussions with the secretariat of the African Union Peace and Security Council. The Panel also visited individuals or organizations with specialist knowledge, in eight other Member States,[2] as part of its investigations. When not travelling, the Panel members pursued their investigations and analysis from their respective home bases.

12. The time spent in the field enabled the Panel to focus its investigations, in accordance with its mandate, on the following areas:

(a) Reported armed violence impacting the civilian population as a result of hostilities between all armed factions;

(b) Technical analysis of new sightings of weapon and ammunition types, analysis of statistical databases[3] on conflict-related issues and investigation of routine breaches of the arms embargo by all belligerents;

(c) Maintenance of data on reported air attacks against civilian areas and analysis of aviation-related material;

(d) Investigation of specific cases of alleged violations of international humanitarian law;

(e) Attacks on UNAMID personnel and humanitarian workers;

(f) Sexual and gender-based violence;

(g) Recruitment of minors by armed parties to the conflict;

(h) Violations of the travel ban by certain designated individuals;

(i) The funding of armed groups;

(j) Impact of the resurgence of tribal conflicts and monitoring the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the impediments to the implementation of the Doha Document and the peace process and the efforts to reenergize the peace dynamics.

13. In order to maintain impartiality and the same degree of contact with the main parties to the conflict (the Government and the armed opposition groups), the Panel regularly met two of the components of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) at locations outside the Sudan: the Sudanese Liberation Movement led by Minni Arkou Minnawi (SLM/MM); and the Justice and Equality Movement led by Jibril Ibrahim (JEM).

---

[2] Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

[3] Where annual comparisons are used in the present report, the period covered is from 1 January to 30 October of each year. This is because the report had to be drafted before the end of 2014, thus not allowing for an annual comparison. The annual data will be provided in a later report.

IV. Operating environment and cooperation

14. The Panel remains generally content with the administrative and logistical support and cooperation provided to its members during their visits to the Sudan, including within the Darfur region.

A. Government of the Sudan

15. The acting national focal point, Major General Moustafa Ibrahim Muhammad Abood, has maintained his willingness to facilitate the administrative requirements of the Panel. There has been a noticeable improvement in cooperation between the Government of the Sudan and the Panel.

16. The acting national focal point and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to issue single-entry visas to members of the Panel, and three multiple-entry visas to one Panel member. The Government also extended three visas in the Sudan for the same Panel member and issued long-term Darfur travel permits for the Panel.

17. More regular official meetings[4] were held between the acting national focal point and the Panel; these meetings took place in a positive atmosphere. After some discussion about the type and use of previous information supplied by the Government, the acting national focal point agreed to provide the Panel with more detailed data than that previously provided. Consequently, the flow of information from the Government in response to the Panel's formal requests has improved during the current mandate, with written answers being provided for some of the Panel's information requests. The acting national focal point also requested that the Panel's reports be balanced and that the Panel emphasize that funding pledges for the implementation of the Doha Document are not being fully met by the international community, thus presenting major challenges to its full implementation. The Government requested that it be given the opportunity to respond to allegations made against it. The Panel complied with this request but received no response from the Government.

18. The Panel has had very good access to local level administrators, criminal justice system and law enforcement officials, including the Special Prosecutor for crimes committed in Darfur.

19. The implementation by the Government of temporary out-of-bounds areas after incidents of armed violence, on a routine and regular basis for "security reasons", constrains the initial response by UNAMID and thus potential follow-up investigations by the Panel.

B. United Nations system

20. UNAMID remains fully supportive of the progress of the Panel's mission on the ground, extending full administrative, technical and logistical support. The Panel has had regular direct access to United Nations country team officials in

[4] Meetings were held on 7 May, 3 June, 18 and 24 August, 28 September and 14 and 29 October 2014.

Khartoum and Darfur, to exchange information and expertise. The cooperation between the Panel and UNAMID therefore remains excellent.

C. Member States

21. The Panel has requested information, in official communications, from Member States and private entities. The Panel has clarified its methodology to two Member States as regards directly approaching commercial entities for information, while concurrently informing the Member State Government of such requests. The Panel is concerned that the insistence by those particular Member States that all approaches to commercial entities be directed through the Government constrains the independence of the Panel to approach the full range of potential sources.

22. As at 19 November 2014, the Panel had sent 234 official communications. The degree of responsiveness of Member States and private entities to requests for information has decreased since the previous report, with only 82 replies. The Panel has also encountered a few delays in obtaining responses from some Member States to its requests for visit. The Panel particularly thanks those Member States that did provide responses to its requests for information and that granted requests for visit, and urges those that did not do so to cooperate in the future.

V. Regional implementation of the sanctions

23. Pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) (i) of its resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council requires that the Panel assist the Committee in monitoring the implementation of the following provisions relating to the sanctions regime established with regard to Darfur pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions:

(a) Arms embargo;

(b) Travel ban;

(c) Assets freeze.

A. Member States in the region

24. The Security Council, in paragraph 20 of its resolution 2138 (2014), reaffirmed the mandate of the Committee to engage with regional States on effective implementation of the sanctions. To this end, the Panel requested details from Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, South Sudan and Uganda, of any comprehensive measures put in place by them. Written responses were received from Egypt, Ethiopia and Uganda, while the issue was discussed verbally with Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda.[5] The Panel also noted that since 2005, only 32 Member States have reported to the Committee on such measures, as urged in resolution 1591 (2005), paragraph (3) (a) (vi). None of the regional Member States have provided reports.

[5] The issue was also discussed during a visit to the United Arab Emirates in November 2014.

25. It is apparent to the Panel that the regional Member States that have responded to the Panel's communications to date do not have the appropriate legislation in place to effectively implement the sanctions regime. Elements of the sanctions regime are implemented through the use of administrative measures, which may not be legally enforceable within those countries. This naturally limits the reach of any measures taken by those States in implementing the provisions of Security Council resolutions.

26. The situation is complicated by the fact that legal guarantees of civil rights in some States can conflict with sanctions obligations. This leads to the administrative measures being challenged in courts of law, thus potentially making implementation of the sanctions ineffective.

27. Certain Member States have expressed the intention of carrying out a review of their current practices, but have emphasized that there is a big challenge in terms of developing legislation to deal with this issue. States have to implement many resolutions and to do so effectively will require a major investment of time, human resources and equipment. Legal and technical assistance will certainly be required to develop and harmonize legislation across the region. Capacity development of effective border management systems is also required.

B. Government of the Sudan implementation perspective

28. A specific query was addressed to the Government of the Sudan on the issue of implementation of the assets freeze and travel ban for the four designated individuals. The response makes the position of the Government clear:

(a) "According to Sudanese Laws no implementation of assets freeze can take place unless under a judicial decision. Any assets freeze without such judicial decision is a violation of the Sudanese constitution, which includes the Human Rights Charter";

(b) "Sanctions against individuals are a violation of the United Nations Charter, which confirms in its preamble respect for human rights; they are also a violation of international conventions resulting from the Charter when knowing that the Security Council is bound by these international conventions. It's worth noting that the Security Council was in fact established as a subsequent result of these conventions. Moreover, these sanctions violate individual property rights and the right to justice since they were decided without enabling these individuals to respond and defend themselves".

29. In terms of the arms embargo, the Government considers that security force units routinely deploying into Darfur with weapons and ammunition are not in violation of the arms embargo, as such deployments were for national and internal security reasons (see paras. 55 and 82).

30. This approach by the Government means that the sanctions regime is in effect inoperative within Sudan.

VI. Progress towards reducing violations of the arms embargo

31. Pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), expanded by paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), and strengthened by paragraphs 7 to 9 of resolution 1945 (2010), the Panel continues to focus on a range of monitoring and investigation activities to identify any violations of the arms embargo by the Government of the Sudan or by other Member States.

A. Conflict dynamics

32. The dynamics of the conflict with Darfur were significantly altered during the first five months of 2014 by the deployment of the Rapid Support Forces (paras. 39-57). The dynamics remain complex and fluid in terms of the engagement of individual groups and their use of force. The same groups of individuals still act under the banner of different organizations, depending on the operational context of their activities on the ground at any given point in time. This makes it very difficult to clearly identify and label groups responsible for certain actions and it explains why there remain a large number of incidents attributed to unidentified groups (see para. 37).[6,7]

33. Direct armed violence between the Government security forces[8] and armed opposition groups has increased since 2013 as a result of an operation, very probably code-named, and widely referred to as, "Operation Decisive Summer" (January-May 2014). The Rapid Support Forces took the lead during this particular operation. During the first 10 months of 2014, there were five reported armed attacks initiated by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) (which excludes Rapid Support Force operations), against armed opposition groups; an increase of 25 per cent over the same period in 2013. There has also been an increase in the number of attacks against civilians by members of Government forces as a result of operations against criminals, or by rogue officers acting without orders.[9]

34. Armed opposition groups reportedly initiated 47 armed attacks[10] against Government security forces during the first 10 months of 2014, which was a reduction of 33 per cent over the same period in 2013. These were virtually all minor skirmishes.

35. Five UNAMID peacekeepers were killed and nine injured during the reporting period (see annex V).

36. During the period under review, the Panel identified the number of reported violent clashes between different tribes as having reduced by 30 per cent, compared with the same period in 2013. The intensity of the violence between the tribes, in

[6] See annex I to the present report for an illustrative matrix of the various armed groups and their possible affiliations during the use of force in both conflict and criminal situations, which has been slightly updated from the matrix presented in S/2014/87, annex I.

[7] See annex II to the present report for a summary of attacks by groups or individuals reported as militia or unidentified.

[8] Including Central Reserve Police operations, but not including the Rapid Support Force operations (which are covered separately).

[9] See annex III to the present report for a summary of the attacks against civilians.

[10] See annex IV for a summary of such attacks. 38 attacks carried out in 2014 can be attributed to particular groups, whereas others could not be attributed to a particular group, but could be identified as having been perpetrated by armed opposition groups, rather than criminal groups.

terms of casualties, was also lower than seen in the first 10 months of 2013. The violence was more geographically widespread and the number of individual tribes involved increased over the first six months, but this has subsequently reduced. It is important to note that during the clashes, the Government was often unable to stop the fighting. Annex VI contains a summary of reported incidents of intertribal conflict and violence.

37. There has been a significant increase in reported armed violence by unidentifiable groups or other militia, where it has not been possible to positively attribute the responsibility for a particular act of armed violence (see annex VII). Similarly, there has been a very noticeable increase in the number of reported criminal activities where armed violence has been a factor.[11]

38. The national armed forces are still maintaining their strategy of fighting a proxy war, using the lightly armed[12] Rapid Support Forces and Janjaweed[13] type of militia. The regular Sudanese Armed Forces ground troops are generally used reactively, or to protect their own bases and logistic assets. The first four months of 2014 saw a significantly increased tempo of operations, using primarily the Rapid Support Forces, but since the conclusion of Rapid Support Force operations in late April 2014, the tempo of Government operations has generally returned to low levels, similar to those reported in 2013. The level of logistical resupply required to sustain armed operations by all belligerents at the current level of conflict intensity is still low,[14] with the predominant use of small arms and light weapons.[15] It is still a low-cost war.

B. Rapid Support Forces

39. The activities of the Rapid Support Forces were the focus of conflict dynamics during the first five months of 2014. The Panel has investigated their origins, organization, structure and operations in detail, and developed its analysis[16] from a wide range of sources, including government declarations, eyewitness statements to Panel members and the media.

Organization and command

40. During August 2013, the then Commander of the border guards, Brigadier General Muhammad Hamdan Dalgo (also known as "Hemeidti" or "Hemeti") began

[11] The Panel only started maintaining data on this aspect of the armed violence of Darfur in January 2014, thus it is not yet possible to quantify the increase in percentage terms.

[12] The national armed forces have not resorted to using their heavy weapons, such as main battle tanks, field artillery or guided weapons, against the armed opposition groups in Darfur.

[13] The term Janjaweed is used in this report as defined in annex III. Such groups should have been disarmed in accordance with Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), para. 6.

[14] For example, a pallet weighing 1 ton containing 7.62 x 39 mm small arms ammunition, which can easily be transported in the back of a light 4 x 4 vehicle, equates to approximately 27,500 rounds.

[15] Small arms are those of less than 20 mm calibre, while light weapons are those of more than 20 mm and less than 100 mm calibre.

[16] Detailed analysis was contained in the Panel's midterm briefing to the Committee, on 20 August 2014. The present report contains a summary of that information, together with further analysis.

the recruitment of large numbers of Darfurians[17] (predominantly Reizigat), many from the border guards, to be trained as the Rapid Support Forces in order to, initially, fight in support of the national armed forces in Kordofan. It is now clear that the Rapid Support Forces have a broader national mandate and have been deployed in Darfur, Kordofan and Khartoum.

41. The strategic command arrangements for the Rapid Support Forces were initially unclear, with contradictory and changing approaches within the Government as the operations of the forces developed.[18] It is now certain that the overall Commander of the Rapid Support Forces is Major General Abbas Abdel Aziz, who is responsible to General Ali-al-Nasih al-Galla of the National Intelligence and Security Service for the strategy adopted by the forces. It is also certain that operational command of the Rapid Support Forces on a daily basis is exercised by Brigadier General Muhammad Hamdan Dalgo and it is he who influences the targets and deployment of the forces.[19] It is therefore now certain that the strategic operations of the forces are the command responsibility of the National Intelligence and Security Service, with tactical coordination taking place with the national armed forces at the local level.

42. The strength of the Rapid Support Forces in May 2014 was estimated at approximately 6,000 individuals,[20] deployed in over 750 "technicals";[21] although some may also be mounted on camels and horses.[22] It has been reported that National Intelligence and Security Service officers were embedded within the

[17] It has been claimed that in addition to Darfurians, Reizegat have also been recruited, or joined the Rapid Support Forces, from the Central African Republic, Chad, Mali and the Niger. At the time of writing the present report, it had not been possible for the Panel to verify this.

[18] On 25 February 2014, Major General Abbas Abdel Aziz stated that operations were coordinated with the national armed forces; in late February 2014, the Governor of Southern Kordofan, Ahmed Haroun, announced that the Rapid Support Forces "belonged to the NISS Operations Department"; on 24 April 2014, the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations, Rahamtalla Mohamed Osman Elnor, informed the Security Council that the Rapid Support Forces was "a regular force that is part of the Sudan Armed Forces"; on 14 May 2014, Major General Abbas Abdel Aziz noted that "the RSF ... falls under command of the NISS"; and on 21 May 2014, Brigadier General Muhammad Hamdan Dalgo clearly stated that the Rapid Support Forces is an armed force of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in a media interview.

[19] Confidential source.

[20] There are claims that the Rapid Support Forces may consist of 10,000 men, but the Panel has not authenticated these claims. In May 2014, there were further reports that a second Rapid Support Force, was being recruited for further operations in Kordofan. This may account for the figure of 10,000.

[21] A "technical" is an improvised civilian or non-combat military vehicle, modified to provide an offensive capability. In Darfur, such vehicles are usually 4 x 4 civilian pattern light trucks with a medium or heavy machine gun (predominantly DShK-type) mounted in the rear of the vehicle. The term originated in Somalia in the early 1990s.

[22] Rapid Support Forces have been observed by UNAMID patrols moving in 4 x 4 vehicles, with armed men on camels and horses operating within a "tactical bound". It has not yet been possible to confirm whether the mounted individuals form part of the Rapid Support Forces or are just there to take advantage of the chaos that often results after Rapid Support Force operations. A "tactical bound" may be defined as the distance separating allied military forces on the ground over which effective mutual fire support may be provided to each force component (Panel definition).

command structure of the forces, as a capability enhancement, to provide experience and assist in the direction of operations.[23]

Figure 1
Rapid Support Forces fighters on 4x4 technical[24]

43. Members of the Rapid Support Forces are reportedly issued with official Government identity cards. Under the terms of article 52 of the National Security Services Act 2010, members and associates of the National Intelligence and Security Service are immune from prosecution for all acts committed in the course of their work. The Panel has asked the Government to clarify this issue and still awaits a response.

Operations and impact of the Rapid Support Forces

44. The initial deployment of the Rapid Support Forces was as a result of the declaration by the President of the Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, in November 2013, that the then approaching dry season would see a final crushing of rebel insurgencies in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur.[25] This was "Operation Decisive Summer". The forces first deployed to Southern Kordofan in late 2013, before redeploying to Northern Kordofan on 9 January 2014.

45. It is apparent that, although reasonably well trained in basic military tactics, the Rapid Support Forces are not a particularly well-disciplined force. After undertaking military style operations in Northern Kordofan, which allegedly included attacks on civilians and markets, the forces were redeployed from that state in early February 2014, after fierce protests from the local population.

[23] Confidential source.

[24] Image from National Intelligence and Security Service/Rapid Support Forces Facebook page, available from www.facebook.com/AldaamAlsree (accessed 29 June 2014). Note the range of different uniforms and mixed civilian dress worn by members of the Rapid Support Forces. It is not known where this picture was taken, whether in Darfur or Kordofan. The symbol superimposed on the image is that of a unit within the Rapid Support Forces named "Jerusalem".

[25] Details available from www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50134 (accessed 11 May 2014).

46. The Rapid Support Forces commenced their deployment into South Darfur on 11 February, basing themselves at the former PDF camp at Um Waraqat from 19 February 2014. Deployment was complete by 3 March 2014. The forces commenced offensive operations on 24 February 2014, with a limited attack against El Salem, South Darfur, immediately followed by a major operation at Hijer Tunjo on 27 February 2014. Analysis of the forces' operations in South Darfur suggests that they were initially deployed in four major axes: (a) Nyala-Um Gunny; (b) Graida-Buram; (c) Labado-Muhajeria; and (d) Menawashie-Nitega. It is not known if these axes represent four individual sub-units within the Rapid Support Forces. The forces then deployed predominantly into North Darfur, where they initiated a range of offensive operations.

47. The role of the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur was explained by the Governor Wali of South Darfur, Adam Mahmoud Jar-al-Nabi,[26] as being "ready to support the army in the best possible manner ... to be deployed rapidly to any front at any time to defend the right in the face of falsehood".[27] The forces' role was further explained by Major General Yahiya al-Sheikh, Commander of the national armed forces 20th Infantry Division in El Daein, as enhancing efforts made towards maintaining security and stability.[28]

48. During a press conference[29] at the National Club in Khartoum on 14 May 2014, the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Major General Abbas Abdel Aziz, described the impact that the forces' operations had had to date in Darfur by listing a detailed range of achievements.[30] Yet the Panel assessment is that it is highly probable that the impact of the forces against the operational military capability of armed opposition groups has in reality been very limited. The forces made only one reported significant and successful attack against the armed opposition groups, that being against SLA/MM forces, on 9 April 2014, in the area of Ba'ashim, north-west of Mellit in North Darfur. The Rapid Support Forces claimed to have killed over 150 fighters from armed opposition groups, including 10 senior commanders, and to have captured 52 vehicles. The forces also claimed to have ambushed SLA/MM in the localities of Alaeet Jar Alnaby and Haskaneeta, with the effect of displacing hundreds of armed opposition fighters.

49. The tactical response of the armed opposition groups in Darfur, with the exceptions above, has been to avoid open combat when outnumbered by the national armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces and withdraw to safe areas, in effect, a voluntary displacement by those groups in response to Rapid Support Force operations. It is therefore highly probable that the majority of the recent operations of the Rapid Support Forces had a minimal longer-term impact on the armed opposition groups, and have not significantly degraded their overall operational capability.

---

[26] At a rally in Nyala on 3 March 2014.

[27] *Via 3ayin Sudan's new Shock Troops*. Nuba Reports. 28 April 2014.

[28] *Janjaweed in Darfur reconstituted as the Rapid Response Force*. E Reeves, Sudan Tribune, 1 March 2014. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50134. Accessed 11 May 2014.

[29] http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=235787. Accessed 15 May 2014.

[30] (1) Removal of insurgents from a number of locations; (2) Opening and safeguarding roads; (3) Dealing decisively with SLA/AW in one area; and (4) Destruction of enemy troops in named locations.

50. In order to illustrate the impact that the Rapid Support Forces made on human security during their recent operations in Darfur, the Panel compiled a database of reported operations by the forces (see annex VIII). The armed violence initiated by the Rapid Support Forces steadily increased from February to April 2014 and at one stage, threatened to produce levels of violence, chaos and confusion not seen in Darfur since 2004.

51. The conflict statistics set out in annex VIII suggest that the main effect of the Rapid Support Force operations has been forced or induced displacement rather than massive casualties as a result of armed violence. If they have sufficient warning of an approach by the forces, the local population generally just hide from them, or avoid them, in order to preserve their lives.

Redeployment of the Rapid Support Forces and future operations

52. Three brigades[31] of the Rapid Support Forces, equating to approximately 3,300 fighters, were almost certainly deployed by the Director of the National Intelligence and Security Service, General Mohammed Atta Abbas El Moula, from Darfur to Khartoum on 18 May 2014.[32]

53. On 19 May 2014, Brigadier-General Muhammad Hamdan Dalgo stated that future Rapid Support Force operations "would be crucial to ending insurgency in Darfur's five states". He added that "his troops will take firm stance against anyone who tries to undermine the security and stability of citizens", and warned political parties and forces against attributing violations committed by rebels to the forces. No such operations have taken place since this time and it is now assessed that less than 10 per cent of the force remain in Darfur, reportedly either on leave or engaged in intelligence-gathering operations.

Classification of the status of the Rapid Support Forces

54. The Panel considers that the Rapid Support Forces could be classified as a regular government armed force under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Service, and thus separate to the regular national armed forces. Yet it is almost certain that that Service is not constitutionally allowed to have such an armed force.[33] The Panel has therefore formally requested clarification of the legislative status of the Rapid Support Forces from the Government of the Sudan.[34]

Violations of the arms embargo by the Rapid Support Forces

55. It is certain that the Rapid Support Forces deployed into Darfur from Kordofan carrying their individual and team weapons, with supporting ammunition. During a wider discussion on the resupply of ammunition to Darfur with the acting national

[31] The organization and structure of the Rapid Support Forces is not in the public domain, but sources suggest that each brigade equates to approximately 1,000 men.

[32] www.gulfnews.com/news/region/sudan/sudan-to-deploy-counterinsurgency-unit-1.1334813. www.newvision.co.ug/news/655728-sudan-to-deploy-controversial-military-unit-around-khartoum.html. Accessed 19 May 2014. Confirmed by "Hemeti" media interview of 21 May 2014 (ibid.).

[33] Article 151 of the 2005 Interim Constitution limits the mission of the National Intelligence and Security Service to: (1) collection and analysis of information; and (2) presenting recommendations to the nation's decision-making bodies.

[34] Letter by the Panel dated 8 July 2014 addressed to the Government of the Sudan.

focal point, on 28 October 2014, the focal point stated that security force units routinely deployed into Darfur with their personal and team weapons, and that the Government did not consider this to be a violation of the arms embargo, as such deployments were for national and internal security reasons. Yet the Panel considers that the now routine movement of weapons and ammunition into Darfur is almost certainly a violation of the arms embargo by the Government, as no request has ever been made to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), as required under paragraph 7 of that resolution,[35] for authority to import these weapons and ammunition into Darfur. The Government should be reminded of the exemption request requirement and encouraged to request such authority on a case-by-case basis. The Panel should be invited to verify any shipments of weapons and ammunition so authorized by the Committee.

Military strategy of the Government

56. The deployment of the Rapid Support Forces does not yet indicate a major shift in the military strategy of the Government in Darfur. The regular national armed forces do not use appropriate counter-insurgency tactics, they are poorly equipped for counter-insurgency operations and several sources suggest that their morale is low. The national armed forces rarely conduct "fix and destroy" operations against armed opposition groups and seems content to adopt a tactical policy of point defence of their own bases and the major settlements. As such, it is possible that the Government has lost some confidence in the ability of the regular national armed forces to implement the overall strategic objectives of the Government in Darfur.

57. The strategy of the Government appears to consist of: (a) collective punishment of villages and communities from which the armed opposition groups are believed to come or operate; (b) induced or forced displacement of those communities; and (c) direct engagement, including aerial bombardment, of the groups when their location can be identified. The introduction of the Rapid Support Forces into the Darfur military equation is not really an overall change in this.

C. Criminal armed violence

58. The level of criminal armed violence is on a much greater scale than in 2013[36] and is much more prevalent than the use of armed force by the Government or the armed opposition groups. This increase in armed violence is a significant indicator of the breakdown of law and order within the five states. The Government response to this increasing threat has been limited, but the local response by the Governor of South Darfur has proved effective, demonstrating that the capability exists where there is political will. The Governor of South Darfur: (a) imposed a curfew; (b) banned the use of vehicles with no number plates (including those of the Government); (c) banned passengers on motorcycles; (d) prohibited the carriage of weapons in civilian clothes; and (e) banned turbans that cover the face.[37]

[35] As updated by Security Council resolution 2035 (2012), para. 4.

[36] See annex VII for summary.

[37] www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51758. Accessed 12 November 2014.

D. Identification of the use of aerially delivered ordnance

S-8DM 80 mm air to ground rockets

59. The Panel examined forensic evidence and imagery (of unexploded ordnance) recovered from an attack at Orschi, on 26 April 2014, which resulted in nine civilians being injured. The Panel finds that it is certain that S-8 Type 80 mm air to ground rockets were used in this attack.

60. The only identified delivery system for such a weapon with the necessary operational range, known to be used in Darfur at the time of the attack, is the Sukhoi Su-25 fighter ground attack/close air support aircraft of the Sudanese Air Force. The Panel finds that it is almost certain that the Su-25 was the delivery mechanism for this attack.

61. In its previous report (see S/2014/87, para. 75), the Panel identified that the transfer of S-8DM 80 mm rockets to Darfur is certainly a breach of sanctions by the Sudan, as the ammunition was imported into the Sudan, then subsequently transferred to, and used in, Darfur. The S-8DM 80 mm rockets were legally delivered to the Government by a Member State, conditional on their non-use in Darfur.

Use of improvised air-delivered munitions

62. The use of improvised air-delivered munitions by the national armed forces (Sudanese Armed Forces) continues. One example is an attack on Abuleha, North Darfur on 19 October 2014. It was reported that six bombs had been dropped on the village. This was confirmed by a UNAMID verification patrol on 21 October 2014, which identified two unexploded devices and four recent craters. The Panel undertook crater analysis[38] and finds that it is almost certain that the detonation of improvised air-delivered munitions was the cause.

63. The two unexploded devices are certainly improvised air-delivered munitions. One such unexploded munition was located in the compound of the school. Measurements from this unexploded munition were taken and proved to be within 10 per cent of those obtained from the photogrammetry reported in S/2014/87. The Panel has therefore revised its analysis of the Type 2 munition and finds that it is almost certain that the device contains approximately 38.6 kg of trinitrotoluene TNT equivalent explosive, which means the Type 2 munition has about 89 per cent of the destructive power of a conventional high explosive aircraft bomb such as the OFAB-100.

[38] See methodology in S/2014/87, annex VI.

Figure 2
Unexploded improvised air-delivered munition at Abuleha (21 October 2014)[39]

64. From the previous technical analysis it is almost certain that the munition is fitted with an AM-A Type Fuze. A Member State previously confirmed the supply of 10,000 AM-A Type Fuze to the Sudan, between 2009 and 2011. Therefore the transfer of the AM-A fuzes fitted to the improvised air delivered munitions into Darfur is almost certainly a breach of sanctions by the Sudan; the AM-A fuzes were delivered by the Member State conditional on their non-use in Darfur.

65. The delivery technique (almost certainly by Sudanese Air Force Antonov An-26) and the design of such munitions means that the Circular Error Probability (CEP)[40] radius would be higher than for an aircraft bomb of more modern design, and hence accuracy would be poor.

66. The Panel therefore finds that the use of such weapons in such close proximity to the civilian population, as evidenced by the attack on Abuleha, is almost certainly indiscriminate and is a violation of customary international humanitarian law. This violation is inferred in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, to which Sudan is a signatory, and which states in its article 13(2) that "... the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack".

[39] Imagery from UNAMID.

[40] Circular Error Probability is a measure of a weapon system's precision or accuracy. It is defined as the radius of a circle, centred about the mean, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50 per cent of the warheads.

E. Ground and improvised ground role weapons systems

67. The Panel has obtained evidence of the following three weapons systems being deployed during the attack at Khor Abeche on 22 March 2014 (see paras. 166-183 of the present report).

UB-32M 55 mm rocket launcher

68. Imagery obtained by the Panel shows the presence of a UB-32M 55 mm air to ground rocket launcher in a convoy (figure 3). The weapon system had been improvised so as to operate in the ground-to-ground role. The UB-32 55 mm rocket launcher is specifically designed for use in the air-to-ground role. It is one of the weapon system options for use on the Su-25 attack aircraft or Mi-24 attack helicopters, and UB-32 55 mm rocket launchers had previously been observed by the Panel in 2013, next to these aircraft types, at the El Fasher Sudanese Air Force Forward Operating Base (see figure 4).

Figure 3
UB-32 55 mm free flight rocket launcher at Khor Abeche (22 March 2014)[41,42]



[41] UB-32M imagery from confidential source.

[42] The insert image is a schematic of UB-32M imagery from www.lockonfiles.com/files/file/2303-dcs-world-ub-32m57-57mm-rocket-pod-model-v2/. Accessed on 17 August 2014.

Figure 4
UB-32 55 mm free flight rocket launchers at El Fasher Forward Operating Base (16 May 2013)[43]

69. Analysis of the imagery shows the UB-32 55 mm rocket launcher mounted on the cargo area of a 4x4 technical. Although the use of UB-32 55 mm rocket launchers in the ground-to-ground role is not new,[44] only crude modifications are usually made to pair the weapon system to the vehicle. The weapons mount shows a more complex and engineered weapons mount, suggesting that a more sophisticated engineering approach has been taken, in terms of design and manufacture, in order to improve the effectiveness and safety of the system. Although arms manufacturers have produced prototypes of properly designed and manufactured weapons mounts for the UB-32 55 mm rocket launcher in the ground role, none are thought to have progressed to a production stage yet.[45] The design of the weapons mount is very different to previously seen prototypes. The Panel concludes that it is highly unlikely that the armed opposition groups have access to the engineering, design and production facilities necessary to produce a weapons mount of the type seen in figure 3.

[43] Panel imagery.

[44] The use of the weapon in such a role was first seen in the 1980s, as used by the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan. Improvised systems have subsequently been seen in Iran/Iraq (1980s), the former Yugoslavia (1990s), Georgia (1998), Afghanistan (2000s), Libya (2011) and the Syrian Arab Republic (2012). Lyamin L and Jenzen-Jones N R, *Improvised Employment of S-5 Air to Surface Rockets in Land Warfare*, ARES Report 1, Armament Research Services, February 2014. (ISBN: 978-0-9924624-0-6).

[45] Ukraine LuAZ-969M Truck mounting (1998) and Azerbaijan (2012). The inherent inaccuracy of the UB-32M system, combined with the small high explosive payload of the S-5 FFR warheads make such a weapons system of limited utility in conventional warfare. Artillery or direct fire anti-tank weapons would be more accurate and have a greater target effect.

70. The UB-32 55 mm rocket launcher is only capable of firing the S-5 type free flight rockets (FFR). Each S-5 rocket weighs approximately 4 kg, therefore a complete reload for the weapon, which can hold 32 rockets, is 128 kg. Therefore the logistical requirements necessary to support the use of the UB-32M system in any sustained manner would be significant. It is highly unlikely that the armed opposition groups have access to a sustainable supply of S-5 rockets for the weapon system or a means of effective logistical resupply.

71. The UB-32 weapons system, when mounted on a technical, is of limited effectiveness in both the direct and indirect fire roles. For indirect fire it has a limited range of less than 4,000 m and its accuracy is so poor that if used in the vicinity of civilians it would certainly be considered as an indiscriminate use of force. It would be slightly more effective in the direct fire role, as accuracy could be improved at ranges of up to 1,000 m and even the low payload would be effective against unarmoured targets.

107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher

72. The image of the convoy in figure 5, obtained by the Panel, also shows the presence of a 107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher mounted on the cargo area of a 4x4 technical.

Figure 5
107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher at Khor Abeche (22 March 2014)[46,47]



73. The quality of the image is not of a high enough resolution to positively identify the make and model of the 107 mm rocket launcher. It is likely to be either a TAKA BRY01 107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher manufactured by the Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) of the Sudan[48] or an imported Type 63 107 mm rocket launcher variant, which is manufactured under licence by a number of countries.

[46] 107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher imagery from a confidential source. The Panel has further imagery showing more than one such system deployed at that time.

[47] The insert image shows a schematic of a TAKA BRY01 107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher manufactured by the Military Industry Corporation of the Sudan. www.mic.sd/idex/en/products/smallarms. Accessed on 18 August 2014.

[48] http://www.mic.sd/idex/assets/lib/images/products_details/bry01-2.jpg. Accessed 19 August 2014.

74. A 107 mm rocket launcher is only capable of firing 107 mm calibre free flight rockets (FFR). Each 107 mm rocket weighs approximately 18.9 kg, and a complete reload for the weapons system, which can hold 12 rockets, is approximately 227 kg. The firing rate of the system is 12 rockets in 6 seconds. Therefore, the logistical requirements necessary to support the use of the 107 mm rocket launcher system in any sustained manner would be significant. It is highly unlikely that the armed opposition groups have access to a sustainable supply of 107 mm rockets for the weapon system or a means of effective logistical resupply.[49]

122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher

75. Also seen in the image of this convoy from 22 March 2014 is a 122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher mounted on a light 4x4 truck (figure 6). Analysis by photogrammetry indicates a highly probable barrel length of approximately 3 m, which is consistent with that of a BM-21 Variant rocket launcher system. The quality of the image is not of a high enough resolution to positively identify the make and model of the 122 mm rocket launcher.

Figure 6
122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher at Khor Abeche (22 March 2014)[50,51]

76. It is of interest that, on its corporate website, the Military Industry Corporation advertises the fact that it manufactures a variant of the BM-21 122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher system, the TAKA2 GRL01 122 mm rocket launcher and ammunition.[52,53] The image in figure 6, however, is of insufficient resolution to positively confirm, or otherwise, that the weapons system observed is a Sudanese manufactured TAKA 2 GRL01 122 mm rocket launcher.

77. A BM-21 Variant or TAKA2 GRL01 122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher is only capable of firing 122 mm calibre free flight rockets (FFR). Each 122 mm rocket weighs approximately 66.6 kg, and a complete reload for the weapons system, which can hold 8 rockets, is approximately 533 kg. The firing rate of the system is 8 rockets in 4 seconds. Therefore the logistical requirements necessary to support the use of the

[49] S/2013/79, para. 51 identified the presence of a captured 107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher in the possession of SLA/AW in Dibule, northern Jebel Marra in December 2012. It is almost certain that this is not the weapon identified by the Panel in 2014, as images show more than one system deployed during the Khor Abeche attack.

[50] BM-21 Variant 122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher image from confidential source. Please also note Sudanese flag.

[51] The insert image shows a schematic of a TAKA2 GRL01 122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher manufactured by the Military Industry Corporation of the Sudan. http://www.mic.sd/idex/en/products/smallarms. Accessed on 18 August 2014.

[52] http://www.mic.sd/idex/en/products/smallarms. Accessed 19 August 2014.

[53] http://www.mic.sd/idex/assets/lib/images/products_details/mrl.jpg. Accessed 19 August 2014.

122 mm rocket launcher system in any sustained manner would be significant. It is highly unlikely that the armed opposition groups have access to a sustainable supply of 122 mm rockets for the weapon system or a means of effective logistical resupply.

78. The Panel initiated tracing requests to various Member States in order to determine the origin and chain-of-custody of the UB-32 rocket launcher, 107 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher and 122 mm multi-barrelled rocket launcher. Some of the tracing requests remained to be answered by Member States. Likewise, a response to the Panel's request for information on these systems from the Government also remains outstanding. It has thus not yet been possible to reach any definitive conclusion regarding the origin and the chain of custody of these particular weapons systems before their delivery and use in Darfur.

F. Rakhsh type armoured personnel carrier

79. In its report S/2013/79, the Panel identified a possible deployment of a Rakhsh type armoured personnel carrier in Darfur during December 2012. The Panel can now confirm the use of this vehicle in Darfur by the Police, after a sighting by the Panel of a Rakhsh armoured personnel carrier in Nyala on 22 May 2014 (figure 7).

Figure 7
Rakhsh type armoured personnel carrier at Nyala (22 May 2014)[54]

80. The Rakhsh armoured personnel carrier is manufactured by the Shahid Kolah Dooz Industrial Complex, Islamic Republic of Iran,[55] and some 20 vehicles were reportedly delivered to the Government of the Sudan during 2005 and 2006. The first sighting of the vehicle in the Sudan was in Khartoum, in August 2005, during protests surrounding the death of SPLA leader John Garang.[56]

[54] Panel imagery.

[55] A variant of the vehicle, the *Amir*, was also advertised as being manufactured by the Military Industry Corporation in the Sudan, on its website, in 2007. The system is no longer listed as being manufactured on the website (accessed on 26 September 2014).

[56] *Skirting the Law: Sudan's Post-CPA Arms Flow*. M Lewis. Small Arms Survey. Geneva. September 2009. (ISBN: 978-2-940415-17-5).

81. As the first sighting in the Sudan and the known delivery dates[57] to the Government of the Sudan are certainly subsequent to the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 1591 (2005), on 29 March 2005, the deployment of this vehicle into Darfur is certainly a violation of the arms embargo by the Government.

G. Small arms and light weapon ammunition violations

82. During the reporting period, the Panel obtained further physical evidence, in the form of recovered small arms ammunition and cartridge cases, of the use of post-embargo Sudanese manufactured small arms and light weapons ammunition. This is summarized in table 1, with full details of all post-embargo manufactured ammunition recovered during 2014 contained in annex IX.

Table 1
Summary of small arms ammunition violations identified by the Panel

Serial	*Calibre*	*Markings*	*Date of manufacture*	*Consistent with manufacturer*[58]	*Date first seen in Darfur*
1	7.62 x 39 mm	1 39 08	2008	MIC,[59] Sudan	2014
2	7.62 x 39 mm	39 09	2009	MIC, Sudan	2014
3	7.62 x 39 mm	3 39 09	2009	MIC, Sudan	2014
4	7.62 x 39 mm	39 011	2011	MIC, Sudan	2014
5	7.62 x 39 mm	2 39 011	2011	MIC, Sudan	2014
6	7.62 x 39 mm	1 39 012	2012	MIC, Sudan	S/2014/87
7	7.62 x 39 mm	1 39 13	2013	MIC, Sudan	S/2014/87

83. These particular small arms were recovered from JEM/Sudan members who had surrendered their weapons to the UNAMID TS at Um Buru on 16 April 2014.

84. The transfer into Darfur, almost certainly by the Government of the Sudan, of these particular small arms ammunition batches are certainly violations of the arms embargo. Such violations are now routine and systematic as evidenced by the range of cartridge case markings and recent dates of manufacture.

85. The Panel also obtained physical evidence, in the form of recovered small arms ammunition and cartridge cases, of the use of post-embargo manufactured small arms ammunition from other countries. This is summarized in table 2 and is in addition to those identified in previous reports of the Panel.

[57] Confidential source.

[58] The markings, materials and design are consistent with this particular manufacturer. The similarities are such that it is almost certain that the ammunition can be attributed to this particular manufacturer.

[59] Military Industry Corporation, Khartoum, Sudan. www.mic.sd.

Table 2
Summary of non-Sudanese manufactured small arms ammunition violations identified by the Panel

Calibre	*Markings*	*Date of manufacture*	*Consistent with manufacturer*[60]	*Date first seen in Darfur*
7.62 x 39 mm	61 08	2008	Unknown factory, China	NEW

86. The transfer into Darfur of these particular small arms ammunition batches are certainly violations of the arms embargo by perpetrators as yet to be identified. The Panel's investigations continue in this area.

87. The Panel also obtained physical evidence, in the form of recovered small arms ammunition, of the use of unmarked 7.62 x 39 mm small arms ammunition in Darfur by JEM/Sudan.[61] The source of this ammunition is unknown and the Panel will monitor this issue to see if it is a developing trend.

H. Indigenous production and supply capability for small arms ammunition

88. The level of logistical resupply required to sustain armed operations by all belligerents at the current level of conflict intensity still remains low, with the predominant requirement continuing to be for small arms ammunition. The main supply chain for such ammunition, including imported ammunition, remains within the national borders of the Sudan and hence under the full effective control of national authorities.

89. An emerging indicator of the capability of the Military Industry Corporation to manufacture[62] and supply enough small arms ammunition of 7.62 mm calibre to sustain Government operations within Darfur is the proliferation of recently manufactured Sudanese small arms ammunition throughout the region. Such Sudanese ammunition almost certainly manufactured between 2007 and 2013 has been identified in the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.[63] Further details are set out in annex X.

90. The fact that the Military Industry Corporation is developing, or has developed, sufficient production capacity to supply an export market is a strong indicator that the Government certainly retains the capability to sustain their internal requirements without any requirement to import small arms ammunition of 7.62 mm calibre from external sources.

[60] The markings, materials and design are consistent with this particular manufacturer. The similarities are such that it is highly probable that the ammunition can be attributed to this particular manufacturer.

[61] Recovered from three JEM/Bashir combatants who surrendered their weapons and ammunition to the UNAMID Um Baru TS on 6 April 2014.

[62] Manufacturing is based at the Alshagara Industrial Complex outside Khartoum.

[63] Options were examined with a view to making possible recommendations to the Council through the Committee. The Panel has not investigated the suppliers, brokers or transit routes for this particular ammunition, as that is beyond the Panel's mandate.

91. This combination of surplus indigenous small arms ammunition production capacity and relatively low logistical supply requirements means that the current arms embargo does not appear to be an effective means of controlling the supply of such ammunition, of 7.62 mm calibre, into Darfur to Government forces. Yet this is the type of ammunition predominantly used in virtually all cases of armed violence within Darfur. The Panel has examined two options for improving the control of such ammunition into Darfur:[64] (a) further targeting sanctions measures for small arms ammunition (see paras. 93-96); and (b) reducing the risks of proliferation of Government stocks within Darfur (see para. 97).

92. In figure 1 of report S/2014/87, the Panel identified that, during 2013, the primary route of supply of small arms ammunition and weapons to the armed opposition groups was via capture from Government forces after successful combat engagements. During 2014, the number of engagements initiated by the armed opposition groups fell to 54 per cent of the levels recorded in 2013 for the same period. This is mainly as a result of the groups moving to "safe areas" during the "Operation Decisive Summer" offensive of the Rapid Support Forces. Thus the opportunities for those groups to resupply have been reduced. It is also probable that their expenditure of small arms ammunition fell to a similar level.

Control of materials and components for small arms ammunition manufacture

93. The Panel has analysed the raw materials and components necessary for the manufacture of small arms ammunition in order to see if this could be a potential option for recommending more effective targeted sanctions. Any disruption of the production of such ammunition in the Sudan could have the potential of restricting its supply into Darfur.

94. The majority of raw materials necessary for the manufacture of such ammunition are common materials such as copper, zinc, steel and lead, which are widely used in large quantities by many other industries. Targeted sanctions to restrict supplies of such materials are unrealistic and operationally unachievable.

95. The Panel identified two specific chemical compounds necessary for the manufacture of the percussion cap:[65] (a) lead nitrate;[66] and (b) styphnic acid.[67] These are the chemical compounds required to manufacture the sensitive high explosive lead styphnate[68] commonly used in percussion caps. The two chemical compounds have few other commercial uses,[69] none of which are known to be present as significant industrial manufacturing concerns within the Sudan. Yet, to produce one million rounds of small arms ammunition would only require an estimated 27.5 kg of lead nitrate and 21.25 kg of styphnic acid.

[64] In response to requests made during informal consultations.

[65] Also referred to as the primer or primer cap. A small metallic cap or cup containing a small charge of an impact-sensitive (often a fulminating powder) or electric-sensitive chemical mixture. It is located in the base of the cartridge case and exploded by percussion to fire the propelling charge of small arms ammunition.

[66] United Nations serial number 1469.

[67] United Nations serial number 0219 or 0394.

[68] United Nations serial number 0130.

[69] Other commercial uses are (a) the production of industrial dyes; (b) the manufacture of matches and fireworks; (c) staining for industrial mother-of-pearl production; or (d) industrial pharmaceuticals.

96. It is therefore not practicable to utilize existing targeted sanctions mechanisms on precursor materials to disrupt the supply of raw materials for the manufacture of small arms ammunition in Sudan, and hence reduce transfer risks to Darfur. Such sanctions would effectively be unenforceable as a result of (a) the widespread use of the majority of raw materials required; or (b) the very small quantities of "unique" precursor chemicals required are easily transported and widely obtainable.

Reduction of proliferation risks for weapons and ammunition during storage

97. In paragraph 6 of its resolution 2138 (2014), the Security Council called upon the Government to improve its standards of physical security and stockpile management of weapons and ammunition. The Government should therefore be encouraged to implement the guidance provided in the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) 05.20 Stockpile management — weapons, International Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 03.10 Inventory management and IATG 09.10 Security systems and principles. This would assist in improving the standards of security for weapons and ammunition storage areas and thus reduce any risks of proliferation to criminals and armed opposition groups. The Ordnance Disposal Office of UNAMID could provide any necessary advice and assistance to the Government on physical security and stockpile management.

Weapons recovered from armed opposition groups by the Government of the Sudan

98. On 2 November 2014, the Panel, after a request, was invited to an ordnance depot near Bahri, the Sudan, to view a sample of weapons recovered from the armed opposition groups in Darfur by Government forces (see table 3).[70]

Table 3
Small arms recovered from armed opposition groups in Darfur by Government forces

Serial	*Calibre*	*Type*	*Serial number markings*	*Production dates*	*Consistent with manufacturer*[71]	*Remarks*
1	7.62 x 51 mm	Rifle FN SLR	KA16373	1954>	14 countries[72]	Broken
2	7.62 x 51 mm	Rifle (M14)	590805	1958-1964	United States of America	Functional
3	9 x 19 mm	Pistol (Jericho)	36306530	1991>	Israeli Weapons Industries, Israel	Functional
4	9 x 19 mm	Sub Machine Gun (Uzi)	060768	1954>	4 countries[73]	Functional
5	40 x 46 mm	Grenade Launcher	202361	1961>	United States of America	Broken

[70] The Government also produced an empty launch tube from an anti-tank guided weapon and control unit. Identification of the system by the Panel is ongoing.

[71] The markings, materials and design are consistent with this particular manufacturer. The similarities are such that it is highly probable that the ammunition can be attributed to this particular manufacturer.

[72] Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Mexico, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zimbabwe. Sold to over 90 countries.

[73] Israel (Israel Military Industries/Israel Weapon Industries), Belgium (FN Herstal), China (Norinco) and United States of America (Lyttleton Engineering). Sold to 90 countries.

99. The age of most of these weapons, combined with the large number of producers and users, means that it highly probable that any tracing requests by the Panel in accordance with the principles of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)[74] would not be productive. The Panel has, however, submitted one tracing request to a Member State.[75]

100. It is almost certain though that none of these weapons are in regular use by, or of standard issue to, any of the armed opposition groups. Logistical support for the particular ammunition types required would not be possible to guarantee or even easily arrange within Darfur and the Panel has seen no evidence of any recent resupply of such ammunition types from outside Darfur.

101. The Government did not maintain best practice chain of custody evidence for these weapons since their recovery and thus the weapons are of little evidential value.

VII. Monitoring of offensive military overflights, including aerial bombardments, and aviation assets in Darfur

102. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1556 (2004), 1591 (2005) and 1945 (2010), the Panel continues to focus on monitoring and investigation activities in order to identify any violations relating to military aviation assets by the Government of the Sudan or other Member States during the Panel's current mandate. The Government is the only party to the conflict in Darfur that operates offensive aviation assets and controls airspace.

A. Offensive military air operations

103. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) demand that no offensive overflights take place in and over Darfur. Yet this requirement has not had an impact on the actions of the Sudanese Air Force. The Panel has continued to receive reports of alleged offensive military air operations, with a significant proportion of such operations occurring in the Jebel Marra area. A summary of this information is set out in annex XI. The Panel continues to analyse the frequency of reported offensive air operations against previous historical open source data.

104. The rate of reported offensive air strikes for the first 10 months of 2014 fell to approximately 62 per cent of the historical average level over the same period between the years 2006 and 2013, as shown in figure 8. Consistent with this, the Panel observed a significant decrease in sorties conducted by the Sukhoi Su-25 and Antonov An-26 aircraft based at El Fasher Forward Operating Base.

105. However, during the final two weeks of October 2014, the Panel observed almost daily flights conducted by the El Fasher-based An-26 aircraft, and occasional sorties conducted by a pair of Su-25 FGA aircraft. The rate of reported offensive air strikes in October 2014 increased compared to the rate in the preceding months (see annex XI).

---

[74] International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, A/CONF.192/15, dated 8 December 2005.

[75] Request sent on 4 November 2014, therefore no response was expected before production of the present report.

Figure 8
Reported air attacks in Darfur (1 January 2006-31 October 2014)



B. Overview of Sudanese Air Force assets in Darfur[76]

106. During the current mandate, the Panel observed that the number of Sudanese Air Force assets present in Darfur had reached a historic low for the period 2006-2014. In September 2014, the Panel observed only four aircraft operated by the Air Force and being based in Darfur:

(a) One Antonov An-26 transport aircraft (based at El Fasher Forward Operating Base);

(b) Two Sukhoi Su-25 fighter ground attack aircraft (based at El Fasher Forward Operating Base);

(c) One Mil Mi-17[77] transport helicopter (based at Nyala Forward Operating Base).

107. The Panel observed, or obtained credible evidence of, the certain presence of the following aircraft operated by the Sudanese Air Force based in Darfur. This includes aircraft deployed to Darfur as a replacement for others:

[76] An overall historical summary of Sudanese Air Force assets in Darfur is set out in annex XII.

[77] Specifically the Mi-171 Type. Mi-17 is used for consistency.

Table 4
Summary of Sudanese Air Force aircraft operating in Darfur

Serial	*Type*	*Quantity*	*TN*	*Role*	*Remarks*
1	Su-25	5	205, 207, 208, 210, 214	FGA/CAS	Plus two written-off TN 204, 212
2	An-26	2	7706, 7715	Transport/(Light bomber)	See paragraph 124
3	Mi-17	3	543, 544, 546	Transport	
4	Mi-24P/Mi-35	2-3	TN TBC	Attack	Not seen since May 2014

108. During the reporting period the Panel observed, or had credible evidence of, the following Sudanese Air Force aircraft that were certainly based outside Darfur and almost certainly providing logistical support to the national armed forces in Darfur (see table 5).

Table 5
Summary of Sudanese Air Force transport aircraft supplying Darfur

Serial	*Type*	*Quantity*	*TN Civil registration*	*Role*	*Remarks*
1	An-12	2	9966/ST-KNR,[78] 9977	Transport	TN 9977 is a new sighting
2	An-26	2	7717, 7719	Transport	7717 was based in Darfur during 2013
3	An-30	2	7704, 7708	Transport	
4	An-32	3	7710/ST-ALM,[79] 7720, 7721	Transport	See paragraph 118 for use of TN 7720 in bomber role. 7721 is a new sighting
5	Il-76TD	2	ST-APS, ST-AZZ	Transport	See paragraph 130

C. Newly identified Sudanese Air Force assets in Darfur

109. The Panel has evidence that the Su-25 marked with TN 205 was operating in Darfur during 2011, but had not been reported during previous mandates. It is therefore reported as a new sighting (see figure 9) for the purpose of the present report.

110. The Sudan has not submitted any exemption requests for the deployment to Darfur of Su-25 with TN 205 to the Committee. The deployment of this aircraft is therefore certainly a violation of the arms embargo by Sudan.

[78] This aircraft has dual military/civil registration.
[79] Ibid.

Figure 9
Su-25 (TN 205) operating from El Fasher Forward Operating Base (May 2014)

111. The Panel has evidence that the An-26 marked with TN 7715 was operating in Darfur during 2011, but it had not been reported during previous mandates. It is therefore reported as a new sighting. The Sudan has not submitted any exemption requests for the deployment to Darfur of an An-26 with TN 7715 to the Committee. The use of this type of aircraft, for the resupply of military equipment, or in the improvised or designed bombing role (see para. 124),[80] would constitute a violation of the arms embargo by the Sudan. The Panel continues to monitor the situation.

D. Military aviation operational levels and deployments

Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft

112. During the current mandate, the Panel observed two to three Su-25 aircraft simultaneously deployed in Darfur at the El Fasher forward operating base. In December 2013, two Su-25s were present in El Fasher: TN 201 and 214. The Panel reported during previous mandates on the presence in Darfur of Su-25s with TN 207, 208 and 210.[81] The redeployment of TN 207, 208 and 210 to Darfur without prior authorization by the Committee is certainly a routine violation of the arms embargo by the Government of the Sudan. The Panel defines it as routine as it is a regular process that is determined by scheduled aircraft servicing and maintenance requirements.[82]

113. In the first half of the current mandate, the Panel observed that the three active[83] Su-25s were fitted with two B-8M1 rocket launcher pods each, which is the parent launcher for the 80 mm S8-DM rockets (see figure 10). However, during the

[80] See also S/2014/87, paras. 107-116.
[81] S/2011/111, para. 82 and S/2014/87, para. 85.
[82] S/2014/87, para. 118.
[83] TN 205, 207 and 208.

latter half of 2014, the three active[84] Su-25s present at El Fasher forward operating base had been rearmed with UB-32 rocket launcher pods, which is the parent launcher for the 57 mm S-5 rockets (see figure 11).

Figure 10
Su-25 (TN 207) on 31 May 2014 fitted with two B-8M1 rocket launcher pods



Figure 11
Su-25 (TN 210) on 28 October 2014 fitted with UB-32 rocket launcher pods



114. The Panel continues to receive reports that mention the use of attack/close air support aircraft in air strikes on civilian targets.[85,86] For example, the air strike on 26 April 2014 at Orschi almost certainly involved the use of Su-25 in their primary offensive ground attack role (see paras. 59-61).

115. The Panel therefore finds that the Sukhoi Su-25 attack/close air support aircraft are almost certainly used in Darfur in their primary role as attack/close air support aircraft, in violation of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005). The Government, by transferring these aircraft into Darfur, is certainly routinely violating the sanctions imposed by the Security Council.

[84] TN 207, 208 and 210.
[85] Confidential sources.
[86] For the national armed forces' rationale for their deployment, see S/2014/87, para. 95.

Mil Mi-24 multi-role attack helicopters in Darfur

116. The Panel has evidence that either two or three Mi-24 helicopters, of Mi-24P or Mi-35 variants, were simultaneously deployed at the Nyala forward operating base until the middle of May 2014. The Panel has not identified these aircraft as being operational in Darfur since then, probably as a result of their deployment elsewhere.

117. The Panel has no evidence that Mi-24 have operated from the airfields of El Geneina, Tine and Zalingei, or the Kutum helipad[87] during the reporting period.

E. Antonov aircraft involved in "special operations" in Darfur

An-32 deployed in bomber configuration to Darfur

118. During the current mandate, the Panel observed in El Fasher that An-32 TN 7720 (manufacturer's serial number 2208)[88] was equipped with four BDZ-34 hard points (coloured orange in figure 12 for clarity), each hard point is designed to carry a 500 kg bomb.[89] The aircraft was observed during the period of the previous mandate, without such hard points fitted. The Panel has yet to obtain evidence that An-32 TN 7720 has been used for offensive overflights within Darfur.

Figure 12
An-32 (TN 7720) as observed in Darfur in November 2013 (top) and in May 2014 (bottom)



[87] The Panel has not observed or received information that any (semi-) permanent support equipment has been located at those four locations during the current mandate, which means these airfields currently lack the capability to support such aircraft.

[88] Manufacturer's serial number confirmed by the manufacturer.

[89] S/2014/87, para. 116.

Flight details on An-26 aircraft based in El Fasher

119. The Panel obtained information from a confidential source concerning the flight patterns of the An-26 when leaving El Fasher for "special operations" flights. The standard practice is that aircrews communicate their destination, estimated time of arrival at the destination, flight endurance[90] and the number of people on board to air traffic control prior to departure. The aircrew of the An-26 on such "special operations" flights do not provide these details to air traffic control.

120. The "special operations" flights differ from other flights departing El Fasher in that the aircraft maintain contact with air traffic control at El Fasher for the majority of the flight. After departure, all other aircraft leaving El Fasher, with the exception of the Su-25, are advised to contact air traffic control at destination. On a few occasions, the An-26 was told to "continue operation" and requested to "report for rejoining" by air traffic control. This means that the aircraft had left El Fasher-controlled airspace and was being ordered to announce its return into that controlled airspace.

121. The Panel has observed that "special operations" flights return to El Fasher after a flight time of two-and-a-half to four hours. Such flight times fall within the endurance of the An-26, and the Panel is almost certain that on these, occasions the An-26 remains airborne within Darfur.

122. On return to El Fasher, An-26 with TN 7706 was heard to use the term "estimated time on target" to air traffic control. Although the crew may have been joking, such a term is only usually used by air intercept, attack or bomber aircraft. The term can also be used, but less routinely, by military transport in the air dispatch role.

123. The Panel has identified that, within days of a "special operations" flight, reports often emerge of one or more air attacks occurring within the same time frame that the aircraft was airborne. Such reports do not emerge when the El Fasher-based An-26 aircraft is on the ground, or engaged in transport or liaison flights.

An-26 in the improvised bomber role

124. The Panel obtained chronological imagery, (including figures 13A and 13B), taken at El Fasher forward operating base on 28 October 2014. This clearly shows a forklift, loaded with four improvised air-delivered munitions,[91] approaching the An-26 aircraft with tactical number 7715. The intent is almost certainly to load them onto the aircraft.

[90] The time period the aircraft can stay airborne without refuelling, for the An-26 a maximum period of between 4.5 and 5.5 hours.

[91] For previous analysis see S/2014/87, figure 16.

Figures 13A and 13B

An-26 aircraft with tactical number 7715 being loaded with improvised air-delivered munitions at El Fasher forward operating base (28 October 2014)

125. The munitions being loaded onto the aircraft are certainly improvised air-delivered munitions and are unpackaged. It is almost certain that they would never be loaded this way for purely transportation purposes. Such munitions can only be dropped by rolling out of the large door located in the belly or aft of the fuselage, as they have no suspension lugs. The El Fasher-based An-26 aircraft, with tactical numbers 7706[92] and 7715,[93] are therefore highly suited to this task.

126. The Panel notes that the An-26 aircraft with tactical number 7706 has manufacturer's serial number 10404. This particular aircraft was registered as ST-ZZZ during 2006-2007. Another An-26 aircraft, with manufacturer's serial number 10407, that crash-landed at El Fasher in 2006, and whose wreckage was at El Fasher airport,[94] also used that registration number at the same time. The Panel

[92] The An-26 aircraft with tactical number 7706 has been observed in El Fasher in September and October 2014.

[93] The An-26 aircraft with tactical number 7715 has been observed in El Fasher in May, June and late October 2014.

[94] In December 2013 the Panel asked the Government of the Sudan if it could visit the derelict, which "was written off by the Sudanese armed forces two years ago". In September 2014, the Panel again requested permission from the acting national focal point to visit the derelict of ST-ZZZ, but then observed on arrival in Darfur that the wreckage had been moved. As the Panel had seen it in May 2014, it is surmised that the derelict of An-26 ST-ZZZ (manufacturer's serial number 10407) was removed from El Fasher airport in June or July 2014.

has always suspected that the main purpose of having two An-26 registered as ST-ZZZ was in an attempt to confuse observers and disguise their involvement in aerial bombardments.[95]

127. The Panel therefore concludes that the An-26 aircraft with tactical numbers 7706 and 7715 are cargo aircraft that are almost certainly regularly used in an improvised bomber role. The transfer to Darfur of such aircraft, when subsequently used in an improvised bombing role, is therefore almost certainly a violation of the arms embargo by the Sudan. The Panel cannot discount the probability that An-26 aircraft with other tactical numbers are also used in such a role in Darfur.

128. The dropping of improvised munitions from a height of between 5,000 and 8,000 feet above the ground[96] from an aircraft that is not properly equipped for the bombing task (no proper release mechanism, no proper release orientation and no proper target finding/locking system) leads to highly inaccurate bombing with a large circular error probability.

129. Civilians and other civil targets are likely to be hit using this highly imprecise bombing method and, consequently, the Antonov An-26 with tactical numbers 7706 and 7715 are almost certainly operating in violation of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts.

F. Supply flights with civil registered aircraft to Darfur

130. The Panel has observed, or obtained compelling information on, two civil registered Ilyushin Il-76TD transport aircraft, ST-APS and ST-AZZ, which have conducted military supply flights from Khartoum to Nyala, Geneina Sebera and El Fasher during the current mandate. The Panel obtained information that the flights were executed under military call sign Gadir 101. This call sign has been previously mentioned in paragraphs 102 and 103 of S/2007/584 in relation to supply flights for the national armed forces.

131. The Panel asked the Government to provide details on two particular supply flights observed by the Panel in Darfur during the reporting period: (a) a supply flight conducted by Il-76TD, registered as ST-AZZ, to El Fasher on 11 August 2014; and (b) a supply flight conducted to Nyala by Il-76TD, with registration ST-APS, on 16 September 2014.

132. The Government responded that the flight on 11 August 2014 conducted by ST-AZZ was a flight "under request of the Ministry of Defence t transport food supplies from Khartoum to El Fasher".[97] Details such as the flight manifest, the flight number or name of the operator were not provided to the Panel.

133. On the flight conducted on 16 September 2014 by ST-APS, the Government responded that the flight was a "commercial flight" and provided the manifest. The

[95] See also S/2007/584, paras. 200, 209 and 210.

[96] Between 1,700 and 2,700 m is a safe height to stay out of range of ground fire. The average elevation of Darfur taken into account, the aircraft operates at an altitude of 12,000 to 15,000 feet (4,000-5,000 m) above sea level, which is the maximum altitude at which to operate with an unpressurized cabin (owing to an opened aft door).

[97] Letter dated 28 October 2014 from the Government addressed to the Panel.

manifest reads that it was operated by Kush Aviation under flight number KUH 105.[98] One package according to the manifest contains "horse" of 1,000 kg, which might correspond with the two horses observed near the aircraft (see figure 14). Besides the two horses, the Panel also observed a number of 4x4 technicals, of which some were painted in a camouflage scheme similar to that used by the national armed forces, or armed groups supported by those forces.

Figure 14
Il-76TD ST-APS at Nyala airport on 16 September 2014

134. The Panel has indeed obtained evidence that ST-APS occasionally conducts flights as KUH 105, however for most flights the aircraft operates as Gadir 101. The Panel was not able to verify the contents of Gadir 101 flights by physical checks or through a verification of the documentation that should accompany the payload. The Panel continues to monitor the situation.

135. The manufacturer, Ilyushin Open Joint Stock Company, on its website,[99] confirms that ST-APS has manufacturer's serial number 1023409316, and ST-AZZ has serial number 1023408265. The two aircraft have been previously mentioned (see Panel report S/2007/584, paras. 97 and 98 and 102 and 103)[100] in relation to the supply of the national armed forces in Darfur. Manufacturer's serial number 1023408265 was then operating under a different registration, XT-FCB. Panel investigations continue.

VIII. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights

136. In accordance with Security Council resolution 2138 (2014), the Panel investigated threats to stability in Darfur, violations of international humanitarian law, sexual and gender based violence and allegations of the recruitment of children.

[98] Ibid.
[99] See www.ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/, accessed on 16 November 2014.
[100] Paras. 97, 98 and 102, 103.

A. Attacks against the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

137. A total of 35 incidents of armed violence against African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) personnel were reported between 1 January and 31 October 2014. The incidents resulted in five fatalities and nine injuries. This equates to a decrease of 30 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively, compared against the 2013 statistics.

138. The killings of five United Nations peacekeepers in Northern and East Darfur during 2014 were the result of three separate incidents (see table 6).

Table 6
Summary of incidents resulting in African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur fatalities, 2014

Date	*Location*	*Fatalities*	*Battalion*	*Incident description*	*Perpetrators*
24 May	Kabkabiya, North Darfur	1	RWANBATT 40	Peacekeeper was participating with team site Commander in a government-initiated mediation process, 20 m outside UNAMID team site	Commander of the armed group identified
19 September	El Daein, East Darfur	1	NIBATT 43	Peacekeeper was on duty at an observation post, inside the Sector headquarters.	Unknown
16 October	Shoba (Korma), North Darfur	3	ETHBATT13	Peacekeepers were on duty near a water point, 0.2 km from the team site	Described as Arab militia, unknown

139. The continued attacks against UNAMID are attributable to (a) general insecurity in Darfur; (b) worsening economic conditions for the population; (c) weakness in the rule of law, as demonstrated by the paucity of arrests and prosecutions and the resultant impunity; (d) a perception by criminals that UNAMID personnel and objects are easy targets; and (e) ineffective follow-up of cases by stakeholders.

140. Of the 12 attacks reported by the Panel in 2013, to date, only one case has resulted in an arrest.[101] The Panel is unaware of any arrests made in 2014 with respect to attacks against UNAMID that resulted in fatalities. On 18 September 2014, the Special Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes successfully prosecuted four men

[101] See "Sudan confirms arrest of suspect involved in killing of UNAMID peacekeepers", *Sudan Tribune*, 1 January 2014, available at www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49419. The Panel requested, but did not receive, an update on steps taken following the arrest. Panel letter dated 14 September 2014 to the Government of the Sudan.

for armed robbery and the rape of an international staff member of UNAMID, which occurred in 2014.

141. Directing an attack against personnel and objects[102] involved in a peacekeeping mission "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict", is prohibited[103] and such attacks constitute war crimes.

Attack against the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur at Kabkabiya (24 May 2014)

142. On 23 May 2014, an altercation occurred between a Field Officer[104] of the national armed forces and a group of Fur internally displaced persons,[105] who had allegedly threatened that Field Officer. On 24 May 2014, the Field Officer deployed between 80 and 150 "armed men" to arrest those who had threatened him the previous day. The armed men were under the authority, command and control of the Field Officer.[106]

Figure 15
Armed men near the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur team site, Kabkabiya (24 May 2014)[107]

143. Community leaders, at the request of the Government of the Sudan, were invited, together with UNAMID and the Field Officer, to mediate the crisis between the Field Officer, his men and the internally displaced persons. The armed group first opened fire on an unarmed community leader, and then when UNAMID arrived, at UNAMID. In the subsequent exchange of fire between UNAMID and this armed group, one civilian, one UNAMID peacekeeper and two armed men were killed. Two community leaders and three peacekeepers were injured.

144. The Panel is certain of the identity of the Field Officer who was responsible for the gathering of the armed men and is almost certain that (a) he was present during the attack against UNAMID; and (b) he had command responsibility during the incident.

[102] Such objects include installations, material, units or vehicles.

[103] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) customary international humanitarian law, rule 33.

[104] A Field Officer being an officer in command, or serving on the staff, of the rank of either Major, Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel.

[105] Official sources indicate that the internally displaced persons "belonged" to LJM. Letter dated 28 October 2014 from the acting national focal point.

[106] The Government of the Sudan independently confirmed the above finding of the Panel. Ibid.

[107] Confidential source.

145. It is almost certain that attacks on the community leaders and subsequently, the United Nations peacekeepers, were deliberate and unprovoked attacks that occurred while they were providing support to a government-initiated local mediation process. Such actions are an impediment to the peaceful resolution of local conflicts in Darfur, adversely affect the stability of Darfur[108] and violate international humanitarian law (see table 10). Yet the Panel is also certain that this armed violence was the result of the actions of an individual's initiative and not as a result of following deliberate or specific orders from the national armed forces.

146. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider a designation in accordance with paragraph 3(c) of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005).[109]

Abduction of a United Nations peacekeeper in Nyala (9 March 2014)

147. On 9 March 2014, one United Nations peacekeeper (NIBATT 43) was abducted 10 km from Nyala Sector headquarters while he was driving a water tanker, unescorted, from Dereige internally displaced persons camp to UNAMID Sector headquarters. The abductors, in two green 4x4 technicals, hijacked the water tanker and abducted the peacekeeper. The abductors demanded ransom for his release. He was held in captivity for 54 days. The Panel interviewed the peacekeeper and commenced preliminary investigations. However, given that internal investigations are ongoing, the Panel will not comment further. Attacks against peacekeeping personnel and objects and the hostage-taking of peacekeepers are violations of international humanitarian law and constitute war crimes.[110]

B. Abductions of humanitarian workers

148. Darfur witnessed a spate of abductions for ransom in the first seven months of 2014. Civilian humanitarian relief personnel are protected against attack and hostage-taking under international humanitarian law.[111]

149. Abductions are now carried out with impunity in Darfur. The Panel finds the lack of arrests a cause for concern, given that the authorities interacted with perpetrators while negotiating the release of hostages. Abductions in South Darfur reduced significantly after the Governor of that state imposed emergency regulations aimed at cracking down on criminal activity in the area.[112]

[108] Under the provisions of Security Council resolution 2138 (2014), para. 14.

[109] The detailed findings of the Panel, basis and criteria for the recommendation, supporting evidence and information concerning the identity is set out in Confidential Annex I.

[110] Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(c)(iii), (e)(iii).

[111] Customary international humanitarian law, rule 31.

[112] See para. 58.

Figure 16
Summary of abductions of humanitarian workers in the Sudan (2004-2014)[113]



Abduction at Nyala (6 July 2014)

150. In Nyala, South Darfur, on 6 July 2014, the International Organization for Migration Head of Office in South Darfur was abducted when gunmen driving in a land cruiser intercepted him along the road between UNAMID Sector headquarters and Nyala town.[114] He was held in captivity for 20 days, during which he was periodically denied access to food and water.[115] A ransom was demanded for his safe release.

Abduction at Kutum (18 May 2014)

151. Between 1100 and 1200 hours on 18 June 2014, over 25 humanitarian workers, travelling in four vehicles, were abducted in three separate incidents by two elements of the same armed group.[116] Most were released within 24 hours of the abduction with the exception of two Sustainable Action Group employees (released on 2 July 2014), two GOAL International staff (released on 19 July 2014) and one United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) staff member (released on 19 July 2014).[117] Ransom was demanded for the safe release of the longer term abductees.

[113] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Bulletin, 20 July 2014. While this figure shows the total number of abductees in the Sudan, the majority were abducted in Darfur.

[114] Information available from http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=11027&mid=14214&ItemID=23681, accessed on 12 November 2014.

[115] Confidential source.

[116] The humanitarian workers were all locally employed staff. Two groups from Sustainable Action Group and GOAL were abducted approximately 5 km from Karakasala Village (30 km south of Kutum) with the other group, (GOAL/UNICEF) being abducted 1.5 km from the Kutum team site helipad. The workers were engaged in a humanitarian assistance mission when the abduction took place.

[117] Information available from www.unicef.org/media/media_74444.html, accessed on 20 July 2014.

152. The Panel, on the basis of credible information and the results of its own investigations, concludes that:

(a) It is almost certain that the abductors were targeting specific individuals, based on individual and group discussions with the abductors;[118]

(b) It is almost certain that the abductees released prior to 19 July 2014 were not physically abused and females were released in the first instance;

(c) Is almost certain that these were pre-planned, coordinated and well targeted operations by the same armed group.

153. The deteriorating security situation during this period resulted in GOAL scaling down its operation in Kutum. 13,000 individuals used to benefit from GOAL health services.[119]

C. Deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objects[120]

154. The first six months of 2014 saw a pattern of deliberate targeting of and/or indiscriminate attacks on civilians with actual or perceived allegiance to the armed opposition groups, and sporadic attacks on those perceived to be aligned to the Government of the Sudan. The effects of this have resulted in 3,324 villages being destroyed in Darfur over the five-month period surveyed by the Darfur Regional Authority, from December 2013 to April 2014.[121] There also has been a significant increase in the number of displacements. There have been 431,291 reported displacements up until 31 October 2014, of which approximately 390,000 were displaced in the first six months of the year. These figures exceed previous annual displacements since 2006 and demonstrate the overall impact of the armed violence on the civilian population.

[118] The abductors concentrated and then segregated the group on the basis of gender, job and organization. Thereafter, they held individual interviews with most of the abductees.

[119] Data from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

[120] This includes dwellings, residences, hospitals, medical units, civilian means of transportation and schools.

[121] More information on the Darfur Regional Authority survey available from www.radiodabanga.org/node/76724, accessed on 10 July 2014.

Figure 17
Total number of new displacements in Darfur (1 January 2003-31 October 2014)[122]



155. International humanitarian law prohibits deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against civilians, the civilian population and civilian objects.[123] It also prohibits spreading terror among the civilian population and exposing civilians to dangers associated with hostilities.[124] Collective punishment of a civilian population is prohibited under all circumstances, including their allegiances to armed opposition groups or the Government of the Sudan.[125]

Responsibility of the Government of the Sudan and associated armed groups for violations of international humanitarian law

156. The Panel is almost certain that the national armed forces, the Rapid Support Forces and armed groups associated with the Government of the Sudan carried out attacks against civilians, the civilian population and civilian objects. It is highly probable that civilian communities were targeted as a result of their actual or perceived affiliations with armed opposition groups.

157. In the incidents investigated, the Panel finds that these forces capitalized on existing inter-community and tribal differences in order to solicit the support of local militias or armed groups to attack the targeted internally displaced persons and resident communities. These attacks were associated with reports of cattle rustling, looting of household material and the removal and destruction of objects

[122] Data from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Figures unavailable for 2005.

[123] See table 9. Additional Protocol II, article 13(2). Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(e)(i), (ii) and relevant customary law.

[124] Additional Protocol II, article 13(1) states that "the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations".

[125] Additional Protocol II, article 4(2)(b) and customary international humanitarian law, rule 103.

indispensable to the civilian population.[126] The Panel is almost certain that these attacks had the tacit support or participation of the national armed forces.

158. The impunity with which these attacks have taken place, as identified in case studies, reflects either the inability or unwillingness of local authorities to protect segments of the civilian population.

159. The Panel also agrees with a Government assessment that some attacks are carried out by armed groups and criminal elements with no links to the Government or to armed opposition groups. For example, in Kobe Al Athar and Kobe Al Ghadi, the Panel finds that it is almost certain that armed groups took advantage of the local insecurity created by parties to the conflict.[127] It is the responsibility of the Government to maintain the rule of law and to prosecute those responsible for such attacks.

160. See subsequent case studies on Khor Abeche and Birka for examples of Government violations of international humanitarian law.

Responsibilities of armed opposition groups for violations of international humanitarian law

161. Reluctance by communities to incriminate the armed opposition groups means that there is limited information on deliberate or indiscriminate attacks carried out by those groups on civilians, the civilian population or civilian objects. Similarly, despite Panel requests, the Government provides virtually no information on this issue.

162. One example is the attack on 4 March 2014 against Taweisha. It is almost certain that SLA/MM carried out this attack, causing significant damage to the civilian infrastructure. The resulting damage included destruction of Government institutions, the main locality store, many civilian houses, vehicles and generators for bore holes. SLA/MM also looted fuel from the local fuel station. Over 81,000 people were displaced as a result of this attack on Taweisha and the surrounding area.[128] These constitute violations of international humanitarian law (see table 10) and war crimes.

163. See case studies on Khor Abeche and Kalma for examples of violations of international humanitarian law by armed opposition groups.

[126] These include foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works. International humanitarian law prohibits parties from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the civilian population. See Additional Protocol II, article 14 and customary international humanitarian law, rule 54.

[127] Panel investigations into the looting and burning of villages, schools and the medical clinic in Kobe area in Korma, North Darfur, beginning on 21 March 2014 revealed that it is almost certain that the attacks were carried out by armed groups identified by witnesses as "janjaweed" and "hajjana" (armed men on camels). Villagers argued that the armed men benefited from the insecurity in the area created by the movement of the Rapid Support Forces through Birka and surrounding areas on 21 and 22 March 2014.

[128] Data from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Impact of armed opposition group activities on civilian communities

164. It is a fact that some civilian communities (1) are perceived to provide; (2) voluntarily provide; or (3) are forced to provide the following to the armed opposition groups:

(a) Information and logistical support;

(b) Finance, either as "taxation", voluntary contributions or otherwise;

(c) The use of the internally displaced persons camps as political and operating bases;

(d) A safe haven for members of armed opposition groups who participate in hostilities.

165. Armed opposition groups often integrate within civilian communities either (a) for tactical reasons or (b) because they undertake a dual role of supporting their families as well as fighting for those groups. Consequently, this translates into families within the internally displaced persons camps supporting the movements, by providing food and shelter, as they are supporting their family members. It is the responsibility of the armed opposition groups to ensure that their activities do not expose the civilian communities to the dangers of military operations, in accordance with international humanitarian law. The events at Khor Abeche on 22 March 2014 are an example of the consequences of such groups' activities in the internally displaced persons camps.

D. Case study — attack on Khor Abeche internally displaced persons camp (22 March 2014)

166. The attack on the Khor Abeche internally displaced persons camp on 22 March 2014 demonstrates the complex linkages between the Government, internally displaced persons, armed opposition groups, local communities (Neteiga and Khor Abeche)[129] and local militias aligned to the Government. At the time of the attack, Khor Abeche was under the de facto control of armed opposition groups.

Events preceding the attack

167. The attack on Khor Abeche was preceded by four events, which are significant in terms of their influence on the subsequent attack on 22 March:

(a) At approximately 1700 hours on 9 January 2014, representatives of SRF[130] were expected to meet in Khor Abeche. It is almost certain that this event contributed to the perception that the internally displaced persons camp was used as a base for armed opposition groups. The initial perception arose as the local area

[129] The population of Neteiga is composed primarily of persons from Misseria tribe, with actual or perceived allegiance to the Government of the Sudan. It is the capital of the administrative unit. Khor Abeche is composed primarily of persons of Zagawa and Bergid tribes, with actual or perceived allegiances to SLA/MM and other non-signatory movements. Following attacks on their village several years earlier, persons from Khor Abeche settled as internally displaced persons in front of the UNAMID team site. Khor Abeche belongs to the same administrative unit as Neteiga.

[130] Confidential source.

was under de facto control of SLA/MM. The belief that the camp was an operational base for such groups contributed to the attack on the camp on 22 March 2014;

(b) On 9 January 2014, during the meeting, an armed confrontation occurred between a local "Arab" armed group leader (Abu Bashir) and SLA/MM, which led to the death of Abu Bashir and at least nine of his men. The Panel finds that:

(i) It is also almost certain that at least one man, belonging to the Abu Bashir group, was gravely injured but still alive at 1030 hours on 10 January 2014. It is almost certain that the armed opposition group denied him appropriate medical care and that this contributed to or resulted in his death. Yet SLA/MM sought treatment for their own injured on 9 January 2014. International humanitarian law requires that all wounded be treated humanely and entitles them to receive, to the fullest extent possible and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition. It prohibits distinction between the wounded on any grounds other than medical ones. This is almost certainly a violation of international humanitarian law (see table 10) and a war crime;

(ii) It is almost certain that the parties exploited the death of Abu Bashir to influence participants' involvement in the attack on 22 March 2014 (see later);

(c) On 15 March 2014, Neteiga was subjected to an aerial bombardment, almost certainly by Su-25 aircraft.[131] The Panel finds that:

(i) It is highly probable that the air strike resulted in injuries to one adult, three children and damage to at least seven houses and to crops.[132] This bombing was indiscriminate, a violation of international humanitarian law and constitutes a war crime;[133]

(ii) It is almost certain that Vice-President Hassabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, accompanied by senior officers of the national armed forces from Nyala, visited Neteiga on 19 March 2014 following the bombardment,[134] highly probably to apologize for the bombing;[135]

(iii) It is possible that the intended target was SLA/MM, who were probably present in the locality of Khor Abeche at that time. The Government of the Sudan subsequently claimed the attack was an error in guidance provided to the pilot. The Government agreed to pay compensation;

(d) On 19 March 2014, in Dilba (near Netiaga), there was an armed confrontation between the Government and SLA/MM, resulting in nine fatalities.[136] This supports the Government argument that SLA/MM was active in the area in the days preceding the attack on Khor Abeche.

[131] Identified from imagery shown to witness.

[132] Confidential source.

[133] Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(e)(i) and relevant customary law.

[134] "Vice President's visit to Neteiga", from Al Rakoba.net. Sources stated that the bombing angered the otherwise pro-Government population, necessitating the high-level visit.

[135] Sources in Neteiga and Khor Abeche collaborated by a confidential source of the Government of the Sudan.

[136] Confidential source.

The attack on 21 and 22 March 2014

168. At approximately 1700 hours on 21 March 2014, the internally displaced persons in Khor Abeche were pre-warned of an imminent attack on their camp and UNAMID team site by relatives in Neteiga, SLA/MM and "Janjaweed". SLA/MM also stated that they were no longer deployed in the area and that the area would therefore be effectively undefended. It is probable that advance warning of the attack on 21 March 2014 was deliberately provided so as to minimize civilian casualties.[137]

169. At approximately 1800 hours witnesses reported that one 4x4 technical entered the camp, abducted one person and left the camp. It is highly probable that this individual was taken to obtain information on the presence of armed opposition groups within the camp.

170. At approximately 1000 hours on 22 March 2014 witnesses observed five 4x4 technicals, highly probably reconnoitring the Khor Abeche UNAMID team site from Neteiga and Menawashi (southerly) directions. This was followed by the main body of 36 camouflaged 4x4 technicals, containing men mainly attired in military dress, as well as two supply trucks and 15 motorcycles (see figure 18).

Figure 18
Convoy at Khor Abeche (22 March 2014)[138,139]



171. The Panel is certain that this convoy consisted of members of the national armed forces, as:

(a) Government sources stated that the attack was directed by the military command in Nyala. The attack was described as a "routine operation" as part of the "Government strategy to fight rebels". The Panel finds that the national armed forces were almost certainly deployed in such strength in order to achieve its operational aim;

(b) The uniforms of the men, the size of the convoy and the weapons systems deployed (see paras. 67-78) almost certainly point to a well-equipped combat-ready patrol of the national armed forces;

(c) Vehicles in the convoy are flying what is almost certainly the Sudanese flag (see figure 6); and

(d) Imagery shows a vehicle with a Government badge (see figure 19).

[137] It is alleged that some segments in Neteiga, including a local leader, opposed the attacks on Khor Abeche and took measures to minimize casualties.

[138] Confidential source.

[139] See also figures 3, 5 and 6.

Figure 19
Vehicle with Sudanese Armed Forces badge at Khor Abeche (22 March 2014)[140]

172. A second armed group of over 100 armed men, mostly in civilian clothes, mounted on camels, donkeys and horses immediately followed the convoy. The convoy deployed to the north and west, whereas the armed men deployed to the east of the UNAMID team site. It is almost certain that this was a planned and coordinated deployment between the national armed forces and an armed militia, which took 30 minutes to effect.

173. It is almost certain that the group of armed men included Misseriya of Neteiga. Nomadic leaders allege that the group included "Arab" tribes hostile towards the internally displaced persons as a result of the death of Abu Bashir (see para. 167).

174. At approximately 1030 hours, once the UNAMID team site was surrounded, three bursts of fire were directed away from the internally displaced persons camp towards the mountains. This is a standard "reconnaissance by fire" tactic designed to provoke a response from any armed opposition groups within, or defending, the camp or local area. Once the armed group sensed that there would be no resistance, they deployed towards the village from all directions in a manner that allowed the witnesses to believe that what followed was a well-coordinated and premeditated attack.

175. The Panel has seen compelling evidence of certain planned and deliberate arson, using multi-point ignition throughout the village, almost certainly designed to ensure the effective destruction of a large part of the village (see figure 20). The arson resulted in the destruction of 80 per cent of the village.

[140] Confidential source.

Figure 20
Results of arson at Khor Abeche (22 March 2014)[141]

176. The attack lasted approximately three hours, during which the perpetrators also looted personal and household belongings (see figure 21). Prior to the arson, the perpetrators also deliberately vandalised and looted community assets, including the grinding mill, school, health centre and water pump. During the attack, an 80-year-old visually handicapped man was burned to death. The Panel is certain that both the national armed forces and the armed men participated in the looting and destruction.

Figure 21
Looting at Khor Abeche (22 March 2014)[142,143]

[141] Confidential source.
[142] Confidential source.
[143] See also figure 19.

177. At approximately 1300 hours, in what was possibly a pre-determined signal to end hostilities, further bursts of gunfire were heard and the armed groups withdrew towards the direction of Menawashi.

178. On the same day, between 1800 and 1830 hours, five individuals, including the community leader of the internally displaced persons and two minors, were abducted from four locations in and around the camp. The two minors were released the same day. It is highly probable that the community leader was tortured during interrogation to obtain information on the location of Abu Bashir's grave.[144] The three persons were released, after 24 days in captivity and a ransom had been paid for their release. It is highly probable that at least one identified perpetrator resides in Neteiga administrative unit.

179. The Panel therefore finds that:

(a) It is almost certain that UNAMID personnel were not the intended target in the attack, as no aggressive action was taken against the UNAMID team site;

(b) It is almost certain that the national armed forces and armed men, including those from the Neteiga locality, participated in a joint attack;

(c) It is almost certain that a group with links to Abu Bashir was involved in the abduction of individuals, and probable that they participated in the attack;

(d) It is almost certain that both the Government of the Sudan and their allied armed groups were responsible for the looting and deliberate attack on civilian objects and for the destruction of objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, such as food stuff and seeds. These are violations of international humanitarian law.[145]

Events subsequent to the attack

180. By 1 June 2014, an official investigation had not yet been initiated at the local level into the looting and destruction. In a September 2014 meeting with the Panel, local authorities emphasized that reconciliation between the two communities was more important than seeking justice.

181. On 11 July 2014, the Government deployed police to Khor Abeche, after an absence of several years. In meetings in September 2014 with the Panel, the residents of Khor Abeche stated that they welcomed the presence of the Government, citing improved security conditions, whereas in May 2014 community leaders had categorically refused any interaction with the Government. The community rejected any possibility of reconciliation with the community in Neteiga locality until their livestock, which were stolen during the attack on 22 March 2014, was returned.

182. The Panel afforded the Government[146] and a leader of the Misseriya community in Neteiga the opportunity to reply to the above allegations. The

[144] Given the hostilities on 9 January 2014 between SLA/MM and the Abu Bashir group, members of his tribe refused to accept his body the next day. The body was then buried by UNAMID.

[145] See table 10. It is also a war crime under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(e)(v).

[146] Letter of 17 October 2014 to acting national focal point.

Government did not respond and the Misseriya community leader denied that they were involved.

E. Case study — attack on Birka, North Darfur, on 20 March 2014

183. Birka was a model village constructed with Arab League funding in 2010 to encourage voluntary returns to the area.

184. At approximately 0830 hours on 20 March 2014, a significant number of vehicles, identified as belonging to an armed opposition group, transited Birka in what villagers described a regular event. During their transit, the group purchased small goods from a shop in Birka. The group did not warn residents that the national armed forces were behind the group. The group left one broken truck outside Birka.

185. Between 1430 and 1500 hours, a large number of Rapid Support Force vehicles, identified by unit signs, entered Birka from the same direction as the armed opposition. The forces then cordoned off the village.

186. At approximately 1700 hours, a search for the armed opposition group commenced. Witnesses reported looting and assaults by groups of 2 to 20 members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) during these searches, which continued for several hours. The soldiers were identified as "RSF", "Arabs" or "non-Sudanese" based on the dialect spoken.

187. During the night, a man was killed by the Rapid Support Forces while protecting his daughters from a possible rape. Following this death, a Commander of the Rapid Support Forces visited the house and apologized for the death caused by his men.

188. During the looting and assaults, a community leader, who consulted with a second Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, stated that they both agreed to divide the village into four protective sectors, with each sector under the responsibility of one of the four of the Rapid Support Force Commanders. A community leader stated that the measures taken by the second Commander of the forces proved effective and that no further violations were reported in his sector.

189. On the morning of 21 March 2014, the first Rapid Support Force Commander re-visited the house of the deceased, participated in funeral rituals, paid 2,000 Sudanese pounds and promised to pay blood money and to punish those responsible. A third Commander addressed the people in the mosque.

190. During 20 and 21 March 2014 the three above-mentioned Commanders of the Rapid Support Forces confirmed that:

(a) There were four Rapid Support Force Commanders in Birka that night.

(b) The Rapid Support Forces were pursuing the armed opposition groups;

(c) The forces had previous information that armed opposition group members could be found in four villages, including Birka;

(d) The forces were compelled to rest in Birka overnight because military regulations prohibited movements after dark;

(e) The forces were present to help the people and not to attack them. However, it had not been possible for them to control the large number of men on the night of 20 March.

191. The Rapid Support Force Commanders requested that people stay in the village and assured them that the forces would leave on 21 March 2014.

192. The Panel finds that it is almost certain that the Rapid Support Force Commanders attempted to prevent attacks against civilians and civilian property, but that the soldiers committed violations whenever they were outside the direct oversight of the commanders.

193. On 21 March 2014, the Rapid Support Forces left Birka. Later that evening, and for several days after, an armed group under the leadership of an identified "Arab" leader in the region, arrived in Birka and surrounding areas. The group looted livestock and other household goods over the next few days, set fire to the huts and compelled villagers to leave the area.

194. The Panel interviewed individuals from the surrounding villages of Usbani, Sarafaya, Jonjona and Abu Senaith, who confirmed that the Rapid Support Forces were in Birka and the local area. They also identified the "Arab" leader and confirmed that his group had destroyed their villages.

195. The Panel interviewed victims and witnesses from Birka in El Fashir, Khartoum and Korma. The Panel did not visit Birka because the 150 families resident in Birka were all displaced as a result of the attack.

196. The Panel continues to investigate this incident. A summary of the violations of international humanitarian law arising from this attack is included in table 10.

F. Case study — disturbances in Kalma internally displaced persons camp, South Darfur

197. Kalma internally displaced persons camp has a population of approximately 126,000 people and is one of the largest such camps in Darfur.[147] It is a highly politicized camp, with known allegiances to Abdul Wahid.

198. It is highly probable that political advisors of Abdul Wahid[148] arrived in Kalma on 27 August 2014. It is probable that this group encouraged the internally displaced persons to conduct mass demonstrations against the Government of the Sudan so as to:

(a) Provoke the Government into using force against the internally displaced persons, at a time when international attention was focused on the national dialogue between the Government and the armed opposition groups, hoping that the resultant media coverage may hinder the national dialogue, which Abdel Wahid opposes;

(b) Demonstrate unity among SLM/AW supporters, given the disunity reported in its ranks.

199. On 4 September 2014, the national armed forces entered and left the camp at Kalma, without incident. On 5 September 2014, demonstrations began in the camp,

[147] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Bulletin Sudan, Issue 44, 2 November 2014.

[148] Leader of SLM/AW and SLA/AW.

allegedly to protest against the incursion by the forces into the camp. This resulted in the death of one female as a result of gunshot wounds and injuries to at least three other civilians.[149,150]

200. The Panel finds that:

(a) It is almost certain that the national armed forces entered the camp without incident, on probably four previous occasions, between 14 August and 4 September 2014;

(b) It is almost certain that protesters, mostly women, carried Abdul Wahid posters and chanted "One Abdel Wahid: one community" during the protest;

(c) It is possible, given the level of organization needed to produce posters, and the fact that the Government had earlier entered the camp without incident, that the protests were premeditated and were not a spontaneous reaction to the entry of the Government on 5 September 2014;

(d) It is highly probable that those supporting Abdel Wahid had an important role in organizing the demonstrations.

201. The Panel understands that the alleged requests of Abdel Wahid to organize this demonstration and to collect financial contributions from the camp has caused friction within the camp, mainly between Fur leaders and other community leaders. There is a strong segment within the camp that resists the use of the camp to further the political agenda of Abdel Wahid. This incident again illustrates the potential risks and hazards to the civilian population of the consequences of association with armed opposition groups.

G. Sexual and gender-based violence

202. Incidents of sexual and gender-based violence continue unabated since 2013, particularly when women go to collect water or firewood or are involved in farming. Children are particularly vulnerable to incidents of opportunistic sexual violence, both outside and inside internally displaced persons camps. Sexual violence and physical assaults are also reported when newly displaced women temporarily return to their villages to collect their belongings. Although sexual violence is alleged during attacks, it is more difficult to obtain verifiable information of these attacks, because the displacement and lack of qualified medical personnel do not enable victims to seek medical care within the stipulated time.

203. The Panel is aware of the allegations of mass rape in Tahbit, North Darfur on 31 October and 1 November 2014 and will continue to monitor the situation.

204. The social stigma associated with sexual violence, because of the nature of the crime and the social, cultural, economic and religious implications, at times, makes affected communities and officials more comfortable with denial. Officials of the Government of the Sudan argue that survivors' inability or the communities' unwillingness to identify perpetrators (for example, for security reasons) contributes

[149] Confidential sources.

[150] The death resulted from a shooting. The origin of the shots is unclear. Some accuse law enforcement officials, while others state that shots may have originated from locals at the marketplace, who intended to disperse the protestors and prevent looting.

to the lack of arrests. Yet, if, at the official level, measures were taken to concede that incidents of sexual violence occur and to actively seek and prosecute those responsible, it could contribute to combating the impunity that allows these violations to continue unabated.

IX. Implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze

205. In accordance with paragraph 3 (d) of its resolution 1591 (2005), the Security Council requires all States to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee. The provisions of paragraph 3 (e) of the resolution require all States to freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources on their territories that are controlled directly or indirectly by designated individuals, or that are held by entities controlled by those individuals or by persons acting on their behalf. All States, particularly those in the region, are required to report on the specific steps they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of the resolution.

206. The Panel has addressed requests to relevant Member States and entities for any information available to them on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1591 (2005). This information is relevant, as it enables the Panel to determine the efficacy of the implementation of the sanctions imposed on designated individuals.

A. Ongoing investigation into designated individuals

207. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 1672 (2006) of 25 April 2006, the Security Council designated four individuals. Investigations continued for (a) the purpose of identifying assets; (b) establishing cases of violations of the travel ban; and (c) following up on violations identified in Panel report S/2014/87.[151]

208. The Government of the Sudan has not yet taken any steps towards implementing paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005), nor has it requested, or received, an exemption from the assets freeze from the Committee to make salary, pension or allowance payments, as reported in Panel report S/2013/79. The Government has categorically indicated that the sanctions cannot apply at the domestic level in the absence of a judicial decision.

Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem

209. The Panel continues to verify additional information on possible violations of the travel ban by Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem. He has stated to the Panel that he had travelled to the United Arab Emirates in 2013. The Panel has addressed several communications to the authorities in the United Arab Emirates over the past year, but no response has been received. It was also verbally raised during a visit by the Panel to the United Arab Emirates on 4 November 2014.

210. In addition to this possible violation of the travel ban, official government sources in Chad confirm that Sheikh Musa Hilal travelled to Chad to attend the second conference for peace, security and peaceful coexistence in Darfur, held at

[151] S/2014/87, 11 February 2014.

Um Jaras from 29 to 31 March 2014. The Panel has not had the opportunity of meeting Sheikh Musa Hilal so as to get his response on this issue. The Panel has formally requested further details from the Government of Chad and a response is awaited. Nevertheless, based on media reports and the confirmation by official government sources in the course of meetings with the Panel, the visit to Um Jaras in March 2014 is almost certainly a violation of the travel ban.

211. Sheikh Musa Hilal is on record[152] as having stated that he made trips to four countries recently. There is no record of any country having requested an exemption from the Committee.

Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (also known as Tek)

212. In paragraphs 179 and 180 of S/2014/87, the Panel identified a possible violation of the travel ban in connection with the entry of Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu into N'Djamena in October 2013, and reported that Chadian authorities are investigating the aforementioned violation of the travel ban. The Panel is still awaiting the result of this investigation from the Government of Chad and reminders have been sent.

Adam Yacub Sharif

213. The Panel has yet to receive any documentary proof to confirm that Adam Yacub Sharif is deceased, as was reported in Panel report S/2013/79.

Implementation by the Sudan

214. The National Coordination Committee of the Government of the Sudan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) reiterated the inability of the Government to implement the travel ban and the assets freeze or designate individuals without appropriate court orders. They further informed the Panel that they had concerns about the implementation of the assets freeze, as in so implementing the freeze, the Government may breach several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Government concern stems mainly from the fact that the designated individuals were not provided an opportunity to defend themselves during the designation process. The Government authorities are concerned that this may be a violation of the basic human rights of the designated individual.

Implementation by Member States

215. In the light of the evidence and information presented in the current and previous reports, violations of the travel ban are a regular occurrence and reflect the current level of implementation by all Member States. Member States are required to take the measures for implementation and enforcement. Moreover, there are very clear provisions for the Committee to grant exemptions, as set out in paragraph 3 (f) of resolution 1591 (2005), with a well-defined procedure elaborated in the "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work". The fact that the Committee has not received any such request, and yet certain designated individuals continue to travel freely, reflects the continued non-implementation of this aspect of

[152] Article available from www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article41521, 6 February 2012, accessed 16 November 2014.

the sanctions regime. The Panel is of the view that, no matter what the justification for travel, unless a request for exemption is presented before the Committee, which then determines whether it is an appropriate case, it would clearly be a violation of the relevant provision of resolution 1591 (2005).

Commercial air travel

216. The Panel initiated enquiries with the 13 airlines that fly between the Sudan and other countries, in order to obtain any evidence of violations of the travel ban and receive indications of the sources of finance of the designated individuals. Responses, in the negative, have been received from six airlines. Seven airlines have not yet responded, despite two reminders. Two of the airlines that operate flights to the United Arab Emirates from the Sudan have not responded; these airlines are obvious options for recent travel by Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem to Dubai.

Asset freeze

217. The Panel has yet to identify any assets either in the name of designated individuals or in the name of anyone acting on their behalf. A detailed request for information was made to the Government of the Sudan, to which a response is still awaited.

B. Financing of armed groups

218. Pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2138 (2014), the Panel was mandated by the Security Council to enquire into the financing and role of armed, military and political groups in attacks against UNAMID personnel in Darfur.

219. The Panel met the group Savana, and its leader, Ali Rizeigallah, in Darfur on 19 October 2014. The leader of the group signed a peace deal with the Government of the Sudan on 14 January 2013, and is presently based in El Daein. Ali Rizeigallah has denied participation in the attack on UNAMID on 18 and 19 April 2013. He is the only one in his group who has received a rank (Lieutenant) from the Government pursuant to the agreement. The Panel investigation into the funding of the Savana armed group (see S/2014/87, paras. 127-133) and the attack is still ongoing.

220. The Panel initiated an analysis of criminal activities (armed robberies and "passage tax" — see annex X) in Darfur in order to identify trends, perpetrators and funding opportunities for armed groups. The perpetrator is rarely identified in reports and the terms "unidentified armed men" or "militia" are widely used.

221. The analysis shows that, in the first half of the year, there were regular attacks on World Food Programme (WFP) trucks and quantities of foodstuffs were looted. These attacks indicate: (a) a lack of food supplies to normal markets; and/or (b) an increase in the use of armed force by armed groups to obtain basic supplies.

222. From August to October 2014, there have been regular carjackings. North Darfur recorded the highest number of incidents, most of which targeted United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations.

223. The local population has also been targeted by criminals, mainly through armed robbery and the rustling of livestock.

Financing of armed groups through illegal vehicle checkpoints

224. The Panel, while scrutinizing other potential methods of resource mobilization by, or on behalf of, the armed groups operating in Darfur, has identified this particular area, which is well organized.

Main supply routes

225. The main supply routes from El Fasher are shown in figures 22A to 22C.

Figures 22A to C
Main supply routes from El Fasher

226. Table 7 summarizes the main supply routes, their hazards and some of the criminal activities used to raise revenue.

Table 7
Summary of main supply routes

From	*Via*	*To*	*Colour code (figures 224-C)*	*Armed group control*	*Tariffs tolls incidents*
El Fasher		Shangil Tobaya	Pink [3]	SLA/AW	Fuel, food and sugar
				SLA/MM	
Abu Zereiga	Shangil Tobaya	Nyala	Pink [3]	SLA/AW	SDG 1,000 + 100L fuel per truck
				SLA/MM	
El Fasher		Kutum	Green [7]	Janjaweed	SDG 3,000 per truck
				Small tribal armed groups	
Kutum	Dor Anka	Fateh Borno	Green [7]	Janjaweed	SDG 3,000/4,000 per truck
Fateh Borno	Um Baru	Tine	Green [7]	SLA/MM	SDG 1,500 annual fee
				LJM	Regular payments to armed opposition group camps
El Fasher	Kornoi	Tine	Green [7]		SDG 600 per truck per vehicle checkpoint
El Fasher		Kebkebiya	Yellow [6]	Janjaweed	Checkpoints every 10 km

From	*Via*	*To*	*Colour code (figures 22A-C)*	*Armed group control*	*Tariffs tolls incidents*
Nyala		El Daein	Blue [4]	Rezeigat and Ma'alia tribal armed groups	
Nyala		Zalingei	Red [5]	SLA/AW	SDG 1,000/1,200 per truck plus food and fuel
Zalingei		El Geneina	Red [5]	Tribal armed groups (Popular Defence Forces)	

Toll fees

227. On the route from Fateh Borno to Tine, via Kornoi and Um Baru, vehicles have to pay a toll to each rebel camp vehicle checkpoint they pass. The groups are mainly SLA/MM, but there are also some JEM factions. The annual toll fee is SDG 1,500 (US$ 263),[153] which is collected at either the Orschi or Abu Gamra checkpoints. A receipt is given, which has to be shown each time the truck travels on this route. Three sample receipts were obtained by the Panel, two of which were issued by SLA/MM — one probably dated 9 November 2013 and the other, 7 February 2014 — and one was issued by LJM, dated 17 February 2014 (see examples reproduced in annex XV).

Vehicle checkpoints

228. All the main factions in North Darfur have well-established vehicle checkpoints, as illustrated in table 8.

Table 8
Examples of illegal checkpoints

Serial	*Route*	*Illegal checkpoint*	*Colour code (figures 22A-C)*	*Operated by*
1	To Kutum	Donkey Shata	Green [7]	SLA/MM SLA/AW
2		Kafowt	Green [7]	Free Will
3		Shegennahara	Green [7]	Arab militia
4	To Kabkabiya	Ingolo	Yellow [6]	SLA/MM
5		Kaora	Yellow [6]	SLA/AW
6		Iddanabak	Yellow [6]	Arab militias

229. Examples of the illegal vehicle checkpoint activity in North Darfur, almost certainly operated by SLA/MM, are in table 9.

[153] Current official exchange rate is approximately US$1.00 = SDG 5.70.

Table 9
Examples of illegal checkpoint activity

Date	*Checkpoint*	*Colour code (figures 22A-C)*	*Convoy*	*Tax*	*Fuel*
14 July	Tangarara	Pink [3]	8 commercial trucks	SDG 15,000 total	Yes
17 July	Thabit	Pink [3]	World Food Programme contracted	SDG 3,000 per vehicle	210L
21 August	Tangarara	Pink [3]	UNAMID escorted	SDG 300 per vehicle	No

230. If the toll is not paid, then the system is that the vehicle is hijacked. Subsequent release of the vehicle involves a phone call to the owner, with instructions to pay the ransom to a local nominated individual. The usual fee is SDG 200,000, which is worth paying as a new truck would cost SDG 1,200,000.

231. In Nyala, South Darfur, the activities of the armed groups have recently decreased, probably because of stricter measures put in place by the local government. The magnitude of the incidents has decreased by between 60 per cent and 70 per cent since the measures were introduced. The government now provides escorts on certain routes, but this involves a waiting time of up to 15 to 20 days, until a convoy is formed. This is sometimes impractical when the truck is loaded, and the waiting time also increases the cost of business. There is a government escort from Nyala to Zalingei once a month. On the Nuhut — El Daein — Nyala route there is a government escort specifically for fuel tankers, which is designed to deny the armed opposition groups easy access to fuel.

232. UNAMID provides convoy escorts for WFP material, including from El Fasher to Um Baru, Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobaya. Some sources suggested that UNAMID protection is probably not very effective, as each escort only consists of three UNAMID vehicles, thus drivers paid the tolls. UNAMID stated that there were only three occasions, in July 2014, when the drivers insisted on paying the toll demanded by the armed opposition groups, despite the patrol commander's instructions to the contrary. The drivers felt that, as they travel regularly on these routes, it would be better to comply rather than face the consequences. Since then, UNAMID has issued strict instructions to the agencies in Khartoum for implementing a system of non-payment. The Panel also finds that it is almost certain that the UNAMID convoy protection is far greater than that claimed above. There were no incidents involving UNAMID convoys in September and October 2014.

233. The data provided in the present report are indicative of the profitability of this venture. The Panel has not been able to estimate the average number of trucks per route per month, as no accurate data are available. Nevertheless, the Panel finds that it is highly probable that an armed group could potentially make in excess of US$10,000 per month. This is probably one of the most important sources of internal revenue for the armed opposition groups and other armed groups.

X. Political process and progress towards removing impediments to the peace process

A. Progress of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

234. The implementation mechanism for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultation was finalized in 2014. After planned consultations with some 9,600 representatives of civil society,[154] the consultation is expected to become an element of the National Dialogue. A Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission has also been established.

235. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Dabajo) has gradually been integrated into the central Government, but their participation in governance within the Darfur Regional Authority, as well in the Darfur representative bodies, is still pending. JEM/Dabajo has concluded an agreement on security arrangements that involves the integration of 3,750 of its members into the national armed forces and police. This integration is to take place in three 6-month phases, each involving 1,350 individuals, the process has already begun. In early November 2014, breakaway factions from JEM, SLM/MM and SLM/AW joined as parties to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

236. The Government of the Sudan has undertaken to pay $158 million to the Darfur Regional Authority in 2014, in the form of a letter of credit, for the financing of 756 microprojects. This credit is the first instalment of the commitments entered into for 2012, 2013 and 2014 (of a total value of $900 million).

237. The State of Qatar has financed the delivery of basic social services for some 20,000 persons per programme in model villages in the five states of Darfur. On 21 September 2014, the Qatar Development Fund signed an agreement with the United Nations Development Programme for the financing of 19 consolidated projects under the foundational and short-term activities ($88.5 million).

B. Delays in implementing the Doha Document

238. Several of the agreed commitments have yet to be implemented. There has been no progress on power sharing (the allocation of 20 per cent of posts in the national administration to Darfurians), nor the holding of a referendum on the permanent administrative status of Darfur. No meaningful measure has yet been taken with respect to the nomadic peoples. The efforts of the Darfur Land Commission, the Voluntary Return Committee and the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission have all stalled owing to the endemic insecurity in the region.

239. The timetable for the security arrangements relating to the planned integration of three battalions of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) into the national armed forces and police was updated on 25 February 2014 and was implemented in November 2014. The delay led to the defection of some 40 individuals from LJM and has accentuated existing internal divisions. On 7 September 2014, an intensive exchange of gunfire took place at the Darfur Regional Authority headquarters in

[154] Qatar has allocated $1.7 million for the holding of the consultations.

El Fasher between supporters of the Chair of the Authority and critics of the security arrangements committee of the Authority.

240. The combination of insecurity and the economic crisis is hampering the implementation of robust rehabilitation and development programmes. People are left to fend for themselves, poverty is increasing and frustration is growing owing to the absence of any tangible peace dividend. A field survey conducted by UNAMID revealed a population sceptical about the commitment of parties to the Doha Document and armed movements to ending conflict.

C. Impediments to the implementation of the Doha Document and peace process

241. In addition to the inertia of the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur Regional Authority, the implementation of the Doha Document faces both internal and environmental challenges.

242. The despondency within the Darfur Regional Authority and LJM is a reflection of an institutional crisis.[155] Officials are critical of the management of the Authority by its leadership. In particular, they criticize (a) the indifference of the civilian leaders to the LJM ex-combatants; (b) the exploitation of tribal loyalties, which works to the detriment of the representation of certain tribes within the leadership and the subsidiary bodies; and (c) policy alignment with that of the dominant party, the National Congress. A prominent leader of the Authority, the Minister for Reconstruction, Development and Infrastructure, Taj Eddine Bashir Niam, tendered his resignation to the President of the Sudan on 7 September 2014. The former Minister has taken the DRA leadership to task for "authoritarian management, failure to consult relevant stakeholders (only two meetings were held in 13 months, as opposed to the monthly meetings that should have been held), refusing to heed warnings, delays in the implementation of the security arrangements, interference in the various bodies and confusion over their powers, weaknesses in launching development projects (which accounts for the reticence of international donors) and a lack of responsible officials in the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund".[156]

243. Furthermore, the precarious security situation is a structural factor that constantly undermines the implementation of the Doha Document.

244. During the first half of 2014, Darfur experienced an escalation of armed violence, marked by:

(a) Sporadic fighting between armed opposition groups and the national armed forces (Sudanese Armed Forces)/Rapid Support Forces;

(b) Terror created by the militias;

(c) Recurring tribal fighting;

(d) Violations of international humanitarian law committed by armed groups that are difficult to identify;

[155] The President of the Darfur Regional Authority acknowledges the existence of a malaise within his movement (interview in the daily newspaper *al-Jarida*, 19 October 2014).

[156] Confidential sources.

(e) Banditry and crime (kidnapping, rape, carjacking, robbery);

(f) Attacks on UNAMID personnel.

245. The armed violence has had a poisonous effect on all areas (political, military, economic and social). It has heightened the suffering of tribal communities, displaced inhabitants, torn the social fabric, led to the destruction of villages and infrastructure and caused damage to the ecosystem.

246. Although SLA/MM,[157] SLA/AK and the SLA/AW have all been active, conducting and coordinating their attacks, they have not obtained the results they had hoped for. In response to attacks by these armed opposition groups, which continue to proclaim their capacity to overturn the regime in short order "using all possible means", the Government of the Sudan mobilized its military and security apparatus. The national armed forces reacted in February 2014 by deploying the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur and it continued its campaign of air strikes.

247. The politicization and militarization of the tribes means that communal fighting continues unabated. Currently, this is mainly between Arab tribes in competition for access to natural resources or disputes over political leadership.

248. Despite the ongoing criminal acts and occasional attacks against UNAMID forces, the second half of 2014 has so far seen the traditional reduction in violence as a result of the rainy season (July to September). The stakeholders' involvement in preparations for the National Dialogue may have also influenced the reduction in violence. Attacks by SLA/MM and SLA/AW in localized areas have lessened. These attacks do not have any strategic significance and do not affect the balance of power in any way. The leader of SLM/AW continues to make occasional use of his supporters in the camps for internally displaced persons in Kalma (South Darfur) and Golo (Central Darfur), but he faces internal dissent from civilian as well as military officials. Meanwhile, in October 2014, the leader of SLA/MM faced opposition from 26 field commanders and a number of civilians, who criticized his poor administrative and financial management of the Movement. Dissidence within SLA/AW and SLA/MM has weakened both these movements.

249. The geographical area of the tribal clashes has become less widespread since July 2014. There is now a relative lull among the many tribes that fought bitterly in 2013 and the first few months of 2014. The Panel has noted persistent tensions between the Arab tribes of Ma'alia and the Rizeigat in East Darfur. Repeated attempts by the Darfurian (Darfur Regional Authority and the Governor) and central (Government of the Sudan) authorities and civil society leaders have failed to lead to a negotiated settlement. Clashes between the Northern Rezeigat (Abbala) and the Beni Hussein in El Sereif region, located in the area of Jebel Amir (North Darfur), the exclusive domain of Sheikh Musa Hilal, are sporadic and not very intense.

250. The degradation of the security situation has affected the social equilibrium, causing divisions and fragmentation in Darfurian society. Violations of tribal rules and values are resulting in social divisions that cause a dislocation of traditional tribal structures. Consequently, the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are no longer functioning effectively. Any agreements for the cessation of local hostilities are temporary and their implementation remains uncertain.

[157] Despite the death of Ali Karbino on 27 June 2014, his group remains active.

D. Regional environment

251. During the period under review, the immediate regional environment of Darfur has deteriorated significantly as a result of radical Islamist agitation in Libya, the Sahel and the Middle East. The Sudan has admitted that "it has provided all means of support and backing to all Libyan rebel factions".[158] The Prime Minister of Libya, while on a visit to Khartoum in late October 2014, commented that Libya has "turned the page" about Libyan suspicions of the Sudan's support for the Libyan jihadists.

252. The Panel finds that Darfur could be "potentially fertile ground" for infiltration by radical Islamists, owing to its porous borders and the cross-border family solidarity between Sudanese tribes and their African "cousins" of Arab descent in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali and the Niger. The Panel has yet to quantify the actual or potential threat that radical Islamist movements pose to the security and stability of Darfur. It is true that the form of Islam practised in Darfur, *Tijaniyah*, which is collegial in nature, and the culture of Darfurian society are resistant to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology of the ruling National Congress Party. Sudanese Islamist militancy, such as (a) "Ansar al-Sunna" (which advocates the strict application of sharia); (b) the "Liberation Party" (which favours the establishment of a caliphate and recruiting from the Army and tribes); or (c) the "Islamic Constitution Front" (among whom a minority openly supports the so-called *Da'esh*,[159] which the Government is reportedly looking to ban), are all unattractive to Darfurians.

253. Chad is still a major regional actor and enjoys good relations with the Government of the Sudan, but has some issues of concern. Waves of radical Islamists from the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria, including Boko Haram,[160] have to be contended with. Furthermore, Chad has to contend with a steady trickle of refugees, as well as nomads trafficking arms and ammunition, from the Sudan.

254. Ethiopia, another key regional actor, maintains good relations with the Sudan. Home to the headquarters of the African Union, and current Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, it is also hosting the inter-Sudanese peace talks. These should lead to the opening of a national dialogue and constitutional process in the Sudan.

255. The ongoing civil war in South Sudan is having a political impact on the Sudanese protagonists. The Government of the Sudan and SRF have both declared their "neutrality" with regard to the civil war. Nevertheless, the Government of South Sudan has stated that the Government of the Sudan is providing significant military support to Riek Machar, while JEM backs the armed deployment of Ugandan troops in support of the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit.[161] During his visit to Khartoum on 4 November 2014, the President of South Sudan agreed with his Sudanese counterpart to put an end to the mutual support they both provide to their respective opponents. The solutions to the problems in the Sudan and South Sudan are closely linked.

[158] Interview with President Al-Bashir in the daily newspaper *Al-Yawm Al-Tami*, 20 October 2014.

[159] Also known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

[160] Now thought to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the Niger. See "Special Report: Boko Haram — between rebellion and jihad", Joe Brock, Reuters, 31 January 2012.

[161] The Government of the Sudan and JEM both continue to deny their involvement in the civil war.

256. The Sudan's relations with Uganda remain tense. Dialogue between the two capitals is almost non-existent. Tensions remain owing to the Sudan's alleged continued support for the Lord's Resistance Army, in particular.

E. National dialogue and constitutional process

257. The national dialogue initiative, launched by the President of the Sudan on 27 January 2014, is designed to inaugurate an inclusive peace process and a constitutional process with all civilian and armed opposition groups. This initiative, known as "al-wathba", meaning "the great leap", which was followed up on 9 August 2014 with a "societal dialogue" involving civil society, has been welcomed by the international community. Various opposition elements and SRF have expressed their tentative support. While favouring a peaceful solution, the opposition groups are demanding a number of preconditions in order to create an atmosphere of trust. The "7+7 Committee",[162] responsible for the dialogue preparation, adopted a road map on 16 August 2014 listing some confidence-building measures, including:

(a) The release of all political prisoners;

(b) The definitive cessation of hostilities;

(c) Comprehensive security arrangements;

(d) The protection of basic freedoms under the justice system.

258. The dialogue will be structured around six priority themes[163] and will last between one and three months. The African Union, the League of Arab States and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel will participate in the dialogue as observers.

259. Ten months after it was announced, the national dialogue has yet to materialize. The reasons for the delay are both psychological and political.

260. The Government of the Sudan and the opposition groups remain deeply suspicious of one another. This serious lack of confidence has led to a range of accusations, which offer an insight into the delaying tactics, posturing, equivocations and evasions by the parties. Each protagonist casts doubt on the sincerity of the other's commitment to a negotiated solution.

261. The Government condemns the opposition groups' diversionary tactics, such as the "Paris Declaration" signed on 9 August 2014 by SRF and the leader of the National Umma Party. The Sudanese authorities consider this a rival initiative to the national dialogue.

262. The Sudanese Revolutionary Front is trying to create a united opposition and denounces Government procrastination. According to them, the Government is taking a long time to adopt concrete confidence-building measures, related to the release of political prisoners and freedom of expression. The Panel's interlocutors at the African Union consider the protagonists' stances and statements obfuscatory.

[162] Comprises of seven representatives from the Government of the Sudan and its allies and seven from Sudanese internal opposition political parties.

[163] These themes are: *peace and unity, the economy, basic rights and freedoms, identity, and foreign affairs.*

263. Thus, major divisions are jeopardizing the start of the national dialogue. Officials in Khartoum have established a clear distinction between the dialogue itself and the negotiations that are a precondition for the participation of SRF in the dialogue in Khartoum. The Government of the Sudan intends to negotiate solely on military matters (the cessation of hostilities and security arrangements) on the basis of the Doha Document. SRF remains hostile to negotiating on the basis of the Doha Document alone and wishes to broaden the scope of the negotiations to also encompass political (power-sharing and wealth) and humanitarian aspects.

264. Rejecting the demands of the opposition groups, which it considers extreme, the Government intends to hold a general election by the constitutional deadline (April 2015) and opposes the formation of an interim Government. At its fourth General Conference, held in Khartoum from 20 to 25 October 2014, the National Congress Party nominated President Al-Bashir as its candidate for the presidential election. SRF believes that this position of the Government jeopardizes the national dialogue.

265. As the time set by the Government for the launch of the national dialogue approaches, in principle around the last week of November 2014, two scenarios are possible. On the one hand, the dialogue will include all of the stakeholders, without exception, or on the other hand, it will be limited to the Government of the Sudan, its satellites and the internal opposition, thus excluding the armed groups and their allies. The second scenario would in no way resolve the Sudan's problems. Worse still, it would, according to SRF, facilitate "the emergence of an uprising (intifada) and the resumption of the armed struggle".[164] The opposition groups are well aware that this prospect would jeopardize stability in the Sudan. Located in a region that is in the grip of deep radical Islamist unrest and facing a profound economic crisis, the Sudan could emerge weaker from the second scenario.

F. Progress towards removing impediments to the peace process

266. Faced with these uncertainties, the Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, Thabo Mbeki, is trying to reconcile the two camps. He has recently taken a step forward by finalizing the "Agreement on the national dialogue and constitutional process", which was signed separately in Addis Ababa, on 5 September 2014, by two representatives of the "7+7 Committee" and by the "Paris Declaration Group" (the Chair of the National Umma Party and the Chair of SRF). After initial hesitation, the Government of the Sudan has accepted the Agreement of 5 September 2014. At the invitation of President of the High-level Implementation Panel, the Government, along with JEM and SLM/MM only, entered into negotiations about the cessation of hostilities and security arrangements on 23 November 2014 in Addis Ababa. SLM/AW declined their invitation to attend these negotiations.

267. Some countries and regional organizations support the dialogue, but their approaches differ slightly. The European Union "supports currents efforts to create a comprehensive platform for the facilitation of the National Dialogue". The Troika on the Sudan (Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States) also supports the

[164] Yassar Araman, Foreign Relations Secretary of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, declaration of 8 October 2014.

national dialogue, but has adopted a position more critical of the Government of the Sudan.

268. Germany enjoys good cooperation with the Sudanese authorities. Under the auspices of their diplomatic service, and with the agreement of the Government the Berghof Foundation organized a meeting with SRF in Berlin, on 1 and 2 October 2014, to discuss, according to the summary of the joint meeting, "two areas critical to the national dialogue and the constitutional process: stopping the war and closing the gaps impeding a comprehensive national dialogue". The Berghof Foundation intends "to consult a variety of Sudanese stakeholders and key international partners, notably the African Union and the United Nations". The German Federal Foreign Office has expressed its readiness to support these initiatives.

269. Chad is also seeking to support the facilitation efforts. Having organized two *loya jirgas* with the Darfurian tribes along the border with Chad (the first Um Jaras Forum in October 2013 and the second in late March 2014), the President of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, was able to resume dialogue with the opposition movements in Darfur. Talks between the three Darfurian movements' delegation on 2 November 2014 in N'Djamena and the Ministerial committee, chaired by the Chad Minister of Foreign Affairs, suggests a thawing of relations between these movements and Chad.

270. At this stage, none of these international efforts are coordinated or truly focused on the same goal. Although some countries have expressed scepticism regarding the position of the Government of the Sudan, various African Union countries and Sudanese opposition groups (including Sadiq al-Mahdi) advocate "international incentives" (such as the lifting of unilateral sanctions and debt cancellation) to encourage the Government to show genuine political will to bring the National Dialogue to a successful conclusion. This would require diplomatic machinery to support and consolidate the facilitation efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel.

XI. Summary of violations of sanctions and international humanitarian law

271. A summary of violations of sanctions and international humanitarian law identified by the Panel in this report is set out in table 10 for ease of reference.

Table 10
Summary of violations

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator: Responsible	Perpetrator: Level of certainty	Security Council resolution reference/Violation of international humanitarian law
1	Arms	Import of small arms ammunition into Darfur	Government of the Sudan	Almost certain	1591 (2005), para. 7
2	Arms	Import of weapons and ammunition into Darfur on or about 11 February 2014	Rapid Support Forces	Certain	1591 (2005), para. 7
3	Arms	Import of S-DM 80mm rockets into Darfur that were used in aerial attack at Orschi on 28 April 2014	National armed forces	Certain	1591 (2005), paras. 6 and 7
4	Arms	Import of AM-A Type Fuzes (fitted to improvised air-delivered munitions) into Darfur that were used in aerial attack on Abuleha on 28 October 2014	National armed forces	Almost certain	1591 (2005), paras. 6 and 7
5	Arms	Import of Rakhsh armoured personnel carrier into Darfur on an unknown date since 29 March 2005	Police	Certain	1591 (2005), para. 7
6	Aviation	Deployment of Sukhoi Su-25 (tactical numbers 207, 208 and 210)) into Darfur from base maintenance in Khartoum	Sudanese air force	Certain	1591 (2005), para. 7
7	Aviation	Niteaga, 15 March 2014, aerial attack by Sukhoi Su-25	Sudanese air force	Certain	1591 (2005), para. 6 Protocol II, art. 13 (2) (protection of the civilian population), art. 14 (protection of objects indispensable to the civilian population)
8	Aviation	Orschi, 28 April 2014, aerial attack by Sukhoi Su-25	Sudanese air force	Almost certain	1591 (2005), para. 6 Protocol II, art. 13 (2) Customary international humanitarian law, rule 11 (indiscriminate attacks against civilians prohibited)

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator		Security Council resolution reference/Violation of international humanitarian law
			Responsible	Level of certainty	
9	Aviation	Deployment of Sukhoi Su-25 (TN 205) into Darfur (sighted in May 2014)	Sudanese air force	Certain	1591 (2005), para. 7
10	Aviation	Deployment of Antonov An-32 (tactical number 7720) into Darfur as a light bomber (observed in May 2014 fitted with BDZ-34 weapon hard points)	Sudanese air force	Certain	1591 (2005), para. 7
11	Aviation	Abulcha, 28 October 2014, aerial attack on civilians	Sudanese air force	Almost certain	1591 (2005), para. 6 Protocol II (see also serial 7). Customary international humanitarian law, rules 1 and 2 (spreading terror among the civilian population), 6 (protection of civilians), 7 (distinction between civilian objects and military objectives), 11 and 71 (weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering)
12	Aviation	Deployment of Antonov An-26 (tactical number 7715) into Darfur as an improvised bomber (sighted 28 October 2014 being loaded with improvised air-delivered munitions)	Sudanese air force	Almost certain	1591 (2005), para. 7
13	International humanitarian law	Khor Abeche, 9 January 2014, denial of appropriate medical care to a captured fighter	SLA/MM[165]	Almost certain	2138 (2014), para. 19 Customary international humanitarian law, rule 118 (treatment of persons deprived of liberty) Third Geneva Convention, art. 3 (humane treatment)

[165] On 12 December 2013, SLA/MM and JEM both agreed to respect international humanitarian law treaties. This was widely covered in the media.

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator: Responsible	Perpetrator: Level of certainty	Security Council resolution reference/Violation of international humanitarian law
					Protocol II, art. 7(2) read together with arts. 4(1), 4(2)(a), 5(1)(a) on the treatment of the wounded
14	International humanitarian law	Khor Abeche, 9 January 2014, meeting in/in the vicinity of the internally displaced persons camp	One or more groups within SRF	Almost certain	2138 (2014), para. 19 Protocol II, art. 13 (1) (protection of civilians from the dangers arising from military operations)
15	International humanitarian law	Tawiesha, 4 March 2014, attacks on civilian population	SLA/MM	Almost certain	2138 (2014), para. 19 Protocol II (see also serial 7) Customary international humanitarian law, rules 1 and 6, 2, 7, 10 (protection of civilian objects), 11 and 103 (collective punishments)
16	International humanitarian law	Nyala, 9 March 2014, abduction of UNAMID peacekeeper	Unidentified	NA	2138 (2014), paras. 14 and 19 Customary international humanitarian law, rule 33 (attacks on peacekeepers)
17	International humanitarian law	Birka, 20 March 2014, attack on civilian population	Government	Almost certain	2138 (2014), para. 19 Customary international humanitarian law (see also serial 15). In addition, rules 52 (pillage), 87 (humane treatment) and 89 (violence to life) Third Geneva Convention, art. 3 (humane treatment)

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator: Responsible	Perpetrator: Level of certainty	Security Council resolution reference/Violation of international humanitarian law
					Protocol II, arts. 4(1) (humane treatment) and (4)(2)(b) (collective punishments) (g) (pillage) and art. 13
18	International humanitarian law	Khor Abeche, 22 March 2014, attack on civilian community	National armed forces, associated armed groups[166]	Almost certain	2138 (2014), para. 19 Customary international humanitarian law (see also serial 15) and rules 28 (protection of medical units), 53 (starvation), 54 (attacks on objects indispensable to the civilian population) and 146 (reprisals) Third Geneva Convention, art. 3 (humane treatment) Protocol II (see also serial 17) including arts. 11(2) (protection to medical units) and 14
19	International humanitarian law	Khor Abeche, 22 March 2014, abduction of five internally displaced persons	Identified individual and group	Almost certain	2138 (2014), para. 19 Customary international humanitarian law, rules 87 (humane treatment), 90 (torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment) and 96 (hostage-taking) Third Geneva Convention, art. 3
20	International humanitarian law	Kabkabiya, 24 May 2014, death of one UNAMID peacekeeper and injury to three others	Identified individual	Certain	2138 (2014), paras. 14 and 19 Customary international humanitarian law, rule 33 (protection of peacekeepers)

[166] Including from Niteaga.

Serial	Area	Violation summary	Perpetrator: Responsible	Perpetrator: Level of certainty	Security Council resolution reference/Violation of international humanitarian law
21	International humanitarian law	Nyala, 16 June 2014, abduction of Head of International Organization for Migration	Unknown	NA	2138 (2014), para. 19 Customary international humanitarian law, rule 31 (protection of humanitarian relief personnel)
22	International humanitarian law	Kutum, 18 June 2014, abduction of 25 humanitarian workers	Unknown	NA	2138 (2014), para. 19 Customary international humanitarian law, rule 31
23	Travel ban	Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem travel to Chad for meetings from 29 to 31 March 2014	Individual	Certain	1591 (2005), para. 3 (d)

XII. Recommendations

272. The Panel recommends to the Security Council that:

(a) The Government of the Sudan be urged to ensure that the measures it implements for the physical security and stockpile management of its weapons and ammunition are fully in accordance with the guidance provided in the International Small Arms Control Standards, standard 05.20 (Stockpile management — weapons), and in the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, guidelines 03.10 (Inventory management) and 09.10 (Security principles and systems);

(b) It specifically task the Panel with inspecting cargo prior to the unloading of Government aircraft at the point of delivery in Darfur and, consequently, it urge the Government to provide the Panel with unhindered access to undertake spot inspections, without prior notice;

(c) It condemn the use of civilian establishments, in particular the camps for internally displaced persons, by the armed opposition groups in a manner that places the civilian population and civilian objects at risk from the dangers arising from armed conflict.

273. The Panel recommends to the Committee that:

(a) Under operative paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005), the Committee consider the designation of the individual responsible for the attack on UNAMID peacekeepers and civilians at Kabkabiya on 24 May 2014;

(b) It remind the Government of the Sudan of its responsibility under paragraph 3 (a) (v) of resolution 1591 (2005) to request approval from the Committee for the movement of military supplies and equipment into Darfur for internal security operations and strongly urge its full compliance in the future;

(c) It urge the Government to ensure that the Panel has the same direct access to military officers that the Panel has to the civilian administration, particularly when access and further information has been requested in connection with ongoing investigations;

(d) It remind all Member States, including the Sudan, to ensure implementation of the assets freeze and travel ban, and of the need to comply with existing procedures to be followed for seeking exemption from the application of such measures;

(e) It consider initiating consultations between all sanctions committees so as to formulate a consolidated approach to making the implementation of all sanctions regimes more effective, by, inter alia, taking the following steps:

(i) Encouraging Member States that do not have appropriate domestic legislation to give effect to the sanctions regimes, to introduce such legislation as soon as possible;

(ii) Reminding all Member States of their obligation to submit timely implementation reports;

(f) It consider strengthening dialogue with interested Member States, in particular those in the region, under the auspices of paragraph 3 (a) (vii) of resolution 1591 (2005), in order to identify information gaps and report capacity-building requirements in the context of the implementation of the sanctions measures;

(g) It urge the Government to take immediate and appropriate steps to conduct enquiries and take action regarding the findings of the Panel where responsibility for violations of sanctions or international humanitarian law has been attributed to officials and/or entities of the Government of the Sudan.

Annex I
Illustrative armed group affiliations

It is often very difficult to accurately identify the affiliation or membership of individual groups and individuals responsible for armed attacks within Darfur. The same individuals, units or groups may operate under the 'banner' of different organizations dependent on the activity being pursued at that time.

The situation is made more complicated by the 'loose' use of terminology. For example, according to common usage in Darfur, the term 'militia' is used to refer to certain uniformed[167] and non-uniformed individuals, groups and units that carry out individual or small to large-scale attacks in Darfur, and to various tribal armed groups (TAG) operating within Darfur. It should be noted that, as per common usage, the term militia is not used to describe the uniformed regular armed forces of the Government of Sudan. The Panel has yet to determine which category the RSF should fall under as there is still conflicting evidence that requires resolution.

In its report, the Panel will use the following terms and definitions to ensure that the terminology used in the report is consistent and in line with international best practice. The terminology adopted reflects the operational requirements and realities of the environment within which the Panel functions.

a. ***Auxiliary Forces***. Uniformed paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies generally recognized as such in domestic law to back up or reinforce regular forces already engaged on operations or to undertake operational support functions which regular forces cannot or do not wish to undertake, such as scouting, handling supplies, or policing rear areas.[168]

NOTE: In the case of Sudan this includes the Central Reserve Police (CRP) and the Border Guards (BG).

b. ***Militia***. A body of citizens, armed and trained, especially by a State, for military service apart from the regular armed forces.[169]

NOTE: Some State regulated militias are formally integrated into the armed forces of the State and are recognized as such in domestic law. They are distinguishable by uniform, insignia and equipment. In the case of Sudan, this includes the Popular Defence Force (PDF) that was established pursuant to the PDF Act of 1989.[170]

NOTE: Domestic law may not regulate all militias that belong to a State.[171] In this case, membership can be reliably determined on the basis of a functional criterion similar to that of an armed opposition group (see below). These militia groups may not wear uniforms and insignia similar to those integrated into the armed forces of a State.

[167] Individuals, groups and units attired in cloths recognized by the population as official uniforms worn by members of GoS military and auxiliary groups.

[168] Adapted from the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, Oxford University Press, eISBN: 9780199891580, 2002.

[169] Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition.

[170] http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3df42cf94.pdf.

[171] See *Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law*, ICRC, p 31. A militia is said to belong to the State if its actions are attributable to the State under the international law on State responsibility. See p. 23 of the above study. See also articles on the "*Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts*", 2001.

NOTE: Parties to a conflict other than the State often have armed groups, which are commonly and inaccurately referred to as militias. For the purpose of the present report all such militias fall under one of the subsequent definitions.

c. ***Janjaweed***.[172] A non-uniformed armed group supplied and armed by the GoS, and acting, de facto, in direct military support of the Government of Sudan in the territory of Darfur. (Panel Definition).

NOTE 1: The term does not indicate, or propose, membership of any particular tribal or ethnic group, although this group is sometimes inaccurately referred to as 'Arab Tribes' or 'Arab Militias'.

NOTE 2: Such groups should be disarmed by the GoS in accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) dated 30 July 2004.

d. ***Tribal Armed Groups (TAG).*** Armed groups that operate exclusively in support of actual or perceived tribal interests. (Panel Definition).

NOTE: These groups are not generally recognized as legal entities under domestic law, and as such, participation on behalf of the group in an armed attack may entail punitive sanctions under domestic law.

NOTE: Membership in these groups is exclusively based on tribal identities. Parties to the conflict in Darfur may provide weapons, logistic and financial support to some of these armed groups.

e. ***Armed Opposition Groups (AOG)***. Organized non-uniformed armed groups[173] when they fight against the GoS. (Panel definition).

NOTE: Armed opposition groups are not recognized as legal entities under Sudanese domestic law.

NOTE: The Panel attributed membership in these groups to those who undertake a continuous combat function.[174]

NOTE: The Panel does not consider persons with tribal or geographical affiliations or family ties to a member of the AOG as a fighter in the AOG in the absence of the above functional criteria. He or she may be considered as a civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities for the duration that he/she takes part in direct hostilities.[175]

The matrix below is designed to illustrate the complexity of these group dynamics and assist in the understanding of the range of affiliations used within Darfur. The primary organization to which a group belongs to is in the left hand column, whereas the horizontal axis contains all the options for the organization to which the group may claim affiliation, dependent on the activity in which it is engaged at that time. The matrix

[172] The word Janjaweed translates from Arabic into English as "*man with a gun on a horse*".

[173] The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04 - 01/07, 7 March 2014, para 1186. See also The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-02/06, 9 June 2014, text in respect of footnote 118.

[174] *Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law*, ICRC, pp. 27-36, in particular p. 33.

[175] See further the International Committee of the Red Cross *Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities*, Ibid. Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. Rule 6 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study of ICRC.

illustrates the dynamic affiliations in the context of the use of force or armed violence as part of the conflict.[176] The Panel recognizes also that individuals from any group may conduct criminal activities such as, for example, murder, rape or theft during the normal course of human dynamics and personal relationships.

The colour coding of intersection squares is used to illustrate the 'legality' of a group's engagement under Sudanese national legislation. Green for legal (L), Orange for 'Undetermined' and Red for illegal (IL). It is not a Panel judgment as to whether the use of force in any particular situation under that claimed affiliation is legal under international humanitarian law or even whether appropriate or justified. The matrix is only designed to be read from Left to Right and NOT vertically.

Unidentified groups would fall within one of the coloured boxes in the matrix once more information is received as to their identity and rationale for action.

The RSF will be included once the Panel receives information from the GoS as to the legislative position of the RSF.

[176] The Panel recognizes that there are complex direct links between the conflict and the level of criminal armed violence, mainly caused by the reality and perceptions of human insecurity and the need to obtain resources for survival.

CONFLICT RELATED USE OF FORCE												
GROUPS / ORGANIZATIONS[177]			OPERATING AS									
			GoS (SAF)	GoS (SAirF)	GoS (Police)	GoS (CRP)	GoS (BG)	GoS PDF)	Janjaweed	AOG	TAG	Criminals
GoS Security Forces	Regulars	Sudan Army (SAF)	L A									
		Sudan Air Force (SAirF)		L								
		Sudan Police Force			L							
	Auxiliary	Central Reserve Police (CRP)				L						
		Border Guards (BG)					L					
	Militia	Popular Defence Forces (PDF)						L				
Janjaweed		Janjaweed							C			
Armed Opposition Groups		AOG										
TAG		Tribal Armed Groups										
CA		Criminal Activities[178]										

Some examples from the matrix above would be:

A. The Sudanese Armed Forces operating within their political constraints and maintaining a legitimate right to the use of controlled and appropriate force under appropriate circumstances.

B. A group from the CRP operating illegally as a Tribal Armed Group, whilst using the equipment and weapons provided by the GoS.

[177] The Groups/Organizations columns illustrate the terminology that is used interchangeably to attempt to describe armed groups.

[178] This is when a Group operates illegitimately to gain necessary resources for the group due to lack of government support or local shortages.

C. The Janjaweed acting in direct support of GoS operations.

D. The Janjaweed acting illegally to gain resources due to lack of government funding.

Annex II

Summary of reported[179] '*Militia*'[180], "*Arab Militia*" or *Unidentified* initiated violence (01 January - 31 October 2014)[181, 182]

Date	*Location (Town)*	*Sector*	*Target*					*Fatal*	*Injured*	*Remarks*
			AOG	*Civilian*	*GoS*	*NGO*	*TAG*			
03 Jan	Abdel Shakur	North			X			0	0	Ambush
06 Feb	Menawashei	South		X				1	1	Robbery
20 Feb	Korny	Central		X				0	0	Robbery
22 Feb	Tabaldia	East		X				0	0	Rustling
26 Feb	Jabel Amer	North			X			NK	NK	
27 Feb	Hijaar	South		X				NK	NK	
28 Feb	Karama	North			X			15	17+	Musa Hilal Group v CRP
01 Mar	Hajer	South		X				32	NK	
04 Mar	Menaweishi	South			X			0	4	
11 Mar	Rumaliya and area	West		X				2	0	
15 Mar	Kuma	North			X			1	4	Target was Wali (N)
19 Mar	Bely	North		X				1	0	2 abducted
21 Mar	Safeh Area	North		X				0	0	RSF also
22 Mar	Khor Abeche	South		X				1	3	RSF also
22 Mar	Hillet Usher	South		X				0	0	RSF also
25 Mar	Kutum	North			X			2	0	
25 Mar	Donkey Baashim	North		X				6+	38	
27 Mar	Tongoro	North		X				0	0	
30 Mar	Amsenina Balhamri	North		X				2	5	

[179] These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data do not necessarily include unreported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data are included as "reported" and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

[180] These forces are not necessarily the Militia as defined in Annex A. They were reported as such by witnesses and were certainly uniformed and armed.

[181] P = Perpetrator. X = Target. NK = Not Known. TBC = To Be Confirmed.

[182] The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
31 Mar	Um Senina	North		X				2	5	
03 Apr	Kutum	North			X			1	0	
03 Apr	Hamed Jadidy	North		X				0	0	
07 Apr	Gadara	North		X				0	0	
07 Apr	Birmaza	North		X				0	0	
07 Apr	Birdik	North		X				0	0	
07 Apr	Kobe Assara	North		X				0	0	
08 Apr	Nabaru and area	North		X				NK	NK	
09 Apr	Zalingei	Central		X				1	0	
09 Apr	El Fasher	North		X				2	7	
09 Apr	Azum	Central		X				1	0	
11 Apr	Tangoro	North		X				0	1	
13 Apr	Um Keddada	North		X				2	1	
14 Apr	Goker	North		X				0	0	
14 Apr	Kobegad	North		X				0	2	
15 Apr	Kobe Jalala	North		X				2	0	
15 Apr	Kona	North		X				1	0	
17 Apr	Nertiti	Central		X				1	0	
18 Apr	El Nadeif	South			X			0	6	
21 Apr	Birkat Siera	North		X				1	0	
23 Apr	Nyala	South			X			2	0	
23 Apr	Foro-Baranga	West			X			1	0	
23 Apr	Al-Khansaa	North		X				1	1	
23 Apr	Kibir > Sileili	Central		X				0	NK	
23 Apr	Bileil IDP	Central		X				1	1	
23 Apr	Al Khansaa	North		X				1	3	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
2? Apr	Wadi Salih	Central		X				1	0	
23 Apr	Garsila	Central		X				1	0	
24 Apr	Al Salam	South		X				1	1	
27 Apr	Kulkul	North		X				1	0	
29 Apr	Kutum	North		X				1	0	
03 May	Nabcai	South		X				0	1	
04 May	Al Matar	North		X				0	1	Sheikh of Al Mater was target
05 May	Focca	North		X				0	1	
05 May	Kabkabiya	North			X			1	0	
07 May	Kundah	Central	X					1	0	
11 May	Manzoula, Sirba	West		X				1	1	
11 May	Kalma IDP	North		X				0	1	
12 May	Kutum	North		X				0	3	
12 May	Dirbat	East		X				3	0	
13 May	Kalma IDP	North		X				0	1	
14 May	Tawila	North		X				1	3	
20 May	Nyala	South		X				1	3	
20 May	Kass	Central			X			1	2	
26 May	Nyala to Beliel road	South			X			2	0	
27 May	Um Dufak	South			X			1	0	Chad soldier dead
28 May	Jimeza Komura	South			X			1	0	
28 May	Kirkira	North		X				1	0	
29 May	Nurain	North		X				2	NK	
29 May	Abrum	South			X			2	0	
31 May	Guba	North		X				0	0	Armed robbery
31 May	Abusuruj	North		X				1	0	Rogue SAF soldier

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
01 Jun	Saraf Jihad	North		X				0	0	Armed robbery
02 Jun	Zalingei	Central			X			1	1	CRP casualties
03 Jun	Abuhamura	South		X				0	0	Village destroyed
04 Jun	Nyalma	North		X				1	6	
05 Jun	Kalma	North		X				7	6	
05 Jun	Sidou	North		X				3	NK	
05 Jun	Korru	North		X				2	1	
06 Jun	Korru	North		X				3	4	
06 Jun	Tarafona	North		X				1	0	
06 Jun	Wadi Kaberei	West		X				0	1	
06 Jun	Abdos	South		X				0	2	
07 Jun	Terej	Central		X				0	8	
07 Jun	Dereig	Central		X				0	5	
08 Jun	Khor Ramla	Central		X				1	1	
09 Jun	Korea, Nyala	South		X				1	0	Armed robbery
09 Jun	Adi Kong	West		X				1	1	Armed robbery
09 Jun	Nyama	South			X			1	0	CRP fatality
10 Jun	Gester	South		X				1	0	
11 Jun	Fata Borno	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
12 Jun	Merro (Road to)	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
14 Jun	Kakkabiya	North			X			0	1	
15 Jun	Deleig	Central			X			0	2	Attack on SAF Base
16 Jun	Tabeldia Wana	North		X				0	3	3 children fired upon
16 Jun	Thur IDP			X				1	0	
17 Jun	Kakkabiya	North			X			1	0	
17 Jun	El Salaam IDP	South		X				0	1	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
17 Jun	El Goura	East		X				3	3	Goat rustling
17 Jun	Kakkabiya	North		X				1	0	
17 Jun	Sanidadi	West			X			2	3	
17 Jun	Alrayan	North		X				1	0	
18 Jun	Kakkabiya	North		X				3	6	
19 Jun	Al Salam	South		X				0	1	
20 Jun	Dereige	South		X				1	0	
21 Jun	El Geneinia	West		X				1	0	Armed robbery
25 Jun	Amar Jadid	North		X				1	1	
26 Jun	Bindisi	Central		X				0	0	
27 Jun	Greida	South		X				1	3	Armed robbery
29 Jun	Malwi	South		X				1	8	
29 Jun	Wadi Salih / Garsila	Central		X				1	0	
30 Jun	Kambi	South		X				0	2	
30 Jun	Jebel Kunjo	Central		X				0	3	
01 Jul	Umday	East		X				0	TBC	
01 Jul	Mila, Kunyumadil, and Kumba	South		X				0	5	
01 Jul	Between El Sareif Beni Hussein and Kabkabiya	North		X				4	0	
02 Jul	Nyala	South		X				1	0	
05 Jul	Zalingei	Central		X				3	0	
06 Jul	Ed Al Fursan	South			X			1	0	
06 Jul	Deleig	Central		X				2	0	
06 Jul	Jukhana	South		X				1	NK	
06 Jul	Tuwal Um Balal	South			X			1	1	Assassination of Abdallah Yasin, Katila Commissioner

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
06 Jul	Joghana	South		X				1	1	
07 Jul	Abu Dinga	West		X				0	2	Mounted similar to Janjaweed
07 Jul	Joghana	South		X				1	0	
08 Jul	Sandeigo	North		X				1	0	
08 Jul	Basinga	North		X				1	0	Armed robbery
09 Jul	El Neem	East		X				1	1+	Indiscriminate fire
10 Jul	Zalingei	Central		X				2	0	Armed robbery
10 Jul	Kass	South		X				1	2	
12 Jul	Assalaya	South			X			1	2	3 x 4x4 captured
13 Jul	Broma	South		X				2	0	
13 Jul	Kalma	South		X				0	1	
15 Jul	Regelmakit	North		X				1	0	
17 Jul	Fata Borno	North		X				0	0	Health centre robbery
20 Jul	Dar Salaam	North		X				0	1	SGBV
20 Jul	Malam	South		X				4	6	
20 Jul	Wadi Salih	Central		X				NK	NK	
20 Jul	Lebeir	South		X				0	1	
20 Jul	Kalma	South		X				0	9	Armed robbery
21 Jul	Um Asal	South		X				0	5	SGBV
21 Jul	Um Daba	Central		X				0	1	Armed robbery
21 Jul	Kass	South			X			2	1	Failed kidnap by possibly RSF rogues
24 Jul	Habila	West			X			0	1	Armed robbery
24 Jul	Daba	West		X				0	1	
25 Jul	Hashaba	South		X				0	4	Pro govt militia were attackers (?)
26 Jul	El Geneina	West			X			1	0	Car jacking
26 Jul	Ashaba	West		X				1	0	Armed robbery

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
27 Jul	Abu Karinka	East		X				0	3	
28 Jul	Gereida	South		X				1	0	Armed robbery
29 Jul	Kutum	North		X				1	0	
30 Jul	Zalingei Bridge	Central		X				1	0	
31 Jul	El Sareif	North		X				1	0	
31 Jul	Fillet Hassab	North		X				1	1	
31 Jul	Albashir	North		X				1	1	Cattle rustling
31 Jul	Kirkira	North		X				0	1	
01 Aug	Umsharena	South		X				1	0	
02 Aug	Bilail Area	South		X				2	0	
04 Aug	El Wihda	North		X				1	0	
04 Aug	Hillet Ibrahim	North		X				0	1	
05 Aug	Kartam	North		X				0	1	
05 Aug	Duma	South		X				1	0	
06 Aug	El Fasher	North		X				1	0	Retired Police
06 Aug	El Sareif	North		X				1	2	
06 Aug	Kabkabiya	North		X				1	0	Fur tribesman
07 Aug	Amarjadeed	West		X				0	2	
07 Aug	Um Dukhun	Central		X				1	0	
08 Aug	Sirba	West		X				0	21	
08 Aug	Al Salam	North		X				1	0	
09 Aug	Kebkabiya	North			X			0	1	
09 Aug	Kebkabiya	North					X	0	1	Linked to above
10 Aug	Marshang	South			X			2	0	RSF casualties
11 Aug	Foro Baranga	West			X		X	1	0	Individual was GoS and Umda of Fur
11 Aug	Kutum	North		X				1	0	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
11 Aug	Zalingei	Central		X				0	1	Armed robbery
12 Aug	Dababeen Gard	North		X				1	0	Armed robbery
13 Aug	Gassor, Kutum	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
13 Aug	Dombre, Kutum	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
13 Aug	Abdel Shakur, Kutum	North		X				2	1	Murder
14 Aug	Kutum	North			X			1	0	Murder of SAF Sergeant
14 Aug	Shangil Tobaya	North		X				1	0	Pro-GoS militia
16 Aug	El Salam	South		X				0	1	IDP
16 Aug	Sirba	West		X				1	0	
16 Aug	Kutum	North		X				0	1	
22 Aug	Khor Ramla	Central		X				1	1	
23 Aug	Kutum	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
23 Aug	Kutum	North		X				0	0	Attempted abduction by possible Border Guards
28 Aug	Labdo, Yassin	South		X				0	1	Armed robbery
29 Aug	Labado	East		X				1	3	Cattle rustling
30 Aug	Kutum	North			X			1	0	MI Officer.
31 Aug	Kutum	North		X				1	0	Armed robbery and beheading
01 Sep	Jawiri	Central		X				1	0	
01 Sep	Ama Kasara	South		X				1	0	Armed robbery
06 Sep	Kutum	North		X				1	1	
06 Sep	Tina	North		X				1	1	Armed carjacking
08 Sep	Al Mahamaraya	South		X				3	2	Fallata tribe were targets
09 Sep	El Neem	East		X				0	1	Cattle rustling at market
09 Sep	Labado	East		X				1	0	Attempted theft of donkey
11 Sep	Al Salam > El Fasher	North		X				1	3	Armed robbery
13 Sep	Abuhamura	South		X				0	1	Militiaman injured

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
13 Sep	Dobo El Jadida	East		X				7	0	
16 Sep	Meleba	West		X				1	0	
17 Sep	Milaibiday	West		X				1	0	Shiekh killed
17 Sep	Yassin	North			X			1	0	SAF killed off duty
18 Sep	Orokom	West		X				0	1	
21 Sep	Aburish	West		X				1	0	Armed robbery
21 Sep	Burma	South		X				0	1	Armed raid on market
21 Sep	Gulnageisa	West		X				1	0	Armed robbery
22 Sep	Kass	South		X				0	1	Alleged CRP perpetrators
22 Sep	Burunga	South		X				0	1	Alleged SAF perpetrators
24 Sep	Tawila	North		X				1	0	
27 Sep	Mashrou Abu Zeid	North		X				1	0	Armed robbery
28 Sep	El Geneina	West		X				1	1	Reason NK
28 Sep	Habila	West		X				0	1	Cattle rustling
28 Sep	Seleah	West			X			1	0	Armed robbery of weapon
02 Oct	Deleig	Central		X				1	0	Armed robbery
03 Oct	Nadiff	South		X				0	2	
04 Oct	Tire	East		X				2	2	Cattle rustling
05 Oct	Tandal	North		X				1	0	NK
06 Oct	Kutum	North		X				1	0	Armed robbery
06 Oct	El Fasher	North				X		0	1	Armed robbery
06 Oct	Rwanda	North		X				0	1	NK
07 Oct	Labado	East		X				2	0	NK
09 Oct	Kabkabiya	North			X			1	0	Policeman killed
10 Oct	Sani Haya	North		X				3	1	Ambush and robbery
13 Oct	Danjo	South		X				1	1	Armed Assault

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target					Fatal	Injured	Remarks
			AOG	Civilian	GoS	NGO	TAG			
13 Oct	*El Daien*	*South*	*X*					*NK*	*NK*	*SPLM-IO from South Sudan were Target*
13 Oct	Abga Rajil	South		X				1	0	
13 Oct	Sani	North		X				5	7	Ambush and robbery
15 Oct	Dabanga	East		X				1	0	
15 Oct	Riyadh	West		X				0	2	
22 Oct	Gerida	South		X				2	1	Massalit farmers attacked.
23 Oct	Kabkabiya	North		X				0	1	Armed robbery
24 Oct	Um Jalbakh	North		X				0	0	
26 Oct	Gargish	South		X	X			4	5	Ambush and robbery
30 Oct	Birsal	West		X				1	0	

Figure II.I
Reported 'Militia' or Unidentified Armed Violence (01 Jan – 31 Oct Period Analysis 2014)



Annex III

Summary of reported[183] armed violence initiated by GoS forces (01 January – 31 October 2014) [184] [185] [186]

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target												Casualties		Remarks
			JEM	LJM	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLA	SPLM-N	SRF	IDP	Civilian	Criminal	SAF	NK	Fatal	Injured	
06 Jan	Helitat	Central									X				1	0	
07 Jan	Fogadiko	Central												X	20	8	CRP response to hijacked trucks.
30 Jan	El Fasher	North												X	2	10	Police operation to recover stolen property.
08 Feb	Badi	East												X[187]	4	0	2 X SAF also killed.
17 Feb	Zalengei	Central								X	X				4	16	CRP
19 Feb	Um Gunya	South				X											SRF Hemeti used by GoS.
27 Feb	Um Gunya	South				X									NK	NK	CRP attack.
02 Mar	El Lait	North											X		8	NK	SRF v CRP
18 Mar	El Fasher	North												X	1	2	CRP
21 Mar	Abujab	North									X				0	0	Cattle rustling
03 Apr	Kutum	North											X		3	2	SAF v BG
29 Apr	Kirro, Bardane, Nani	Central			X										NK	NK	Counter-attack
06 May	Zamzam	North									X				2	1	Rogue Officer
08 May	Bahr el Arab	East												X	1	12	In market

[183] These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data do not necessarily include unreported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data are included as "reported" and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

[184] P. perpetrator: X. target: NK, not known: TBC, to be confirmed.

[185] The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

[186] This table does Not include attacks initiated by the Rapid Support Forces against civilian targets. Those are covered in table VIII.

[187] Ma'alia.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target												Casualties		Remarks
			JEM	LJM	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLA	SPLM-N	SRF	IDP	Civilian	Criminal	SAF	NK	Fatal	Injured	
09 May	Greez / Disa	North									X				1	0	Witness elimination
11 May	Kabkabiya	West		X											0	1	
12 May	Dirbat	North									X				1	0	
15 May	Al Danga	South									X				1	2	CRP
19 May	Nyala	South									X				0	1	CRP
19 May	Galab	North	X												30	0	GoS Casualtis?
20 May	El Fasher	North										X			12	NK	SAF v RSF
25 May	Sawany	West											X		1	0	
29 May	Abu Surung	West									X				1	0	Rogue Officer
06 Jun	Kirarow	Central										X			2	4	GoS took casualties during operation
07 Jun	Kailik	Central										X			6	7	GoS took casualties during operation
08 Jun	Striana	Central								X					1	0	Self defence
10 Jun	Chukori	West									X				2	0	
15 Jun	Korma	North								X					1	8	
7 Jul	Anka	North								X					0	0	BG and air strike
7 Jul	Birdik	North								X					0	0	BG and air strike
9 Jul	El Fasher	North											X		2	0	SAF v PDF
19 Jul	Koaki Wadi	North									X				0	1	BG
28 Jul	Saraf Omra	North								X					0	1	BG
28 Jul	El Salam	South								X					0	2	SAF
05 Aug	El Sereif	North									X				1	3	SAF v Beni Hussein
14 Aug	Tandelti	West									X				1	0	Drunk tribesman doing celebratory fire
18 Aug	Abata, Zalingei	Central												X	3	3	SAF v Arab Militia
03 Sep	Khor Omer	East									X				1	0	IDP killed by Military Officer

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Target												Casualties		Remarks
			JEM	LJM	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLA	SPLM-N	SRF	IDP	Civilian	Criminal	SAF	NK	Fatal	Injured	
05 Sep	Kalma IDP	South								X					4	5	During demonstration at IDP Camp
08 Sep	Ed Daein	East									X				1	1	Suspected bandits (Reizegat)
17 Sep	Deribat	North									X				3	0	Killed by RPG
13 Oct	Deribat	North									X				1	0	Killed by Rogue soldier
14 Oct	Al Riyadh IDP	West									X				0	2	Killed by Rogue (intoxicated) soldier
19 Oct	Ishma	South									X				0	1	Injured by Rogue CRP Officer
20 Oct	El Fasher	North											X		0	0	SAF v BG
21 Oct	Muhajeria Zamzam	North								X					0	3	CRP

Figure III.I
Reported GoS initiated Armed Violence (01 Jan – 31 Oct Period Analysis 2013 – 2014)



Annex IV

Summary of reported[188] armed opposition group (AOG) initiated violence (01 January – 31 October 2014) [189] [190]

Date	*Location (Town)*	*Sector*	*Armed Opposition Group (AOG)*							*Armed Faction or NGO*			*GoS Casualties*		*Remarks*
			JEM	*LJM*	*SLA-AK*[191]	*SLA-AW*	*SLA-MM*	*SPLM-N*	*SRF*	*GoS*	*NGO*	*NK*	*Fatal*	*Injured*	
01 Jan	Beesa	North				P				X			23	TBC	3 x 4x4 stolen
03 Jan	Wadi Eweiji	North				P				X			41	TBC	11 x 4x4 stolen
04 Jan	Nertiti	Central								X		P	0	1	Police post
08 Jan	Khor Ramla	Central				P				X			1	TBC	Convoy ambush. Field Commander SLA/AW killed.
09 Jan	Khor Abeche	South					P					X	13	11	Inter AOG/TAG fight. Abu Bashar killed.
10 Jan	El Salaam	South					P			X			7	3	Police post
13 Jan	Al Sunta	South								X		P	7	1	6x 4x4 stolen
21 Jan	Zalingi	Central								X		P	0	0	Hijack vehicle
21 Jan	Graida	South					P			X			1	0	2 x 4X4 stolen 3 civilians killed
23 Jan	El Geneina	South								X		P	1	0	
31 Jan	Kass	South								X		P	1	0	1 x Rifle stolen
31 Jan	Singita	South								X		P	4	2	CRP Convoy attacked.
02 Feb	Singita	South		P						X			4	0	2 x LJM arrested
05 Feb	Kabkabiya	North								X		P	1	TBC	
09 Feb	Burum	South					P			X			0	0	1 x TLC stolen

[188] These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data do not necessarily include unreported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data are included as "reported" and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

[189] P, perpetrator; X, target; NK, not known; TBC, to be confirmed.

[190] The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

[191] Also reported as being called the Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice (SLMJ) or SLA/Justice.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Armed Opposition Group (AOG)							Armed Faction or NGO			GoS Casualties		Remarks
			JEM	LJM	SLA-AK[91]	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLM-N	SRF	GoS	NGO	NK	Fatal	Injured	
11 Feb	Wadi Borgo	North								X		P	1		
24 Feb	Nyala	South					P			X			2	2	1 x 4x4 stolen + 10 weapons
26 Feb	Jebel Amer	North								X		P	NK	NK	14 x vehicles seized
26 Feb	Galdi	South					P			X			0	NK	RSF attacked.
26 Feb	Tarma	North								X		P	4	9	4 x vehicles seized
02 Mar	El Lait	North					P			X			NK	NK	
02 Mar	Haskanita	North					P			X			NK	NK	
04 Mar	El Taweisha	North					P			X			30	23	
04 Mar	Kulbus / Olibade	West					P			X			0	2	
13 Mar	Millet	North							P	X			101	NK	
17 Mar	Delbah	South					P			X			11	1	4 x AOG vehicles captured or destroyed.
17 Mar	Al Dababeen	North								X		P	1	0	
23 Mar	Fanga Suk	South				P	P			X			NK	NK	
28 Apr	Rockero, Koro and Nogzogol	Central				P				X			10	31	
30 Apr	Turo	Central				P				X			16	NK	
? May	Gosmino and Aro Shorou	West	X										0	1	LRM/JEM
22 May	Arosharow and Gossmino	West					P			X			1	0	
26 Jun	Goba	North					P			X			TBC	TBC	SAF won
27 Jun	Alquba	North			P					X			1	22	SLA/AK Leader killed
09 Jul	Wade Mora	North			P		P			X			17	NK	
14 Jul	Golo	Central				P				X			2	3	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Armed Opposition Group (AOG)							Armed Faction or NGO			GoS Casualties		Remarks
			JEM	LJM	SLA-AK[191]	SLA-AW	SLA-MM	SPLM-N	SRF	GoS	NGO	NK	Fatal	Injured	
19 Jul	Birka	North			P					X			11	NK	
24 Jul	Korny	North								X		P	2	1	JEM/Sudan Jina/Musa splinter group
09 Aug	Dar El Salam	North					P					X	2	0	Robbery
12 Aug	Oo, Jebel Marra	North				P				X			17	2	
24 Aug	Bersi	North				PX							1	1	AW/Tarada v AW/Gadora
26 Aug	Tawilla	North					P					X	0	0	
04 Sep	Rokoro	Central				P				X			7	NK	
07 Sep	Tibra	North				P				X			17	NK	
08 Sep	El Fasher	North	X										0	1	Protest
11 Sep	Nurtic	North					P			X			4	NK	SLA/MJ (Taher Hajer) also involved.
11 Sep	Alwedha	South				P						X	0	0	Sheikh + 1 Reizeget killed. 10 SLA/AW killed
27 Sep	Golo	Central				P				X			NK	NK	
06 Oct	Guldo	Central				P				X			16	NK	
12 Oct	Jebel Amer	North								X		P	4	6	Including Battalion CO
15 Oct	Straha	Central				P				X			2	2	
15 Oct	El Zubeir	Central				P				X			8	NK	
16 Oct	Rokoro	Central				P				X			21	NK	
31 Oct	Deribat	North				P				X			37	NK	

Figure IV.I
Reported AOG initiated Armed Violence (01 Jan – 31 Oct Period Analysis 2013 – 2014)



Annex V
Summary of reported[192] armed violence against UNAMID (1 January – 31 October 2014) [193] [194]

Date	*Location*	*Sector*	*UNAMID Target*						*Perpetrator*	*Casualties*		*Remarks*
			Base	*TS*[195]	*Patrol*	*Residence*	*Individual(s)*	*A/C*[196]		*Fatal*	*Injured*	
30 Jan	Nyala	South	X						NK	0	0	10 armed attackers fired shots at sanger.
08 Feb	North	Sindy			X					0	0	Major UN equipment theft.
14 Feb	El Fasher	North				X			NK	0	0	4 armed men attempted robbery.
20 Feb	Sindy	North			X					0	0	Minor attack
25 Feb	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
09 Mar	Nyala	South					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
12 Mar	Kass	South					X		NK	0	0	Attempted robbery
14 Mar	Nyala	South				X			NK	0	1	Armed robbery
16 Mar	El Fasher	North	X						NK	0	1	Attempted robbery of WFP
22 Mar	Korma	North		X					RSF / Militia	0	0	Shots fired at TS
05 Apr	Sindy	North			X				NK	0	1	Ambush
10 Apr	El Fasher	North				X			NK	0	0	Attempted robbery
25 Apr	Nyala	South	X							0	0	Attempted armed robbery
27 Apr	Nyala	South	X						NK	0	0	Attempted armed intrusion
27 Apr	Nyala area	South			X				NK	0	0	Water tanker hi-jacked

[192] These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data do not necessarily include unreported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data are included as "reported" and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

[193] P, perpetrator; X, target; NK, not known; TBC, to be confirmed.

[194] The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

[195] Team Site.

[196] Aircraft.

Date	Location	Sector	UNAMID Target						Perpetrator	Casualties		Remarks
			Base	TS[195]	Patrol	Residence	Individual(s)	A/C[196]		Fatal	Injured	
04 May	Karkara	North			X				NK	0	0	Ambush
10 May	Foro Baranga	West				X			NK	0	0	Armed robbery
14 May	Nyala	South			X				NK	0	0	UNAMID Bus shot at
17 May	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Car-jacking
24 May	**Kabkabiya**	**North**			**X**				**TAG**	**1**	**3**	**RWABATT**
29 May	El Daein	East					X		Reizegat	0	0	Robbery
28 Aug	Kutum	North					X		NK	0	0	R4 Rifle and 35 rounds ammunition stolen
01 Sep	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery
01 Sep	Geneinia	West					X		NK	1	0	National staff member
05 Sep	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
10 Sep	ZamZam	North			X					0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
17 Sep	El Fasher	North					X			0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
19 Sep	**El Daein**	**East**		**X**					**NK**	**1**	**0**	
24 Sep	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
25 Sep	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
28 Sep	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
01 Oct	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
02 Oct	El Fasher	North					X		NK	0	0	Armed robbery of vehicle
16 Oct	**Korma**	**North**			**X**				**NK**	**3**	**0**	**Plus 4 abducted ETHBATT**
29 Oct	**Kutum**	**North**			**X**				**NK**	**0**	**3**	**RSABATT**

Figure V.1
Reported Armed Violence Attacks against UNAMID (01 Jan – 31 Oct Period Analysis 2013 – 2014)



Annex VI
Summary of reported[197] armed tribal violence (01 January – 31 October 2014) [198] [199]

Date	*Attack Location (Town)*	*Sector*	*Armed tribes involved*																				*Casualties*		*Remarks*
			Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fur	Gimir	Habbinaya	Hamar	Khozam	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Taisha	Uturiya	Zaghawa	*NK / Other*	*Fatal*	*Injured*	
08 Jan	Deleig	Central								X			P										6	TBC	
11 Jan	Dungo	Central				X								P									1	1	
25 Jan	Sheg Altiko	East									P				X								2	3	
05 Feb	Shabab	East									X				P								1	0	Cattle rustling
12 Feb	Um Kiteru	North	X		P																		1	0	
19 Feb	Salih	Central											P			X							47	6	
20 Feb	Um Kitero	North	X		P																		1	0	
25 Feb	Adilla	East									P				X								1	0	Cattle rustling
26 Feb	Urum, Habila	West			X								X										NK	NK	
03 Mar	Saraf Umra	North	P														X						9	7	
04 Mar	Abu Jabra	East									P				X								2	0	
05 Mar	Bendisi	Central														P	X						0	0	
06 Mar	Tadamon	North	P				X																2	0	
07 Mar	Saraf Umra	North	X				X																0	1	

[197] These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data do not necessarily include unreported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data are included as "reported" and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

[198] P, perpetrator; X, target; NK, not known; TBC, to be confirmed.

[199] The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.

Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Armed tribes involved																				Casualties		Remarks
			Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fur	Gimir	Habbinaya	Hamar	Khozam	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Tatsha	Uturiya	Zaghawa	NK / Other	Fatal	Injured	
08 Mar	Saraf Umra	North	X				X																14	48	
12 Mar	Labado	East																			X	P	2	0	
19 Mar	Khamsat	East									X				X								5	3	
19 Mar	Al Fadou	East									X				X								3	2	
19 Mar	Algegamia	East									P				X								3	6	
03 Apr	Nertit	Central	X			X																	2	2	
04 Apr	Shag Harif	East							P		X												8	0	
05 Apr	Um Deibum	East							X		P												39	7	
13 Apr	El Sireaf / Harani	North	P	X																			2	1	Cattle rustling
13 Apr	Sheiria	East																			X	P	11	7	
16 Apr	El Jihel	North	P	X																			1	3	
17 Apr	Umjarwa Asani	North	P	X																			1	0	
22 Apr	Foro Baranga	West				X						P										P	1	0	
22 Apr	Krindling	West										X										P	1	0	
23 Apr	Um Derisya and Medasses	North	X	X																			0	0	
24 Apr	Um Derisya and Medasses	North	X	X																			0	0	
27 Apr	Um Derisya and Medasses	North	X	X																			2	0	
28 Apr	Habila	West											X			X							0	2	
30 Apr	Beida	West											X			P							0	0	
01 May	Adila	East									X				P								10	0	Cattle rustling

Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Armed tribes involved																				Casualties		Remarks
			Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fur	Gimir	Habbimaya	Hamar	Khozam	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Taisha	Uturiya	Zaghawa	*NK / Other*	*Fatal*	*Injured*	
07 May	Jakhara area	East									X				X								1	0	Cattle rustling
10 May	Graida area	South										X										P	1	2	
14 May	Um Dukhan	Central											P			X							1	0	
20 May	Kulkul	Central	P																			X	0	1	
22 May	El Guruf	East							P		X												20+	16+	
24 May	Kabkabiya	North				X																X	5	3	Includes UNAMID Casualties
24 May	Abu Jabra										P				X								5	0	
26 May	Al Kulkul	North	X	P																			1	1	
29 May	Kirkira	North				X																P	1	0	
4 Jun	Nyalma	North				X																P	5	4	
5 Jun	Tarafona	North				X																P	2	0	
10 Jun	Alaradaya	East									P				X								1	0	
15 Jun	Kaileck	South							P				X										1	1	
16 Jun	Kaileck	South		X									P										0	2	
19 Jun	Salayle	Central											X			X							9	13	
20 Jun	Mukjar	Central											P			X							5	5	
20 Jun	Habilla Kanari	West										X			P								2	0	
21 Jun	Muraduf	Central											X			X							10	10	
21 Jun	Um Kitero	North	X	P																			1	0	
22 Jun	Kiro	North	P	X																			3	5	
25 Jun	Sandi Karo	West										X										P	3	4	Casualties include 2 GoS policemen.
26 Jun	Siriki	North	P	X																			13	23	
30 Jun	Um Shaalouba	East							X		X												25+	35+	

Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Armed tribes involved																				Casualties		Remarks
			Abbala	Beni Halba	Beni Hussein	Fur	Gimir	Habbiniaya	Hamar	Khozam	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Taysha	Ururiya	Zaghawa	NK / Other	Fatal	Injured	
05 Jul	Al Fadul	East											P		X								31	17	
05 Jul	El Ferdous	East													P								1	0	Inter tribal clash
06 Jul	Ed Daein	East									P				X								18	NK	
08 Jul	Al Quite	East									X				X								3	3	
15 Jul	Medessis	North	P	X																			1	2	
16 Jul	El Sereif	North	P																			X	1	2	
18 Jul	Gusa	North	P	X																			2	0	
25 Jul	Kabkabiya	North	P																			X	1	0	
28 Jul	Shatain	South		P																		X	NK	NK	Fallata Tribe
01 Aug	Nertiti	West				P																	1	0	Inter tribal
03 Aug	Mila	South	P																			X	2	3	
03 Aug	El Sereaf	North			P																	X	1	3	TAG v SAF
06 Aug	Um Dukhun	Central														P		X					1		
07 Aug	Kereinik	West																				P	1	2	Eringa killed
16/ 17 Aug	Abu Rakubah	East									X				P							X	66	42	Plus 4 GoS killed
17 Aug	Napagaya	South	P																			X	5	0	
20 Aug	Um Rakoba	East									X				P								323	74	Casualty figures differ by source. Worse case shown.
24 Aug	Tege	North	X		P																		7	0	Awlad Rashid TAG attacked.
27 Aug	Al Harani	North	P		X																		9	NK	
28 Aug	Midaisis	North	X		X																		25	5	
31 Aug	Amarjadeed	North	P																			X	1	0	
31 Aug	Mileisa	North	P																			X	0	13	

Date	Attack Location (Town)	Sector	Armed tribes involved																				Casualties		Remarks
			Abbala	Bem Halba	Bem Hussein	Fur	Gimir	Habbinaya	Hamar	Khozam	Maaliya	Massalit	Misseriya	Nwaiba	Rezeigat	Salamat	Tamar	Tarjam	Tarsha	Uturiya	Zaghawa	NK / Other	Fatal	Injured	
03 Sep	Kulbus	West																			P	X	1	0	Cattle rustling
07 Sep	Amud Elsahhub	South																				PX	6	0	Cattle rustling (Fallat v Habaniya)
11 Sep	Dobo Madrasa	South													P							X	10	2	Revenge attack on SLA/AW
30 Sep	Otab	East													P							X	0	14	Fellata
02 Oct	Abu Sufyan	East									P											X	0	0	5 Abducted
03 Oct	Abu Jabra	East									P				X								3	2	
09 Oct	Shabbab	East									X	X											NK	NK	
12 Oct	Abu Dungul	East									X				P								1	NK	
21 Oct	Um Marahik	North																				PX	2	2	Zayadiya v SAF(CRP)

Figure VI.1
Reported Inter-Tribal Armed Violence (01 Jan – 31 Oct Period Analysis 2013 – 2014)



Annex VII
Examples of 'reported' criminal acts (armed robbery) (01 January – 31 October 2014) [200]

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
11 Jan	Cimayat East	Central	TAG		50						
13 Jan	Kassab	North	NK			1 M/C[201]					
15 Jan	Abu Karinka	South	NK			3					
19 Jan	Safi	South	NK			2					
21 Jan	Abu Zeraga	North	NK			1					
01 Feb	Kalma	South	NK					300 x Flour			
01 Feb	Habila	West	NK			1					
02 Feb	Tawilla	North	NK			1					
04 Feb	Wadi Mora	North	NK	23,000							
06 Feb	Menawashei	South	NK			1					
14 Feb	Nyala	South	NK			1					
15 Feb	Dereige	South	NK		TBC						
22 Feb	Tabaldia	East	NK		150 Goats						
26 Feb	Kalma	South	NK			7 M/C					
27 Feb	Al Salam	South	NK								
05 Mar	Hamra	North	GoS			1 (GoS)					
10 Mar	Umtajok	West	Militia		200+						
12 Mar	Yassin, Mabrouka	East	Armed NK		133						Camel mounted
13 Mar			SLA/MM						Market Looted		

[200] These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity where possible. The data do not necessarily include unreported incidents of armed violence, but does indicate the magnitude of the issue. The data are included as "reported" and therefore may not necessarily be totally accurate.

[201] Motorcycle.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
14 Mar	El Fasher	North	Armed NK						WFP Looted[202]		In 4 x TLC
19 Mar	Um Dukhum	Central	Armed NK					WFP Truck Load			
03 Apr	Kutum	North	Armed NK				X				SAF C/P[203]
03 Apr	Kutum	North	Armed NK							1 x Truck Load	
03 Apr	Dembow Kabdy	West	Armed NK							3 x Truck Load	
08 Apr	Al Mazad, Nyala	East	Armed NK			1 (NGO)					
12 Apr	Abu Karinka	East	Armed NK	40[204]						1 x Truck Load	Some later recovered
14 Apr	Zam Zam, El Fasher	North	CRP x 8	X						Cell Phones	
23 Apr	Um Dukhun, Kubar	Central	Armed NK							Personal belongings	
24 Apr	El Geneina (UNAMID)	West	TBC			1				Vehicle Parts	
27 Apr	Nyala	South	Armed NK			1 (UNAMID)					UNAMID
04 May	Mellit, Karkara	North	Armed NK				1			1 x Radio	Armed with 12.7mm and RPG
06 May	Nyala	South	Armed NK x 3			1					
25 May	Shangil Tobaya	North	Armed NK x 2	9,000							

[202] The spate of robbery of food and non-food items from WFP warehouse in El Fasher is a major concern. The facility serves as the major hub of the food and non-food items for Western, Central and Northern Darfur. Considering the economic situation of Darfur and the vulnerability of facility (location, inadequate security arrangement and limited control by the host government, presence of criminals in the area) there is likelihood of further incidents in the area.

[203] Checkpoint.

[204] Passage Fee.

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
25 May	Zailingei	Cenral	Armed NK			1					
26 May	El Salm, Bulbul	South	Armed NK x 5							Bus hijack. All belongings.	
26 May	Nyala	South	Armed NK			1 (UNICEF)					
27 May	Nyala	South		X							From MoI Vehicle
30 May	Gemiza Lagarou	South	Armed NK					Sugar			
31 May	Kutum	North	Armed NK x 4	15,860		2 x M/C					
02 Jun	Zalingei	Central	Armed NK			1 (CRP)					
04 Jun	Tawila, Nyalma	North	Militia x 60		X						
16 Jun	Yassin, Labado	East	TAG x 15	2,800						4 x Cell Phones, Spare Parts	Suspected Misseriya
17 Jun	Abu Karinka, Jad	South	Armed NK					Sorghum x 820 Cereal x 600			From WFP
20 Jun	Abu Karinka, Jad Elsid	South	Armed NK					73 tonnes			From WFP
22 Jun	Um Shididg	North	Militia			1				All belongings	
22 Jun	Ed Al Fursan	South	Armed NK x 3			1					GoS vehicle
22 Jun	Kokomanda Vill. Beida	West	Armed NK							All belongings	
22 Jun	Tongfuka	West	Armed NK			1					Abducted ZAIN employees
23 Jun	El Safa area	East	Armed NK x 3	(30,000)							Ransom demand
											On 1 x TLC
27 Jun	Kutum	North	SLA/MM x 50+	200,000							On 7 x TLC
				3.5kg Gold							

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
28 Jun	Yassin, Labado	East	Armed NK x 15	70						UNAMID furniture	Mounted and with M/C x 1
03 Jul	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1					UNAMID vehicle
06 Jul	Nyala	South	Armed NK			1					Abduction
06 Jul	Nyala	South	Armed NK	80,000							
07 Jul	Bunduga	Central	Armed NK	15,000		1					Mounted.
11 Jul	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1					Attempted car jacking
11 Jul	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1					Deputy Wali's vehicle. Recovered
14 Jul	Tanara	North	Armed NK	15,000						6 x Barrels Petrol	
14 Jul	Nyala	South	Armed NK	40,000						1 x Cell Phone	15 armed men on 2 x Technicals
15 Jul	Fato Borno	North	Armed NK							1 x Solar Power Cell	
17 Jul	Thabit	North	SLA/MM							210L Diesel	
18 Jul	Duma	South	BG ?							Personal belongings	
21 Jul	Arosha	North	SLA/MM	9,000						2,100l Fuel	UNAMID escorted convoy
21 Jul	El Daba	Central	Armed NK							1 x Cell Phone	
21 Jul	Um Sangamty	West	Armed NK							Personal belongings	WFP convoy
22 Jul	Korma	North	Armed NK		117 Goats						

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
24 Jul	Ed al Fursan	South	Armed NK	84,000							From hospital
25 Jul	Hashaba	South	Govt Militia		6 Horses						
26 Jul	El Geneina	West	Armed NK			1					From GOS
26 Jul	Ashaba	West	Armed NK	NK						Personal belongings	
26 Jul	Kutum	North	Armed NK							Personal belongings	WFP staff assaulted
28 Jul	Gereida	South	Armed NK							Mobile Phone Credits	
31 Jul	Albashir	North	Armed NK		82 Goats						
02 Aug	El Fasher	North	Armed NK	NK		1 UNAMID				Mobile Phone	
07 Aug	Korma	North	Armed NK		205 Goats and Sheep						
09 Aug	Kebkabiya	North	Armed NK				1				From SAF
13 Aug	Abdel Shakur, Kutum	North	Armed NK				3				From miners
13 Aug	Abdel Shakur, Kutum	North	Armed NK							Personal belongings	Commercial truck
15 Aug	Tawila	North	Armed NK		32 Goats and 2 Donkeys						
16 Aug	Kutum	North	Armed NK		3 Donkeys						
16 Aug	Yassin	East	Armed NK		56 Sheep						
17 Aug	Kenkabiya	North	Armed NK		3 Camels and 2 Donkeys						
18 Aug	Mellit	North	Armed NK	300,000		2				Cell Phones	INGO GAA Organization
18 Aug	Djafafil	North	Armed NK		35 Goats and 2 Donkeys						
19 Aug	Labado	East	Armed NK		23 Sheep and 1 Camel					Cell Phone	

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
21 Aug	Tangarara	North	SLA/MM	7,200							"Transit Tax" for 24 vehicles. 300SDG per vehicle negotiated from 1,500SDG demand.
22 Aug	Bir Medina	West	Armed NK		148 Goats, Sheep and Donkeys						Personal belongings
23 Aug	Kutum	North	Armed NK							17 Cell Phones	
25 Aug	Tawilwa	East	Armed NK								
28 Aug	Kutum	North	Armed NK				1				From UNAMID
29 Aug	Labado	East	Armed NK		104 Sheep						
30 Aug	Sirba	West	Armed NK							Personal belongings	
30 Aug	Kout, Sirba	West	Armed NK		20 Goats and 2 Horses						
30 Aug	Emery	South	Armed in GoS uniform	20,000	4 Cattle					Personal belongings	
31 Aug	Kutum	North	Armed NK							1 Cell Phone	
31 Aug	Markuba	North	Abbala TAG		50 Horses and Donkeys						
31 Aug	Mileisa	North	Abbala TAG		250 Sheep and Goats						
01 Sep	Sanidadi	West	Armed NK							Solar panels	From INGO World Relief
03 Sep	Kulbus	West	Zaghawa TAG		150 Camels						
04 Sep	Sirba	West	Armed NK		300 sheep						

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
04 Sep	Kabkabiya	North	Armed NK	8,000							
04 Sep	El Sisi IDP	West	Armed NK		25 Sheep						
05 Sep	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1					UNAMID Vehicle
05 Sep	El Tomat	South	Armed NK		20 Cattle						
06 Sep	Tina	North	Armed NK			1					
07 Sep	Amud Elsahhub	South	Armed NK		150 Cattle						
09 Sep	Terbiba	West	Armed NK			Motorcycle					
11 Sep	Kassab	North	Armed NK		8 Goats					Personal belongings	
11 Sep	Pangal	Central	Armed NK		30 Cattle						From Misseriya
11 Sep	El Salam > El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1				Personal belongings	
17 Sep	Shalgalnil	North	Armed NK		30 Camels						
21 Sep	Gulnageisa	West	Armed NK		10 Cattle						
28 Sep	Alfayga	West	Armed NK		? Cattle						
29 Sep	Haja Bondoga	East	Armed NK	3,000						Cell phone	
01 Oct	Hai Al Thawara	South	Armed NK			1					
02 Oct	Deleig	Central	Armed NK			Motorcycle					
02 Oct	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1					UNAMID
02 Oct	Gosmino	West	Armed NK			1					INGO
04 Oct	Tire	East	Armed NK		340 Sheep 130 Goats 4 Donkeys						
05 Oct	Aby Sufyan	East	Armed NK			5				Personal belongings	
06 Oct	Kutum	North	Armed NK	1,000		Motorcycle					
06 Oct	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1					

Date	Location (Town)	Sector	Responsible	Stolen Items							Remarks
				Cash (SDG)	Cattle	Vehicles	Wpns	Food (Bags)	Locality	Goods	
11 Oct	Saraf Umra	Central	Armed NK		109 Sheep / Goats						
12 Oct	El Fasher	North	Armed NK			1					DRA vehicle
12 Oct	Saraf Umra	Central	Armed NK	2,000							
13 Oct	Saraf Jidid	West	Armed NK	8,000		1 Motorcycle					
18 Oct	Labado	East	TAG		40 Goats						

Annex VIII
Summary of reported RSF operations in Darfur (March – 31 October 2014) [205]

Date	*Location* [206]	*State*	*Alleged Damage*	*Resulting IDP*	*Killed*	*Injured*
24 Feb	El Salam	South	2 House and 6 shops burned in IDP camp market		1	4
27 Feb	Hijer Tunjo	East	35+ villages burned. Over 20 women raped	5,000+	53	23+
28 Feb	Um Gunja, Sane Delebah, Tukumare, Himeida, Birkatuli and Afora	East	7+ villages burned	35,000+	12+	4
02 Mar	Al Salam	South	IDP Camp attacked		1	0
7 Mar - 12 Mar	El Taweisha, Ailliet and Kaskanita	North	Major population displacement	10,000+		
8 Mar	Saraf Umra area	North	Major population displacement	55,000	50+	NK
11 Mar	Mellit	North	Armed assault			
11 – 12 Mar	Malawi, Koma, Jamama, al-Daw, Aulad-Mokhtar, and Ammar Jadeed	North	15 villages destroyed, armed robbery and arson		24+	NK
14 Mar	Birka, Tarny, Khartoum Belleil and Konjara	North	Arson, armed robbery and displacement			
16 Mar	Hashaba	North	Village destroyed		3	0
17 Mar	Fanga Suk	North	SLA/AW		NK	NK
17 – 18 Mar	Malawi and Foda area	North	16+ villages burned, major population displacement	2,000+		
18 Mar	El Fasher	North	SAF		0	0
19 Mar	El Fasher	North	Armed assault.		5	0

[205] From a wide range of sources.

[206] Identifying particular locations within Darfur remains a challenge for the Panel. UNAMID GIS GEO maintains a database of over 4802 place names (and variations) with accurate GEO co-ordinates. This database is routinely updated. Force HQ J3 hold a separate database of 4356 place names, which is slightly outdated. There is no single consolidated UNAMID database. Yet government agencies, press reports, local residents and even UN organizations all use different spellings for the same place. The panel has been able to positively identify only 51% of the locations reported in this Table.

Date	*Location* [206]	*State*	*Alleged Damage*	*Resulting IDP*	*Killed*	*Injured*
20 Mar	Al Salam	South	Armed assault.		2	0
20 Mar	Birka	North	Village destroyed		1	15
21 Mar	Safeh area	North	Villages destroyed			
22 – 26 Mar	Khor Abeche	South	IDP Camp destroyed Health Centre and Kindergarten destroyed Arson, armed robbery and displacement	2,000+		
23 Mar	Birka	North	Village destroyed			
23 Mar	Abu Sneit Fal	North	Village attacked		1	0
23 Mar	Donkey Baashim	North	SRF		8	NK
24 Mar	Donki Baashim area	North	Major population displacement		10+	20+
25 Mar	Donkey Baashim	North	SRF		6+	38
24 – 28 Mar	Sarafaya, (5km West of El Fasher), Uzbani, Korma and Kobe	Central	Major population displacement	8,500+		
27 Mar	Tongoro	North	Village destroyed			
28 Mar	Hashaba	North	Village destroyed		2	1
28 Mar	Amarei	North	Village destroyed		2	1
29 Mar	Amarai, Khashum Wadi, Wadi Buwa, Silu, Shurgilei, Dabba Nayra, Tima, and Garbu Salat	North	Major population displacement		3+	
31 Mar	Shagarla, Tima, Girba, Hillet Saleh Nurein, Jido Nurein, Hillet Mohamedein Abd El Banat, Hillet Bashar Abd El Banat, Hillet Dabbat Farti, Hillet Gumeiza, Hillet Ismail Khater, and Hillet Abdallah Mohamed Hassan	North	15+ Villages destroyed, major population displacement		6+	15+

Date	*Location* [206]	*State*	*Alleged Damage*	*Resulting IDP*	*Killed*	*Injured*
02 Apr	Kengkeng	North	Village destroyed		2	0
06 Apr	Ed Ei Garad and Sani Haya area	North	IDPs ambushed, assaulted and armed robbery		1	2+
06 Apr	NE of Kutum area, Bowa and Ed El Garad	North	1,500 IDPs ambushed, assaulted and armed robbery		1	0
07 Apr	Gadara, Birmaza, Birdik and Lill Valley	North	Villages destroyed			
08 Apr	Nabarujuju, Naburu Samal, Hilet Jabel, Hilet Um Arda, Hilet Kamis, Tawazin, Birika Sarafaye, Janjona, Um Usus and Kobe Assara	North	Villages destroyed			
10 Apr	Tawila	North	Village destroyed		1	0
10 Apr	Ba'ashum, near Mellit	North	SLA/MM		150+	NK
15 Apr	Hashaba, Kutei, Karafula, Kujir, Tumu, Kadarik, Um Triter, Aboh, Um Deriseiya, Sharafa and Dali	North	Villages destroyed, armed robbery, abductions		5	NK
16 Apr	Gaoud Al Azraq	North	Village destroyed, armed robbery		26	6
17/18 Apr	Um Alqura	South	Majority of RSF forces relocate to South Darfur to await further operation orders. Confined to Um Alqura barracks.			
22 Apr	Kutum	North	Armed assault		0	1
29 Apr	Kirro, Bardane and Nawni	South	Villages destroyed, major population displacement	5,000+		
01 May	Mukjar	Central	Armed robbery		0	0

Annex IX
Summary of arms embargo (ammunition) violations in Darfur (17 February - 31 October 2014)

Date Found	*Location*	*Calibre*	*Type*	*Markings*	*Date of Manufacture*	*Manufacturer*	*Panel Case File*	*Seen in Darfur*	*Remarks*[207]
06 Apr	Um Buru	7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	39 09	2009	MIC[208] Sudan	ARM/024	NEW	
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	1 39 08	2008	MIC Sudan	ARM/024	NEW	
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	3 39 09	2009	MIC Sudan	ARM/024	NEW	Ammunition from JEM members surrendering weapons at UN TS.
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	39 011	2011	MIC Sudan	ARM/024	NEW	
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	2 39 011	2011	MIC Sudan	ARM/024	NEW	
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	1 39 012	2012	MIC Sudan	ARM/024	2013	
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	1 39 13	2013	MIC Sudan	ARM/024	2013	
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	61 08	2008	China	ARM/024	NEW	
		7.62 x 39mm	Cartridge Case	811 08	2008	China	ARM/024	2013	

[207] This column is included for panel analysis purposes only.
[208] Military Industrial Corporation.

Annex X
Regional proliferation of Sudanese small arms ammunition (2011 – 2014) [209]

Year	*Location*[210]	*Calibre*	*Markings*	*Date of Manufacture*	*Remarks*[211]
2014	Central African Republic	7.62 x 39mm	3 39 09	2009	Seized from Séléka elements and anti-Balakas militias since the beginning of the Sangaris military operation in December 2013.
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 10	2010	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 011	2011	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 12	2012	
		7.62 x 39mm	2 39 012	2012	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 13	2013	
		7.62 x 54mm Rimmed	1 54 09	2009	
2011	Côte d'Ivoire	7.62 x 39mm	2 39 09	2009	In ex-President Gbagbo forces' possession
		7.62 x 39mm	3 39 09	2009	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 10	2010	
2012	Côte d'Ivoire	7.62 x 39mm	2 39 09	2009	Some packed in unpainted wooden crates labelled with a white paper sticker identifying the lot number and year of production. Each crate contains 15 heat-sealed, black polyethylene bags. [212]
		7.62 x 39mm	3 39 09	2009	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 10	2010	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 011	2011	
		7.62 x 54mm Rimmed	1 54 011	2011	
2013	Côte d'Ivoire	7.62 x 39mm	1 39 011	2011	In ex-President Gbagbo forces' possession

[209] Sources include; 1) *UNOCI Profile*. UNOCI. 2013; 2) *Ammunition profile of non-state actors, Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo*. UNOCI. 12 January 2014; 3) *Small arms and machine gun ammunition profile. Central African Republic*. Libya Panel of Experts. January 2014; 4) *Conflict Armament Research Spotlight on South Sudan*. www.conflictarm.com/spotlight.html. Accessed 10 May 2014; 5) UN S/2014/106. Libya Panel of Experts (2095/2013) Report (19 February 2014); 6) www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/world/africa/arms-shipments-seen-from-sudan-to-syria-rebels.html?_r=1&. Accessed 10 May 2014; 7) *Following the Headstamp Trail*. N R Jenzen-Jones. Small Arms Survey. April 2014; and 8) *Following the Thread*. HSBA Working Paper 32. J Leff and E LeBrun. Small Arms Survey. May 2014

[210] The Table is referenced alphabetically by country, then by date and finally by date of manufacture.

[211] This column is included for Panels' analysis purposes or for reader information.

[212] Each bag contains 100 loose cartridges. The polyethylene bags are notable because no other producing country is currently known to use such packaging.

Year	Location[210]	Calibre	Markings	Date of Manufacture	Remarks[211]
2013	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	7.62 x 39mm	1 39 07	2007	In M23 possession
		7.62 x 39mm	2 39 07	2007	In ex-combatants' possession
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 08	2008	In M23 possession
		7.62 x 39mm	2 39 08	2008	In ex-combatants' possession
		7.62 x 54mm Rimmed	2 54 07	2007	In M23 possession
		7.62 x 54mm Rimmed	4 54 07	2007	In M23 possession
2012	Libya	7.62 x 39mm	2 39 011	2011	
2013	Libya	7.62 x 39mm	2 39 011	2011	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 12	2012	
2013	Somalia	7.62 x 39mm	3 39 09	2009	For sale with Mogadishu arms dealer at USD 0.90 per round
		7.62 x 39mm	- 39 09		
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 10	2010	
2013	South Sudan	7.62 x 39mm	1 39 10	2010	
		7.62 x 39mm	- 39 11	2011	
		7.62 x 54mm Rimmed	2 51 08	2008	
		7.62 x 54mm Rimmed	3 54 11	2011	
2013	Syria	7.62 x 39mm	- 39 09	2009	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 10	2010	
		7.62 x 39mm	2 39 011	2011	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 012	2012	
		7.62 x 39mm	1 39 12	2012	

Annex XI
Summary of reported[213] air attacks in Darfur (1 January – 31 October 2014) [214] [215]

Date	Location	Sector	Attack Type				Aircraft Type				Ordnance Type	Target	Casualties	
			A/C Bomb[216]	AGM[217]	IM[218]	NK[219]	Mi-24	Su-25	Antonov	NK			Fatal	Injured
01 Jan	Burgo area	Central							X				2	0
26 Jan	Dumay area	South								X				
26 Jan	Konjara area	East								X			2	0
27 Jan	Uraydimah area	East								X				
29 Jan	Dukur Nazal area	East								X				
30 Jan	Tabaldiya	East			4				1					
30 Jan	Geinak	East			3				1					
04 Feb	Graida	South								X				
19 Feb	Um Gunya	South								X				
28 Feb	Shawa	East								X				
02 Mar	El Eid Jaralnabi	North								X				
06 Mar	Al Lait	North								X			3	7
07 Mar	Sayah	North								X				
07 Mar	Karoya Laban	North								X			2	7
13 Mar	Karoya Laban	North								X			NK	NK

[213] These are incidents reported from a range of sources, cross-referenced against UNAMID reporting to establish veracity. The data do not necessarily include unreported incidents of armed violence, but do indicate the magnitude of the issue.
[214] P, perpetrator; X, target; NK, not known; TBC, to be confirmed.
[215] The dashed lines on this, and all subsequent, tables indicate the commencement of the mandate period or end of reporting quarters.
[216] Aircraft Bomb. (e.g. FAB 500).
[217] Air to Ground Missile or Rocket. (e.g. S-8).
[218] Improvised Munition.
[219] Not Known.

Date	Location	Sector	Attack Type				Aircraft Type				Ordnance Type	Target	Casualties	
			A/C Bomb[216]	AGM[217]	IM[218]	NK[219]	Mi-24	Su-25	Antonov	NK			Fatal	Injured
14 Mar	Mellit	North								X			1	NK
15 Mar	Niteaga	South								X			0	4
16 Mar	Niteaga	South			75								0	7
16 Mar	Karoya Laban	North								X			NK	NK
19 Mar	Uzban	East								X			3	7
29 Mar	Rahad Negagia	North								X			NK	NK
01 Apr	Samara	North								X			0	0
06 Apr	Amarei	North			8			X					NK	NK
07 Apr	Um Baru	North								X			1	4
07 Apr	Lill	North								X			1	8
08 Apr	Kunjara Tarny	North								X			1	2
26 Apr	Orschi	North		5+	8			X	X				3	0
28 Apr	Tabit	North								X			1	3
29 Apr	Ruh Fatah	East			3				X				1	1
14 May	Fanga	East											3	NK
16 May	Kaguru	East			3				X				NK	NK
05 Jul	Um Rai	North							X				5	NK
07 Jul	Anka	North						X	X				0	0
07 Jul	Birdik	North						X	X				0	0
24 Jul	El Dawai	North							X				0	0
01 Aug	Dolma	North				18			X				2	0
23 Aug	Goz Doz	North							X				1	0
04 Sep	Kaja	North				X				X			1	0
17 Sep	Daba	North				24			X				4	0
22 Sep	Torbua and Dibba Naira	North				X			X				0	0

Date	Location	Sector	Attack Type				Aircraft Type				Ordnance Type	Target	Casualties	
			A/C Bomb[216]	AGM[217]	IM[218]	NK[219]	Mi-24	Su-25	Antonov	NK			Fatal	Injured
23 Sep	Landa	North				X			X				0	0
27 Sep	Mashrou Abu Zeid	North				X			X				0	0
04 Oct	Khor Mali	North				X				X			0	0
17 Oct	Burgo	North				12				X			2	0
19 Oct	Um Baru / Abelhu	North			6	15			X				1	0
21 Oct	Anka	North				X			X				0	0
22 Oct	El Aradeb El Ashara	North				8			X				0	0
27 Oct	Wadi Murra	North				4			X				1	0
29 Oct	Khor Mali	North				NK				X			1	NK

Annex XII
Summary of SAirF military aviation assets (historical and new violations in Darfur) (01 January – 31 October 2014)

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF[220]	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2014	Remarks
A-5 *Fantan*[221]	402	Before 2005		Mar 07	2007 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	403	Before 2005		Mar 07	2007 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	407	Before 2005		2008	2008 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	410	Before 2005		Mar 07	2007 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
	482	Before 2005		2008	2008 Report		▪ Based at Nyala FOB.
Su-25[222]	201	2008		2010	2010 Report		▪ Arrived at El Fasher on 02 Dec 2013.
	202	2008		Not seen			▪ Possibly written off due to an accident.
	203	2008		2009	2009 Report		▪
	204	2008		2009	2009 Report		▪ Almost certainly written-off in 2013; being cannibalized
	205[223]	2008		Dec 11	**2014 Report**	**YES**	▪ Seen in 2011, but never reported. In El Fasher in May 2014.
	206	2008		2009	2009 Report		▪
	207	2008		2010	2010 Report	**YES**	▪ In El Fasher in May, Sep and Oct 2014.

[220] For Su-25. Data from Permanent Mission of Belarus to UN Letter 1082-12 dated 13 August 2010.
[221] Official name: Nanchang Q-5; *Fantan* is a reporting name.
[222] Su-25 Fighter Ground Attack (FGA) Aircraft; Aircraft marked with Tactical Numbers 201 – 214 are of the first generation single seat version; NATO reporting name *Frogfoot-A*. All Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft in service with the Sudanese Air Force are marked with a Tactical Number in the 200-series. The last known TN delivered to Sudan is 217.
[223] Use of bold type indicates aircraft seen by the Panel in 2014.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF[220]	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2014	Remarks
	208	2008		2013	2010 Report	**YES**	▪ *Most likely* misreported as TN 209 by the Panel in 2010; In El Fasher in May, Sep and Oct 2014.
	(209)	-		2010	2010 Report		▪ Not delivered by Member State.
	210	2008		2010	2010 Report	**YES**	▪ In El Fasher in Oct 2014.
	211	2009		2010	2010 Report		▪ El Fasher (May 2013), Nyala (June 2013); Still in Darfur in September 2013.
	212	2009		2010	2010 Report		▪ Certainly written-off in 2011; being cannibalized
	214	2009		Dec 11	2013 Report	**YES**	▪ Almost certainly in El Fasher until May 2014.
Su-25UB[224]	215	2008		2012	2012 Report		▪ Probably based at Wadi Sayyidna
	216	2008		-	-		▪ Probably based at Wadi Sayyidna
	217	2010		-	-		▪ Probably based at Wadi Sayyidna
Mi-17/Mi-171Sh[225]	525			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-17; No further details available.
	527			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ No further details available.

[224] Training version of Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft, able to carry armament; Aircraft marked with Tactical Numbers 215 - 217 are of the first generation dual seat version; NATO reporting name *Frogfoot-B*.

[225] Transport Helicopter of which Attack Helicopter versions exist with 2x2 or 2x3 external hard points and a machine gun attached in the nose; All Mi-17 and Mi-171 types are derivatives of the Mil Mi-8 helicopter; Many versions are around, and SAirF has various types in service; A more recent development includes: a little nose, large loading ramp in the back and enlarged sliding doors on either sides of the fuselage. NATO reporting name is *Hip*, followed by a suffix letter to indicate the exact subversion (like *Hip-A* or *Hip-H*). All Mi-8/Mi-17/Mi-171Sh helicopters in SAirF service are marked with a TN in the 500-series.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF[220]	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2014	Remarks
	528			2007	2007 Report		▪ Mi-171Sh; Two-tone colour scheme (c/s) (light olive/ dark green).
	529			2008	2008 Report		▪ Mi-17V-5.
	533			2007	2007 Report		▪ Mi-17V-5; Two-tone c/s (light olive/ dark green).
	534			2007	2007 Report		▪ Mi-17; Two-tone c/s (khaki/ dark olive); seen without and with external hard points mounted.
	537			2010	2010 Report		▪ Mi-17; No further details available.
	543			**2014**	TBC	**YES**	▪ Mi-171Sh; three tone c/s (sand/dark olive/brown); In Nyala in May 2014.
	544			**2014**	TBC	**YES**	▪ Mi-171Sh; three tone c/s (sand/dark olive/brown); In El Fasher in Sep 2014
	546			2013	TBC	**YES**	▪ Mi-171Sh; three tone c/s (sand/dark olive/brown); In Nyala in May 2014 and in El Fasher in Oct 2014
Mi-24P/Mi-24V[226]	913			2006	2006 Report		▪ Mi-24P; Two-tone c/s (light olive/ dark green).
	916			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ No details available.

[226] Attack Helicopter, which can carry up to 8 troops. More recent versions are designated as 'Mi-25' et 'Mi-35'; The Sudanese Air Force employs two versions: Mi-24P with a fixed double barrel machine gun at the starboard side of the cockpit and the Mi-24V with a flexible four-barrel gun attached under the nose; the Mi-24V in Sudanese service is also designated as 'Mi-35'; NATO reporting name is *Hind*; The Mi-24P is indicated as *Hind-F* and the Mi-24V (Mi-35) as *Hind-E*. All Mi-24 helicopters in SAirF service are marked with a TN in the 900-series; the last known TN delivered is 960.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF[220]	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2014	Remarks
	918			2006	2006 Report		▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	922			2006	2006 Report		▪ Mi-24V; No details available.
	923			Aug 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	925			Aug 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	926			Aug 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24V; No further details available.
	928			2010	2010 Report		▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	929			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	933			2010	2010 Report		▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	937			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	938			2010	2010 Report		▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	939			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24V; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	941			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24P; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	942			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Light olive/ dark green c/s; crashed in April 2011.
	943			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-35; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	945			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-35; Khaki/ dark green c/s.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF[220]	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2014	Remarks
	946			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-35; Khaki/ dark green c/s.
	947			Jul 09	2009 Report		▪ Mi-24P; No details available.
	948			2010	2010 Report		▪ Mi-35; Light olive/ dark green c/s.
	950			2012	2012 Report		▪ Mi-35; Khaki/ dark green c/s.
	951			2012	2012 Report		▪ Mi-24P; Khaki/ dark green c/s.
	952			2012	2012 Report		▪ Mi-35; Khaki/ dark green c/s.
	955			May 13	2013 Report		▪ Mi-35; Khaki/ dark green c/s.
	956			Aug 13	2013 Report		▪ Mi-24P; Khaki/ dark green c/s.
An-26 [227] [228]	7705	NK		Aug 06	2006 Report	-	▪ Marked (UN-)26563. All white colour scheme, no further markings. Also observed in 2007 and 2008 by the Panel.

[227] Transport Aircraft, with the SAirF also in use as Reconnaissance/ Observation Aircraft; NATO reporting name *Curl*; All An-26 and related An-30 and An-32 aircraft in SAirF service are normally marked with a TN in the 7700-series.

[228] The use of these aircraft is only a violation of the arms embargo if used in an offensive aerial bombing role. The Panel is investigating.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF[220]	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2014	Remarks
	7706	Under Investigation		Aug 13	2013 Report	**YES**	▪ Initially 'registered' ST-ZZZ (2) (2006-2007); MSN 10404; White fuselage with red/white/red line along fuselage; In El Fasher in Sep 2014
	7715	Under Investigation		**May 14**	**2014 Report**	**YES**	▪ White fuselage with red/white/red line along fuselage; Seen in Darfur in 2011; in El Fasher in May and Oct 2014.
	7717	Under Investigation		Jul 13	2013 Report		▪ White/grey colour scheme; also in Darfur in 2014 on supply flights.
	7718			Sep 13	2013 Report		▪ All white colour scheme, no nationality markings except TN.
	7719			Sep 13	2013 Report		▪ All white colour scheme, no nationality markings except TN; also in Darfur in 2014 on supply flights.
	7777			2008	2008 Report		▪ All white colour scheme, no markings except TN.
	ST-ZZZ (1)			Aug 06	2006 Report		▪ All white colour scheme, no markings except registration; MSN 10407; Crash-landed at El Fasher on 07 Aug 2006. Hull seen until May 2014, but in Jun or Jul 2014 removed.

Aircraft Type	Tactical Number	Delivered to SAirF[220]	Positively Identified in Khartoum	Positively Identified in Darfur	Panel Violation Reference	Operational in Darfur 2014	Remarks
	ST-ZZZ (2)			2007	2007 Report		▪ All white colour scheme, no markings except registration; MSN 10404; Became 7706 in 2007 or 2008.
	ST-ZZZ (3)		2007		2007 Report		▪ No markings, no further details available.
An-32[229]	**7710/ST-ALM**			**Sep 2014**	TBC	-	▪ Double marked with military TN and civil registration.
	7720			**May 2014**	**2014 Report**	-	▪ Observed by the Panel in 2013 without BDZ-34; Observed in Darfur by the Panel in May 2014 fitted with BDZ-34 external hard-points.[230]
	7721			**May 2014**	TBC	-	▪ White fuselage with blue port engine cowling.

[229] The use of these aircraft is only a violation of the arms embargo if used in an offensive aerial bombing role. The Panel continues its investigation.

[230] Refer to S/2014/87, paragraph 116.

Annex XIII
Examples of toll receipts



Panel Translation Receipt 1

0003409
Name:
Sudan Liberation Army
Headquarters of the Unit
Address: Financial Affairs Office
Received from Mr. ……..
320 Sudanese Pounds
As a support for goods
Finance Manager Signature 9/11
Paid by the brothers to facilitate …. (*Writing illegible*)
Seal of Sudan Liberation Army
SLA Headquarters

Panel Translation Receipt 2

Liberation and Justice Army Movement
Receipt
Date: 17/02/2014
Mr.: ……
Amount: 200 Sudanese Pounds
Type of Taxes: Truck Transit

Signature
Seal
Liberation and Justice Army Movement

Panel Translation Receipt 3

Sudan Liberation Army
Receipt
Date: 07/02/2014
Mr.: ……
Received the Amount: 1250 Sudanese Pounds as a support …. (*writing illegible*)

Signature
Seal
Sudan Liberation Army
Public Finance Secretariat
Secretary General of Economic and Financial Affairs